



**“A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE ELECTORAL  
AND DEMOCRATIZATION PROCESS OF THE GAMBIA’S  
FIRST AND SECOND REPUBLICS (1965-2015)”**

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## **Declaration**

I hereby declare that this Dissertation was carried out by me and fully take charge of errors, omissions and any other mistakes that may be observed herein. However, I submit that all sources of my materials have been duly acknowledged in the in-text and Bibliography.

**Oyejide Felix Omotosho**

.....

**Signed**

## **Certification**

This is to certify that this Dissertation entitled “**Comparative Analysis of the Electoral and Democratization Process in The Gambia’s First and Second Republics (1965-2015)**” by **Oyejide Felix Omotosho** with Matriculation No.10760, was carried out under my supervision and guidance. More so, the Dissertation has been approved for submission to St. Clements University, British West Indies, for the award of Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) in Comparative Politics and Government.

**Professor (Dr.) David Le Cornu**  
**Academic Advisor and Thesis Supervisor**



**St. Clements University**

## **Dedication**

This great research work is dedicated to my late parents; Pa Martin Oyetomiwa Omotosho, a teacher by profession, farmer by occupation and the former Catechist by devotion of St. James' Catholic Church, Okeigbo in Ondo Diocese of Ondo State, Nigeria and Madam Emily Adewola Ajeokun Omotosho, a trader. May their gentle souls rest in perfect peace, amen. E sunre o, eyin obi mi, Pataki julo, mama mi Ajeokun Adewola. We your children loved you so much, but God loves you more than us.

God says, in everything give thanks. We thank Him therefore for your fulfilled lives that you lived and your peaceful transition to eternal glory and rest. To God is the glory for this and His unending mercies upon we your children on this earth since you departed?

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**Oyejide Felix Omotosho**

## **Abstract**

In The Gambia a number of times people and electorates have tried to make a comparison of the country's Electoral and Democratic process by pointing out that either the First Republic was better than the Second Republic or that the Second Republic was better than the First Republic. It has been speculated also that both Republics' Electoral and Democratic process differed and that one was better than the other. These two Republics as speculated have been a major set-back in the development of The Gambia and a critical determinant of national development performances in the small nation and smiling coast, called "The Gambia".

As the country struggles to give Electoral and Democratic process a human face and earn its marks in international community rating, speculations are rife that the electoral and democratic process of the country are highly flawed; thereby given large room for condemnation of a system that has produced ONLY two (2) leaders over a fifty –year period. This has continued to have major adverse effects on the political, economic and social trajectory of the country.

It is in recognition of these speculations that the study attempted to assess empirically the actual Electoral and Democratic process of the First and Second Republics Gambia from 1965- 2015. In order to carry out this assessment study, all-embracing literature review was carried out which formed the background knowledge to the study as well as provided the essential input to the discussion of the findings of this study.

To carry out this research, a total of 100 respondents made up of men and women were drawn from the five geo -political zones in The Gambia; and administered with questionnaires, and their divergent responses collated and analyzed. The data generated from interviews and questionnaires were analyzed using quantitative and qualitative methods framework. Two hypotheses were tested in order to quantitatively analyze the findings from the study. The analysis confirmed all the hypotheses stated as well as the fact that the Electoral and Democratic process of The Gambia has been critical in the country's national development and that The Gambian society is still grappling with highly flawed electoral and democratic process which mitigate national development in some way.



Given this backdrop, data collected was analyzed using a combination of both descriptive and quantitative statistical analysis. Measures of Central Tendency for hypothesis 2 and Pearson's Product-Moment Correlation coefficient ( $r$ ), for Hypothesis 1 and one-way ANOVA, using the SPSS Version 20.5 software integrated with the Microsoft Spread Sheet (MSS). Detailed descriptive analyses of the relevant variables involved and examined in this research work were graphically presented clearly in Chapter 4. The alpha level of 0.05 level of significance was used as the standard for rejecting or retaining hypotheses. The one-way ANOVA with two independent samples from the same population was also applied.

Results revealed that both the First and Second Gambian Republics Electoral and Democratization process were highly flawed. But in terms of performance in overall development infrastructures in The Gambia, the Second Republic under Yahya Jammeh performed appreciably well than the First Republic under Dawda Jawara. Nonetheless, in the first republic was also recorded encouraging human rights performance. The findings of the research also strongly attest to the fact that high illiteracy level in The Gambia retards democracy as most Gambians cannot analyze electoral and democratic trajectory of the country, with intellectual tools and practical surveys due to poor education. However, democracy is on course in The Gambia; as she tries to measure up to international standards. Hope is high for a future expectation for a Gambia's new democracy if improvements are recorded in education and political advancement in the country for a good democratic governance that majority yearn for.

Finally the study was concluded by alluding that, though, The Gambia had passed through unstable electoral and democratic processes that have robbed her of economic and political development over fifty years, 1965- 2015, a period within which other Third World countries like Singapore and Brazil grew tremendously to advanced economies and political systems. Electoral and democratic process in The Gambia should be seen as one of those challenges of development process and should brace up to overcome its noticeable shortcomings. This study therefore suggested that the country's electoral and democratic process should be overhauled to reflect standard practice, the electorates should be more empowered and act of governance should be improved upon, as well as improve human rights records of the country. Equally, government institutions should be transparent and accountable to the people, while the people hold their leaders accountable at all times for their stewardships, lest, efforts of human change may become a mirage. Above all, investment in the people is an

investment in human capital development which is an absolute necessity for The Gambia's economic and political development drives, among other recommendations.

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## **LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS**

APRC –	Alliance for Patriotic Re-orientation and Construction
AU –	African Union
BATC –	Bathurst Town Council
BUDC –	Bathurst Urban District Council
DP –	The Democratic Party
ECOMIL –	ECOWAS Military
ECOMOG –	ECOWAS Monitoring Group
ECOWAS –	Economic Community of West African States
GG –	The Gambia Government
GGC –	Gambia Groundnut Corporation
GPP –	Gambia People’s Party
IAEA –	International Atomic Energy Agency
IEC –	Independent Electoral Commission, The Gambia
MC –	The Mushin Congress
NADD –	National Alliance for Development and Democracy
NCP –	National Convention Party
NEPAD –	New Partnership for Africa’s Development
NIA –	National Intelligence Agency
NRP –	National Reconciliation Party
PDOIS –	Peoples Democratic Organization for Independence and Socialism
PPP –	The People’s Progressive Party
RPA –	Rate Payers’ Association
UDP –	United Democratic Party
UN –	United Nations
UP –	The United Party
WAMZ –	West African Monetary Zone

## **Chapter One**

### **1:0: Introduction**

#### **1: 1 General Background and Conceptual Framework**

*"Choose for each of your tribes, individuals who are wise, discerning and reputable to be your leaders" (Deuteronomy 1:13)*

The Gambia's First Republic was better than the Second Republic comparing their electoral and democratization processes. No, the Second Republic Gambia was better, given the fact that it carried everybody along in the electoral and democratization process; having established the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) in the country. More than four decades after The Gambia's independence, the contributions of the Gambia's First and Second Republics towards democratization has not been put to empirical research and critical appraisal. With The Gambia still only tottering on its feet for survival, some people argue that the problem is due to the democratization leadership styles of the two different regimes under Sir Dawda K. Jawara (1965- 1994) and Alhaji Yahya A.J.J. Jammeh (1994- to present). Hence, this research is aimed at making a comparative empirical analysis and appraisal of the two Gambian Republics.

Elections and democratization process in The Gambia continue to elicit more than casual interest by scholars and researchers due to the fact that despite the appreciation that only credible election can consolidate and sustain the country's fragile democracy, over the years, The Gambia continues to witness with growing disappointments and apprehension inability to conduct peaceful, free and fair, open elections whose results are widely accepted and respected across the country and by the international community (Igbuzor, 2010; Osumah & Aghemelo, 2010, Ekweremadu , 2011). All the elections that have ever been conducted in The Gambia since independence have generated increasingly bitter controversies and grievances on a national scale because of the twin problems of voters' registration, irregularities and fraud that have become central elements of the history of elections and of the electoral process in the country (Gberie, 2011). Despite the marked improvement in the conduct of the 2011 elections, the process was not free from malpractices and violence (Bekoe, 2011; Gberie, 2011; National Democratic Institute, 2012).

Thus over the years, electoral processes in the history of The Gambia 's democratic governance have continued to be marred by extraordinary displays of rigging, dodgy, “do or die” affair, ballot snatching at gun points, violence and acrimony, thuggery, boycotts, threats and criminal manipulations of voters' lists, brazen falsification of election results, the use of security agencies against political opponents as well as the use of the state apparatuses, especially the military and the para-military forces for campaigns and intimidations of the opposition parties by the ruling oligarchy and the intimidation of voters and other members of the polity. (Rawlence and Albin-Lackey, 2007; Nnadozie, 2007; Adigbuo, 2008, Onike, 2010 Omotola, 2010, Bekoe, 2011). In fact, elections remain one of the leading notable sources of conflict which often result to confrontations that continue to threaten the political stability and peace of the nation (Gueye & Hounkpe, 2010; Idowu, 2010). Scholars have attributed this problem of election credibility in The Gambia to the weak institutionalizations of the agencies of electoral administration, particularly the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC), the political parties and security agencies in the country, arguing that elections can only engender the consolidation of democracy in the country if the electoral processes are reformed in ways that fundamentally address the autonomy and capability of IEC to discharge its responsibilities effectively (Obi, 2008) and the security agencies high degree of neutrality and non-politicization, alertness, and commitment to maintaining law and order in the electoral process (Adigbuo, 2008; Omotola, 2010; Idowu, 2010). Observations reveal that the mode of involving Security Forces and how they carry out their duties while participating in the electoral process in The Gambia are part of the sources of violence and insecurity during elections (Gueye & Hounkpe, 2010). Unfortunately, there is however no informed emphasis on the central role played by the security agency during elections in the country (Idowu, 2010).

Elections are central to competitive politics. They are central because, ideally, they should provide the opportunity for yesterday's winners to become today's losers and for yesterday's losers to become today's winners. The model of democracy on which this theory of election is based is liberal democracy. The centrality of elections to be liberal democratic politics also presupposes the importance particularly of impartial electoral administration. This is because the indeterminacy of elections- the possibility of erstwhile winners becoming losers and erstwhile losers becoming winners, which is an inherent and necessary prerequisite of liberal democratic politics is to a large extent a function of an impartial administration of elections.

Electoral administration is the organization and conduct of elections to elective public (political) office by an electoral body. By process, it means the rules, procedures and all activities relating to, among others, the establishment of electoral bodies, the appointment of their members, the registration of voters, the nomination of candidates, balloting, counting of the ballots, the declaration of results, the selection and training of electoral officers, constituency delimitation, voters education and in some cases, registration of political parties and supervision of party nomination congresses.

Existing literature tends to be based on the reports of election monitoring groups and not on analytical studies (Kohnert, 2004; Obi, 2008). Few of the existing analyses on the subject deal essentially with the mutually reinforcing questions of political violence and electoral fraud and only touch upon the security agencies tangentially. Outside the developed democracies, and recently from the Latin American and post-communist European experiences, very little is known about the role of security agencies in achieving credible election. This knowledge gap is most acute in The Gambia and Africa in general. Against this backdrop, this research seeks to empirically investigate the relationships between the role of the two Gambian Republics and the quest for credible elections in the country. The questions that this study seeks to answer therefore include the following; what has been the role of the two Gambian Republics in the electoral politics? How have they been carrying out their functions of ensuring smooth, free and fair elections over these periods, *visa viz* in terms of voters, candidates and election materials during elections and how can they be positioned for better electoral and democratization process needed for the desired credible, meaningful and of course objective elections in the country's democratic government?

That election is at the heart of democracy and democratization process has become widely acknowledged. Election performs indispensable roles and thereby remains central to the whole essence of democratic process. However, experience has shown that democratic process in Africa and the developing states in general collapses on the altar of mismanaged and abused elections and electoral processes. Such failure can be easily traced to the doorstep of the institution saddled with the responsibility of managing the electoral process. This is because of the direct linkages that exist between electoral process and the managing institution. Indeed, it has been widely asserted that more than anything, the quality and credibility of elections depend greatly on the extent of competency and viability of the



electoral institutions. No state shows better the strong relationship between elections and managing agency than The Gambia.

Looking back at the Nation's history, it is glaring that past efforts at democratization collapsed due to the failure of electoral commissions to conduct credible elections. It is however, sad that elections managers in The Gambia have failed to learn from history. The problem faced by past commissions, continues to beset present electoral institution, while past shortcomings continue to manifest in the present. That past history that is being re-enacted was vividly shown by the way the Independent Electoral Commission fumbled in the 2001 general elections. This paper argues that rather than learn from past mistakes, IEC is preparing to fail again in the coming elections. The writings on the wall are numerous, but paramount among these is IEC's inability to prepare a comprehensive, up to date and credible voters' register lists. Though the commission argued that it is frantically doing all that is best and necessary for peaceful elections in subsequent times, the position of this paper will be that IEC's efforts as at now are grossly inadequate as they are manipulated by the powers that be or the political oligopoly/oligarchy and the ruling party.

The definition of democracy has continued to defy all attempted propositions of common understanding. In Idike (2013), conceptual issues in democracy have also been highlighted as follows: democracy is a political system in which the people in a country rule through any form of government they choose to establish. In modern democracies, supreme authority is exercised for, the most part, by representatives elected by popular suffrage (Osakwe, 2011:1). Hence, democracy is 'rule by the people'. Democracy is not for instance, rule by the elite, even when representatives elected by popular suffrage have formed part of the political elite. Democracy is not essentially rule by elected representatives. Democracy is rather essentially rule by the representatives of the people. Central to the concept and practice of democracy therefore, are the wishes and the will of the people. Thus, democracy in the people's reckoning means improvement in their circumstances (Abati, 2006:2). Whenever therefore, an attempt is made to re-conceptualize democracy, the effort ends up reaffirming that people are central to the democratic concept and practices. Awotokun (2004:131) for instance has contended as follows: By democracy, I do not mean something as vague as 'the rule of the people' or 'the rule of the majority'; but a set of institutions (among them especially general elections, i.e., the right of the people to dismiss their government) which permits public control of rulers and their dismissal by the ruled, and which makes it possible for the ruled to

obtain reforms without using violence, even against the will of the rulers (Awotokun, 2004:131). However, besides the express mentioning of 'the right of the people' in this contention; that is 'the ruled', upon which emphasis is placed in the re-conceptualization, also refers to 'the people'. Democracy is therefore, essentially people –centered and people-oriented governance process, which holds country by country where that is obtained (Idike, 2013).

Democracy is popularly defined as a form of government in which all eligible citizens participate equally – either directly or, through elected representatives, indirectly – in the proposal, development and establishment of the laws by which their society is run. The term originates from the Greek, which means "rule of the people", which was found from "people" and "power" or "rule" in the 5th century BCE to denote the political systems then existing in Greek city-states, notably Athens; the term is an antonym to "rule of an elite". While theoretically these definitions are in opposition, in practice the distinction has been blurred historically (Wilson 2006). The political system of Classical Athens, for example, granted democratic citizenship to an elite class of free men and excluded slaves and women from political participation. In virtually all democratic governments throughout ancient and modern history, democratic citizenship consisted of an elite class until full enfranchisement was won for all adult citizens in most modern democracies through the suffrage movements of the 19th and 20th centuries.

Democracy contrasts with forms of government where power is either held by an individual, as in an absolute monarchy, or where power is held by a small number of individuals, as in an oligarchy. Nevertheless, these oppositions, inherited from Greek philosophy, are now ambiguous because contemporary governments have mixed democratic, oligarchic, and monarchic elements. Karl Popper defined democracy in contrast to dictatorship or tyranny, thus focusing on opportunities for the people to control their leaders and to oust them without the need for a revolution.

Several variants of democracy exist, such as republic democracy, constitutional, socialist, anarchist, denarchy, inclusion, participatory politics, liberal democracy etc, but there are two basic forms, both of which concern how the whole body of all eligible citizens executes its will. One form of democracy is direct democracy, in which all eligible citizens have direct and active participation in the political decision- making. In most modern democracies, the whole body of eligible citizens remains the sovereign power but political power is exercised

indirectly through elected representatives; this is called a representative democracy or democratic republic.

‘Democracy’ is the collective term for a wide variety of regimes. These include radical democracies and moderate ones (Aristotle 1948 [322BC]), representative and direct democracy, parliamentary versus presidential government, majoritarian and consensus democracy, and established democracies as opposed to partial democracies, to mention only a few examples (Loewenstein 1935, 1975; Lijphart 1999; von Beyme 1997; Merkel 1999). The trademark of democratic regimes is ‘government of the people, by the people’ (or elected representatives of the people) ‘and for the people’, to quote Abraham Lincoln’s famous definition of popular government. But the degree to which that trademark is reflected in practice varies from one democracy to the other and from one regime to another. And so, too, does the extent to which popular government is complemented by free speech, a free press, an independent judiciary and the impartial enforcement of the rule of law. This is suggested by indicators of the political performance of democracies regardless of whether they are based upon yardsticks of ‘political productivity’ (Almond & Powell 1996: 144–145), measures of the political process, policy outputs and policy outcomes (Lijphart 1999) or socio-economic outcome indicators (Roller 2001). For example, some democratic regimes pride themselves in the reduced role they give to the state, the larger role for the private sector and the higher degree of economic freedom they reserve for the individual, such as most English-speaking nation-states. In contrast to this, other democracies produce big government and collective care from cradle to grave, such as the constitutional democracies in Northern Europe, Benelux, France and Germany.

It is uncontroversial to argue that performance levels vary from one democratic country to the other. More controversial is the nature of the relationship between levels of political performance and types of democracy (Lijphart 1999; Armingeon in 2002a [in press], 2002b [in press]). However, comparative studies on democracies conducted over the last two or three decades have shed more light on the relationship between performance profiles and types of democracy. Particularly helpful have been investigations of the strengths and weaknesses of different types of democracies (see, e.g., Lipset 1995; Keman 1997, 2001; Schmidt 1999, 2000: 307–388, 489–538; Roller 2001). It is chiefly on these conceptual frameworks that this thesis is based.

Laski (2008:17) additionally posits that the democratic form of government is doubtless, a final form of political organization, in the sense that men who have once tasted power will not without conflict, want to surrender it. The issue of whom the power would have been surrendered to, however remains outstanding. In all, the contention of Laski (2008:17) refers to the primacy of the people in the democratic concept. In all societies of the world today, argues Ogundiya (2010:204), the issue is not; which political system is appropriate but rather when will society become democratized or fully democratic? According to Owolabi (2003) cited in Ogundiya (2010:204), the democratization project is therefore, regarded as the age of civilization, that every society should strive to attain, rather than a political option among many others. Ogundiya (2010:204) further posits that democracy has thus been recognized as the only moral and legitimate way, through which a society can be administered (Idike, 2013). In the meantime, democracy in this research stands for a system of government by freely and fairly elected representatives of the people conducted, regulated and monitored by established electoral institutions in the state.

Accordingly, the primary purpose of government by the representatives is the welfare of the citizens. The primary concerns of this study therefore cover an enquiry into how the electoral and democratization process contribute to the enthronement of democracy or how such development negates the outcome of the democratic project in a polity. How does the electoral process promote or impede the evolution of strong democratic culture? Electoral process, according to Elekwa (2008:30), is the electioneering process (electoral process) which relates to the entire cycle ranging from the provision of voter education to the dissolution of the National Assembly. Furthermore, IEC (2006), in Elekwa (2008:30), deposes that the different phases of the electoral process include the following:

- (i) Delimitation of electoral boundaries
- (ii) Registration of voters
- (iii) Notice of elections
- (iv) Nomination of candidates
- (v) Election campaigns
- (vi) Elections, announcement of results and completion of Tribunal Sitzings

- (vii) Participation of other organizations, such as the interest groups, civil society groups and other democracy institutions
- (viii) Resolution of electoral conflicts resulting from the participation of other Organizations, people, groups, among others.

The electoral process is therefore a complex process that encompasses the good intentions and undesirable outcomes of election administration, particularly in emerging and nascent democracies where general elections are often marred by culturally hued electoral malpractices. In the Gambia's case, the truth remains that the electoral process is immensely characterized by a culture of electoral malpractices. Electoral malpractices refer to illegalities committed by government officials responsible for the conduct of elections, political parties, groups or individuals with sinister intentions to influence an election in favor of a candidate or candidates or a political party (Ezeani, 2004:145). Intense electoral malpractices often lead to electoral violence which in every polity must be considered undesirable if not ruthless. How would electronic voting (e-voting) countervail the periling incidence of electoral malpractice, in the electoral process of The Gambia? For purposes of proper delimitation of the scope of this study, one highlights that in conceptual and empirical terms, an electoral process is distinct from an electoral system.

Reynolds, et al (2005:5) describes an electoral system as follows: At the most basic level, electoral systems translate the votes cast in a general election into seats won by parties and candidates. The key variables are the electoral formula used (i.e. whether a plurality/majority, proportional, mixed or other systems used, and what mathematical formula is used to calculate the seat allocation), the ballot structure (i.e. whether the voter votes for a candidate or a party and whether the voter makes a single choice or expresses a series of preferences) and the district magnitude (not how many voters live in a district, but how many representatives to the legislature that the district elects). In the opinion of this study, the electoral process commences with the announcement of intention to conduct elections, till the elections have been won and invariably lost.

Voting is at the center of the electoral process in a democratic system of government. It is indeed, the first in the democratic process. The journey to democratic governance not only starts with the voting process but its consolidation is determined by it (Ujo, 2008:62). The goal of any voting system is to establish the intent of the voter and transfer that intent to the

vote counter. The efficiency of the voting method and the accuracy of the vote counter are the crucial determinants of the ability and capacity of the system to correctly determine the wish of the voters (Iwu, 2008:1). The ability and capacity of the system to correctly determine the intent of the voter it appears, is the superior technology, inherent in the e-voting methodology.

Elections and Democratization processes have become veritable instruments of measuring good governance and primary means of achieving popular goals. While some models of democracy may accommodate selective indigenous elements to achieve political aims and objectives, other models may use a popular segment of the society to achieve political goals. The Western model of democracy which is rooted in such concepts as political equality, popular representation and control of public decisions by the general will appears to be in conflict with traditional models of democracy. Democracy and its attendant electoral processes; however therefore appears to mean several things to many people.

On the centrality of elections and electoral institutions, Liberal democracy has undoubtedly become the most acceptable form of political system the world over. Central to the whole idea of democracy and democratization is the issue of elections. As Diamond (2002: 353) asserted, elections are the litmus test of a democratic political system. It is a crucial instrument of recruiting leaders by the electorate in a democratic system. Krouse (1982: 529), has argued that voting remains the principal form of political activity in representative democracy. By implication, elections can thus be seen as the most important mechanism by which elected official are held accountable to the electorate (Obi and Abutudu 1999: 285; Momoh and Adejumobi 1999: 143). While election does not automatically guarantee the consolidation and sustenance of the democratic process, because, as it is thus subject to manipulation by groups and individuals directly or indirectly, it yet remains a central element in the process of democratization, primarily, also because it cannot be divulged from democracy itself that calls for it for purpose of representation. Though elections and democracy are not synonymous, elections however, remain a fundamental pillar not only for installing democratic government, but also as a necessary requisite for broader democratic consolidation. The regularity, openness and acceptability of elections, according to Bratton (1998: 52), signal whether basic constitutional, behavioral and attitudinal foundations necessary for democratic sustainability are being laid or not. Nothing emphasizes the centrality of elections to democratization than the fact that there can be elections without

democracy, whereas there can never be democracy without elections. While it has been noted (Yaqub, 2006: 9), that the importance of elections differs across States of the world and indeed from one election/democracy to another, elections are always held under known stipulated regulations. Such regulations guiding the conduct of elections most often clarify issues of eligibility, legal inhibition and the conditions that must be put in place for an election to be adjudged free and fair. Of all institutional conditionalities necessary for a credible electoral process three appear more prominent. These according to Edigheji (2006: 103) are: an independent judiciary, an independent, competent, credible and non-partisan electoral body and a developed system of political parties or party politics, believed to be free from class/elitist manipulations.

While a developed system of political parties or party politics are a necessary instrument for competitive elections and an independent judiciary essential for the resolution of electoral disputes, an independent, competent and non-partisan electoral commission, being the body that is constitutionally charged with the duties of conducting credible elections is of greater importance to the whole electoral process. This is due to the fact that the quality and credibility of elections are directly related to the competency of the organizing institution. Electoral body must not only be independent, transparent and credible in the conduct of its activities and impartial, but must also be seen and trusted to be so by all actors believed to be involved in the electoral process (SSAN 2003: 1). Aside from these, it must be competent enough as to discharging its constitutionally assigned duties with minimal or no institutional, structural and financial hindrances. Without a vibrant, competent and strong electoral institution, the conduct of elections would be seriously flawed and jeopardized and the whole democratization process thrown into disrepute and total nonsense and ridicule.

One of the most significant developments in recent history is the increased use of democratic electoral processes. The United Nations' "Millennium Declaration" commits the nations of the world "to promote democracy and strengthen the rule of law, as well as respect for all internationally recognized human rights and fundamental freedoms". In it, world leaders commit "to work collectively for more inclusive political processes, allowing genuine participation by all citizens". Upon the occasion of the 60<sup>th</sup> Anniversary of the UN "Universal Declaration of Human Rights", adopted on 10th December 1948, it is important to recall this text in light of recent electoral processes in Kenya, Georgia, the Ukraine and Pakistan; and in

anticipation of elections in Zimbabwe, Angola, Russia, Armenia, Italy, the United States and Fiji.

A critical look at electoral processes as a part of democratic governance is needed in order to safeguard a just, participatory and moral framework for the exercise of power in democratic systems. Though, democracy has led to a greater degree of liberty and participation for individuals in their political systems, in some cases it has been misused in such a way that it has negated the rule of law, exacerbated corruption, and offered a political legitimization for the abuse of human rights. In addition, there is a growing tendency for certain economic, bureaucratic and media elites to exercise significant power without sufficient accountability to democratically elected authorities. It is the responsibility of the church and perhaps other religious and ethical and/or reformist bodies to call attention to these abuses of power. To an extent in some developing states or growing democracies like the Federal Republic of Nigeria, Ghana, Kenya and South Africa, these institutions, most especially, the church are active in this area.

In democratic systems, elections serve as a way for people to confer legitimacy on a participatory democratic political system for a political order. In order to ensure that an election truly reflects the will of the people, attention is presumed to be paid to pre- and post-electoral mechanisms. Electoral monitoring on election days does not suffice. A number of recent situations reveal that serious compromises to electoral outcomes can occur, both during the preparation period preceding the elections and after the elections (for example, in cases where there is a dispute over the result and a recount). In addition, dubious election laws, limitations to the full participation of minority and economically disadvantaged candidates and parties, manipulation of voter registration processes and voting machines, biased media coverage of candidates, and manipulation on the part of opposition parties can affect outcomes. Effective monitoring of electoral processes should seek to analyze these factors, and to address any perceived manipulations in order to ensure the legitimacy of democratically elected governments.

In spite of these safeguards, it must be acknowledged that a democratically elected government does not guarantee the fulfillment of citizens' aspirations. This is because an elected or representative government may thus not be a responsible one. An elected/representative government becomes responsible when such government has attained the status of the necessary variants/components of good governance, mainly, process, content



and deliverables, all of which address; accountability, responsibility, equity, equal level playing ground, rule of law, respect for human rights and delivery of dividends/returns of democracy-basically the welfares of the people. Democracy cannot flourish in a context of fear, nor in a situation lacking the institutions necessary for sustaining a democratically elected government. Effective public institutions, including an independent judiciary, an impartial Police Force, an accountable and people-oriented legislature, a responsible and effective as well as highly professional and neutral public/civil service, and a process for democratic evaluation and reform are necessary. The obligations of the international community are not limited to electoral monitoring, but rather to the encouragement of all the necessary frameworks for the establishment of a truly participatory democracy.

Democratic assessments offer an important tool for the identification of democratic deficits. They can also provide valuable information, which can enable civil society to engage in public debate about the objectives of democratization and the needed reforms in any democratic system. Such assessments can help to establish and sustain accountable, effective and participatory democratic governments, which minimize potential abuses of power. In addition, it must be acknowledged that - as in every political system - poverty and exclusion pose a major threat to full participation in the political life of a community, and to the proper functioning of society. In The Gambia, extreme poverty, destitution and total neglect or exclusion have always been the banes of participatory democracy, presumed to be all-inclusive and popular-deciding.

In all regions of the world we have seen evidence of the abuse of power, electoral irregularities, and examples of corruption, intimidation and electoral fraud. We believe that, in situations where people and societies have established democratic systems, that their governments should be based on the collaboration and participation of all citizens - regardless of race, ethnic background, economic status, different abilities, gender or religion.

Today we are witnessing an upsurge in the popularity of democracy as the “primary vehicle for the fulfillment of individual aspirations, the articulation of interests and the nurturing of civil society.” Myriad political systems and cultures adhere to the fundamental values of respect for human dignity, justice, equity, participation and accountability that underpin human rights, democracy and good governance. Even as democracy proliferates, however, its

nature and models diversify. This is especially true for developing and newly democratic countries in which variables such as cultural and political differences, economic and social development, history of democratic governance, and globalization impact on the way in which (and pace at which) democracy evolves.

As a concept and a system of government, democracy is quite old. Robert Dahl asserts that a certain rudimentary democracy most likely existed in pre-historic hunter-gatherer societies where the three criteria of group identity, little outside interference and assumption of equality prevailed. Once human beings began to settle in large groups, however, a certain degree of hierarchy crept into their governance. According to Dahl, democracy did not re-emerge forcefully until approximately 500 BC, when the Greeks and Romans established systems of government based on popular participation.

The Greek system of governance was more or less directly democratic in the sense of having few intermediary structures between the “people” (with the notable exceptions of women, slaves and others) and their government. The Roman system, on the other hand, employed a system of representative government known as the republic (but also omitting women, slaves and others). After the decline and fall of the Greek and Roman systems, democracy itself went into a long decline and did not re-emerge until early in the 12<sup>th</sup> century in the city states of northern Italy. Some scholars also assert that the early practices of democracy may be traced back not only to the ancient Athenians and Romans but also to the Phoenicians and the Egyptians. As Adel Safety writes, “the European thinkers of the Enlightenment were not the only, indeed not the first, source of the values that came to be associated with democratic governance. Long before Rousseau and Locke, Arab social philosopher, Alfarabi spoke of liberty and equality and of rule of law on the basis of the consent of the governed.”

What is notable about these early experiments in democracy is their difference both from one another and from our modern conceptions of representative democracy. They all placed conditions on who could participate in the process and the institutions of democracy were incomplete, unsustainable or rudimentary in terms of representation. The foundations for democracy as we know it today can be more readily discerned in the evolving political institutions and revolutions of 18<sup>th</sup> century Europe and North America.

Representative national and local institutions—such as the British House of Commons or local councils in Scandinavia—and people-driven revolutions in North America and France

advanced the ideas of equality, inalienable rights and government by consent of the governed. Out of these foundations come the institutions and processes most readily identifiable with modern representative democracy—namely, elections, political parties, separation of powers, representative bodies, etc. The three main systems of democracy to have emerged from Western Europe during this period are the presidential, parliamentary and mixed models of government.

Parliamentary systems, (also referred to as the “Westminster” system for the British version), features a parliament—sometimes unicameral and sometimes bicameral—from which a Prime Minister is chosen. The Prime Minister is the head of state. The presidential model, the most well-known example of which is the United States system, features a strong, popularly elected president as the head of state and a unicameral or bicameral legislature that acts as his or her counterweight. The mixed system, of which France is an example, features a strong, popularly elected president who chooses a premier in consultation with (and sometimes at the demand of) the unicameral or bicameral legislature. Each of these models rests firmly on a foundation of party politics. Recently, however, some developing countries have begun to experiment with party-less politics. In Uganda, for example, political parties were initially banned but civil society organizations were allowed to exist and lobby parliament. Today, for the first time in history, there are more democratic states than non-democratic states. Indeed, some view the rise of democracy as perhaps the most important event to have transpired in the 20<sup>th</sup> century, pervading continents and diverse societies including the communist federations of Russia, China and the Far East. In the 21<sup>st</sup> century, the system (democracy), has become the most popular form of government so much that there is hardly any leader who does not wish to be seen as a ‘Democrat’ or a regime that does seek to be described as ‘Democratic’, even though, such a regime is dictatorially depicted and irresponsibly administered. The term/concept has not only become a household name, but has found an appeal among the ordinary people (Omotosho, O.F, 2014:1-6, Enemuo, C.F, 2005:141, cited in Anifowoshe, R. et, al 2005).

## **1:2 The History of Elections, Democracy and Party Politics in The Gambia**

The history of elections, democracy and party politics in The Gambia is traceable to the Rate Payers' Association (RPA) which was designed to serve as a liaison between the people of the colony and the Colonial Government and to provide a pool of interested men to stand election for the Bathurst Urban District Council (BUDC) established in 1930. The BUDC was

reconstituted as the Bathurst Advisory Town Council (BATC) in 1935. In the first BATC election in 1936, the RPA won all six seats open to Africans. This marked the beginning of the RPA's dominance of Bathurst politics.

Even though the RPA became the leading political organization in Bathurst in the mid 1930's, its influence, even over municipal affairs, was limited. This was mainly because the BATC had a purely advisory role. Despite limited functions, however, the BATC served as the training ground for the Gambia's first political leaders. The council gained one important achievement when it secured Small's appointment to the legislative council in January 1942.

Edward Small went on to represent the Municipal Council in the Legislative Council between 1942 and 1947. When the elective principle was first introduced for the Legislative Council in 1947, Small became the first Gambian to win a popular vote. Sponsored by his Labour Union, Small defeated Sheikh Omar Faye and I.M. Garba Jahumpa and became the elected representative for Banjul and the Kombo area in the Legislative Council.

Edward Francis Small will be remembered as the founder of the Gambia branch of the National Congress of British West Africa, the first Gambian to be directly elected to the Legislative Council and the first to be appointed to the Executive Council. He was also the driving force behind the Bathurst Rate Payers' Association which dominated the politics of Bathurst in the 1930's [observer.gm/africa/gambia/article/2008/2/15/the-road-to-independence](http://observer.gm/africa/gambia/article/2008/2/15/the-road-to-independence), (Omotosho, O. F, 2014, Hughes, A and Perfect, D. 2006)

### **1:2.1 Political Parties In The Gambia**

Political parties, in the formal sense came into being in the Gambia only after the Second World War. The first political parties in The Gambia came into being to meet specific challenges created by the colonial government's decisions for the Gambia to follow the political advances made in the other British colonies of West Africa. Before 1960 none of the Gambian political groups attempted to force the rate of political advancement, but merely reacted to changed situations dictated largely by non-Gambian events.

### **1:2.2 The Democratic Party**

The first Gambian political party to be formed was the Democratic Party founded by Reverend J.C. Faye. The formation of the Democratic Party in February 1951 was a reaction

to the revised constitution of that year which provided for two elected members to represent the Bathurst and Kombo area in the legislative Council. The formation of the party was also the logical culmination of the public and personal roles of the Rev. J.C. Faye. Faye had been a member of the Bathurst Town Council and had had long association with the Colonial Government as a nominated member of the Legislative Council since 1947. Faye was elected as the first member for Bathurst in the 1951 elections.

### **1:2.3 The Muslim Congress (MC)**

In January 1952, a second party, the Muslim Congress was formed under the leadership of I.M. Garba Jahumpa. The Muslim Congress came into being as a fusion of the Bathurst Young Muslim Society with a number of similar Muslim organisations in the Kombos and the protectorate. The Muslim congress was designed to link religious affiliation with political activity. Garba-Jahumpa as leader of the new party had also been a member of the Bathurst Town Council since 1942 and was elected to the Legislative Council as the second member for Bathurst in the 1951 elections.

### **1:2.4 The United Party (UP)**

The third political party, the United Party, was also formed as an outgrowth of the 1951 elections. The leader of the party, P.S. Njie, returned to The Gambia only in 1948 after his law studies in Britain. Sponsored by prominent Bathurst elders, he contested the 1951 elections and lost them to Faye and Jahumpa on an individual basis. The formation of the United Party in 1952 paved the way for the party's victory at the elections to the legislative council in 1954 at the head of the poll. The party was later to become the most veritable and powerful party in the Bathurst and the Kombos (urban areas).

### **1:2.5 The People's Progressive Party (PPP)**

The last of the major Gambian political parties to be created was the Protectorate Peoples Party later renamed the People's Progressive Party (PPP). The PPP was formed in 1959 by people of Protectorate origins, residing in the colony, in response to the extension of the franchise to the protectorate by the 1960 constitution. It was the 1960 constitution, we have seen, that extended the franchise to the protectorate. The coming to limelight of the PPP has

aply been described as Green Uprising, which is used to describe the domination of party politics in The Gambia by Protectorate based political party.

The 1960 constitution for the first time divided the Protectorate into electoral districts and twelve representatives were to be chosen from these on the basis of universal suffrage as members of the new House of Representatives. Leadership for the newly formed PPP soon passed to Dawda Kairaba Jawara, an Edinburgh trained veterinarian, who resigned his post as head of department in the colonial administration to seek for elected position.

In the elections held under the 1960 Constitution, the main contest was between the United Party and the newly formed PPP. The results of the elections saw the PPP winning seven seats. The Democratic Party and the Muslim Congress which formed the "Democratic Congress" Alliance won only seat in the elections. In deed the 1960 elections marked the end of both the Democratic Party and the Muslim Congress as political forces in The Gambia. Although the new government that was appointed after the 1960 elections contained six Gambian Ministers, four with portfolios, the elections created a situation of political conflict in the country.

Just as pointed out earlier on, the 1960 constitution that served as the basis for that year's elections were already overtaken by political events both inside and outside the country as 1960 became marked as Africa's year of independence. The 1960 constitution and its elections resulted to the creation of a political conflict in the country because, in the first place, none of the parties that contested the elections won a clear cut majority in the new House of Representatives. The 1960 Constitution also failed to provide provisions for a "Chief Minister" to coordinate the work of the new ministries that were created. When Governor Edward Windley decided to appoint a Chief Minister, the Protectorate Chiefs gave their support to P.S. Njie who became appointed Chief Minister in March 1961.

The appointment of P.S. Njie as Chief Minister led to the resignation of the PPP leader Dawda Kairaba Jawara as Education Minister. The PPP would particularly condemn the power of thirty-five chiefs to select eight members to the House of Representatives. Coming so soon after the 1960 Gambia Workers Union strike, the political crisis precipitated by the PPP marked a definite advancement towards self government with the party emerging as the most militant advocates of rapid decolonization.

The colonial government responded to the labour and political crisis by convening the Bathurst and London Constitutional Conferences of 1961. The results of the talks, was the introduction of the 1962 constitution that paved the way for The Gambia's full internal self-government. The constitution of 1962 drastically reduced 'the seats reserved for the Chiefs. But as to the PPP demand for independence in 1962, the new British Colonial Secretary, Ian Macleod, was skeptical to the demand. While accepting the principle of self- rule for The Gambia, the British Government was anxious that the new Gambian government should negotiate a form of relationship with the Senegalese Government before talking of independence.

In the general elections held in May 1962 the PPP defeated its main political rivals, the United Party, and it now devolved on Jawara who became the new Premier, to negotiate the final stages of decolonization process with Britain. Perhaps, faced with the 'stark economic realities of the Gambian situation, the PPP in power were less insistent that independence from Britain must come at once. Meanwhile, once the march to independence got under way, the issue of association with Senegal became an important political one. When P.S. Njie was Chief Minister, a joint Senegal-Gambian Ministerial Committee was set up which asked the United Nations to study Senegambia association.

In 1964, the United Nations Commission rejected integration between the two countries as unrealistic and recommended closer association in stages. By 1964, however, when the United Nations Commission submitted its report, it was Jawara's PPP government that was in power in Banjul. The PPP government before independence sent ministers to negotiate closer Union with Senegal and United Nations legal and financial experts were brought to advise but little progress was made.

There was agreement that the two countries can coordinate the development of the Gambia River Basin, sign a defense pact and share diplomatic missions abroad. Whilst the Government of Senegal welcomed an eventual merger of both countries, it was the political leaders of small Gambia who feared that they would be economically, culturally and politically submerged as second class citizens in a French speaking Senegambia. The PPP government and their supporters were united in the view that the interest of the Gambia in self rule and economic development, not the British anxiety to rid itself of a liability, should determine the future of the country. They opted for independence.

In July 1964 a constitutional conference was held in London on the Gambia's political future. At this conference it was agreed that the Gambia, while continuing to cooperate with Senegal, should become an independent sovereign state on February 18th 1965. On that date the Gambia attained independence under the leadership of Sir Dawda Kairaba Jawara who in April 24th 1970 became the first President of the Republic of The Gambia. Sir Dawda Kairaba Jawara and his Peoples Progressive Party (PPP) were to remain in power for a generation after independence.

However, on 22nd July 1994 the PPP regime was overthrown in a bloodless military coup and an Armed Forces Provisional Ruling Council (AFPRC) established under the leadership of Lieutenant, then later Captain Yahya A.J.J Jammeh.

The AFPRC, who initially announced a four year transition period to return the country to civilian rule, finally accepted a two year period after consultations with the people throughout the country.

Meanwhile to contest the elections that were to be held in 1996, the AFPRC was transformed into a political party, the Alliance for Patriotic Re-orientation and Construction APRC. In the presidential elections held on 26th September 1996, to return the country to civilian rule and multiparty democracy, the APRC candidate, now Retired Colonel Yahya A.J.J Jammeh won handsomely and became the first President of the Second Republic of The Gambia.

### **1:3 An Overview of Gambia's Electoral and Democratization Process**

The Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) formed in the wake of The Gambia's Second Republic under Yahya AJJ Jammeh inherited the mandate of the Provisional Independent Electoral Commission (PIEC), was to conduct elections in The Gambia's First Republic. But peculiar to the IEC was its permanent status and a reduction of its membership from seven to five members, provided for under Section 42 of the Constitution of the Republic of The Gambia. The Mandate of the PIEC was clearly stated in section 6 of the PIEC Decree, Decree 62 of 1995, these are:

- a) to conduct and supervise the registration of voters, for all public elections and referenda,
- b) to demarcate electoral boundaries for both national and local government elections,



- c) to conduct and supervise all public elections and referenda
- d) to register political parties
- e) to ensure that the dates, times and places of public elections and referenda are fixed and that they are publicized and that elections are held accordingly.
- f) to ensure that the candidates for elections make full declaration of their assets at the time of nomination,
- g) to announce the results of all elections and referenda.

There is also the additional responsibility to conduct elections of the Speaker and Deputy Speaker of the National Assembly. <http://www.iec.gm/about-iec>

The IEC has been primarily charged with the responsibility to provide the Gambian people with an independent and efficient electoral process that is based on fairness, transparency and trust and supported by competent staff for the democratic conduct of all public elections and referenda. Furthermore, the Commission is committed to maintaining a credible voters' register and carrying out continuous voter education. Suffice it to say that despite the seemingly good electoral system put in place, The Gambia's electoral and democratic process has been highly flawed. The first Republic Gambia's Electoral System was marked by high-handedness, manipulation and marginalization of the uneducated.

Despite some significant progress, the consolidation of democracy in The Gambia remains a valid goal for many challenges still lying ahead. Repeated attempts to amend the constitution in order to remain in power or to give to their political affiliation and/or biological cases of electoral fraud, human rights violations, corruption, violation of the separation of executive, legislature and judiciary, lack of citizen oversight of government actions in most countries, often censored press, and people less aware of democratic principles and values show the amount of work remaining to be done. However, the status of the process of raising awareness in relation to these challenges and the determination of the continent in search of solutions and achieving meaningful actions are such that it is legitimate to ask today If The Gambia is facing a crisis of democracy, or rather signs of democratic renewal, or "something" in between.

In many countries, there is always a sense of frustration, disillusionment, dissatisfaction with democracy, governance and elections that resulted in low rates of participation in elections and citizens' lack of interest in politics. That is why the question of principles and procedures for the proper functioning of a democratic state is at the heart of the equation The Gambia - Democracy. Failure to follow these principles and procedures calls into question not only the political actors and gladiators (government and opposition parties), but also other stakeholders who play a key role in the control of political citizenry (citizens, media, civil society, etc....). <http://www.goreeinstitut.org/index.php/en/programmes/democratisation-elections-et-processus-politiques>

Electoral and democratic process in The Gambia, just like any other part of African countries has been surrounded with controversy. Controversy of contestations, agitations and clamors. When an election in The Gambia draws international attention, the news is seldom good: elections in the country, for example, fuel suspicion, rigging, intimidation, manipulation of the electoral process, through reckless display of might and irresponsible open distributions and/or throwing of biscuits and other eatable and disposable items like vests etc. by the ruling party, especially, under Yahya Jammeh to hungry-stricken and deplorably-illiterate electorates, who in the course of struggling to pick biscuits are in event crushed or knocked down by the convoys of Mr President who is seeking re-election in the guise of chicken-pox campaigns.

Recent headline-grabbing electoral failures, however, do not justify abandoning efforts at developing electoral democracy in the country. Although elections are often marred by fraud or incompetence and do sometimes result in violence, no other means have brought about nonviolent transitions of power with the same consistency. Most Africans agree—according to a 2005 Afro barometer survey, 60 percent of Africans believe democracy is preferable to all other forms of government. Even in the countries that have suffered most from failed or flawed elections—or even from the failure to hold elections entirely— the people have responded not by abandoning democracy but by increasing their demands for accountability and reform.

Indeed, the very purpose of elections is to achieve participatory governance without violence—through political rather than physical competition—and this has succeeded in a number of African countries. South Africa and Botswana, for example, have proven themselves among the continent's most stable democracies, while Ghana, Mali, and Benin

have emerged as democratic strongholds in West Africa. Moreover, countries such as Sierra Leone and Liberia, among the poorest in the world and only recently emerged from civil war, have demonstrated the power of elections to foster and solidify peace. <http://www.ifes.org/Content/Publications/Testimony/2010/>

In reality, then, The Gambia's experience with electoral democracy has been mixed: though, progress has been made, but challenges remain. The various elections in the past several years have become historical landmarks for different reasons, varying drastically in their conduct and outcome. This mix of electoral experiences has generated considerable debate and passion on the subject of transparent, free, and fair electoral processes among election stakeholders, especially as democratic progress itself can come with further challenges; as more elections are held, and as these elections become increasingly competitive, the more destabilizing challenges that could increase the risk of fraud and violence.

It is thus difficult to identify a general trend in Gambia's elections specifically. In the broadest of terms, Sub-Saharan Africa is certainly more democratic and holds more free and fair elections today than several decades ago, but gains in some countries have been offset by losses in others, while a number have remained democratically stagnant since independence. Therefore, to understand recent trends in African elections, it is helpful to examine individual countries along with those others that have shared similar experiences and will thus face similar challenges and opportunities in the coming years. These various electoral experiences can serve as positive examples or critical warnings to other countries in Africa and can help the international community, including the United States, more effectively engage with elections across Africa by learning from past failures and successes.

Despite the importance of elections, President Barack Obama was right when he remarked in Ghana that democracy "is about more than just holding elections." This statement could infer that democracy transcends merely holding elections to legitimate a government. Elections are just part of such processes of realizing a viable democratic system and which cannot be wished away. Therefore, to be a genuine representative democracy or to realize it, a country must go beyond holding free and fair elections. Democracy requires good governance, which prevails when government officials efficiently and transparently manage public institutions so as to address citizens' concerns. Democracy also requires rule of law, including judicial independence and enforcement; a transparent, accountable, and open government; and freedom from corruption. Moreover, representative democracies must include the voices of

all citizens, particularly through the engagement of civil society organizations and the media, and be populated by citizens who know their rights and responsibilities. In order for all these conditions to be met, democratic governments must respect basic human rights, such as freedom of speech and assembly, without which democracy cannot thrive.

While these conditions are nominally independent of elections, elections represent an essential piece of the democratic process and serve as means to these ends—while elections do not guarantee democratic progress, they tend to advance the overall goals of democracy. For example, elections discourage mismanagement and corruption by holding leaders accountable for their actions, and democratically elected governments are far more likely to uphold human rights and serve the basic needs of their people. Moreover, elections, often-times even if flawed, help to motivate citizens to engage with their government and become more involved in the democratic process, as well as to increase citizens' understanding of democratic principles and processes.

Elections are not only integral to all these areas of democratic governance, but are also the most visible representations of democracy in action. They are also, in most cases, the most complicated and expensive single event a country will ever undertake. The attached list of African elections in 2010 reveals how many of these complicated and expensive events are scheduled to take place in 2010 alone. Thus while support to all aspects of democratic governance is crucial, particularly by fostering good governance, upholding rule of law, and supporting civil society, this testimony examines all these areas in the context of elections. International support to electoral processes is crucial if democracy is to continue developing on the continent, and each country can benefit from such support, regardless of where it stands in the democratic spectrum. What follows is an overview of democratic and electoral trends in The Gambia (Yaqub, 2006).

#### **1:4 Historical Background of The Gambia**

The Gambia is a small country in West Africa with total area of 4,000 square miles or 11,295 sq. km (about 320 km. long). It is surrounded by Senegal on all sides (see map below), except on the Atlantic coast, and for this reason the two countries have a lot of ethnic and cultural ties. The coastal line is 80 km and the border boundary with Senegal is 740 km. In contrast to Senegal, a former French colony, The Gambia was colonized by Britain. It had a population of 1.3 million according to the 2003 census release population figures. However, the

country's 2013 Population and Housing Census preliminary results released early this year 2014 revealed that its recorded population is now estimated at One Million, Eight Hundred and Eighty Two Thousand, Four Hundred and Forty (1,882,440:00) (Omotosho, O. F, 2014:3, Perfect, D, 2008) (see table 1 below). Aside, some opinions revealed that The Gambia's current population is or could likely be put at Two millions or there about. The Gambia is also home to a growing population of Africans from the West African sub region like Nigeria, Sierra-Leone, Liberia, Guinea-Bisau to name a few. While their exact number is unknown, they are estimated to be about 300,000 to 500,000 strong.

See Table I for the population figures preliminary results.

TABLE I

THE GAMBIA 2013 POPULATION AND HOUSING CENSUS

PRELIMINARY RESULTS

POPULATION BY SEX BY DISTRICT

District	Male	Female	Total
Banjul South	4,400	3,570	5,270
Banjul Central	5,135	5,552	11,597
Banjul North	5,419	4,915	11,334
Banjul	16,954	14,347	31,301
Kanifing	192,417	159,679	382,096
Kombo North	173,252	171,504	344,756
Kombo South	54,991	53,752	105,773
Kombo Central	71,434	71,397	142, 531
Kombo East	21,589	21,366	42,955
Foni Bondali	3,983	3,758	7,741

Foni Brefet	7,074	7,340	14,414
Foni Kansala	7,001	7,237	14,238
Foni Bintang Karanai	8,445	8,541	16,986
Foni Jarrol	3,713	3,297	7,010
Brikama	351,482	348,222	699,704
Kiang Central	3,952	4,414	8,366
Kiang East	3,162	3,687	6,849
Kiang West	7,217	7,736	14,953
Jarra Central	5,166	3,271	8,437
Jarra East	8,310	8,241	16,551
Jarra West	12,914	14,291	27,205
Mansakonko	40,721	41,640	82,361
Lower Niumi	28,168	29,190	57,358
Upper Niumi	15,464	16,016	31,480
Jokadu	10,486	11,645	22,132
Central Badibu	9,841	10,263	20,104
Illiasa	20,987	20,616	41,603
Lower Badibu	8,388	9,642	18,030
Sabach Sanjal	11,597	18,750	30,347
Kerewan	104,931	116,123	221,054
Lower Saloum	7,046	8,835	15,881

Sami	11,886	12,543	24,429
Kuntaur	47,233	51,875	99,108
Janjangbureh	2,029	1,959	3,988
Fulladu West	41,002	43,959	84,961
Niamina East	11,628	12,943	24,571
Niamina West	3,536	3,757	7,293
Niamina Dankunku	2,806	3,291	6,097
Janjangbureh	61,001	65,909	126,910
Kantora	18,154	20,630	38,784
Tumana	17,998	19,563	37,561
Basse Fuladu East	24,695	25,295	49,990
Jimara	20,948	22,512	43,460
Wuli	22,793	23,444	46,237
Sandu	11,372	12,512	23,884
Basse	115,960	123,956	239,916
Total	930,274	952,176	1,882,450

Just like in most sub-Saharan countries, The Gambia consists of diverse ethnic groups such as Jola 10%, Mandinka 42%, Fula 18%, Wolof /Serer 16%, Serahule 9% ,Manjago, Balanta, Aku (4%), non-African 1% (2003 Population Census). Beyond this diversity, there is a considerable degree of commonality. All the six of Gambia's 'national' languages (Mandinka, Wolof, Fula, Jola, Serahuli, and Serer belong to the Niger-Kordofanian linguistic family (Ross, 2008). This family stretches across the breadth of the continent from Senegambia to east and southern Africa, and it includes the various Bantu Languages (Swahili, Zulu, Congo etc) as well as Igbo, among others (Ibid).

Approximately 90% of The Gambia's population comprises of Muslims, while Christians and traditional worshippers are 9% and 1 % respectively. By descent, originally, it was part of Mali Empire, later, the ancient Ghana and finally became part of the Songhai before becoming an independent nation-state as The Gambia. It has seven administrative regions of West-Coast, North-Bank, Lower-River, Central-River and Upper-River with two Municipalities of Banjul and Kanifing, with Banjul as the state capital, formerly known as the Bathurst. Politically, it is divided into eight local government areas, thirty-five Districts, hundred and fourteen Wards and two thousand and seventy Village Development Councils, all for administrative convenience and suitability that is development-oriented. The Gambia has a defined political system, but, which is unitary-presidential, with a supreme constitution that has a popularly elected president of the republic. It operates a multi-party system that appears controversial as a ruling party always dominates and has an edge to win elections all the time and form government as applicable under the two regimes under study with a unique voting system of 'Drums and Marbles', that is locally-based and politically conceptualized for literacy reasons (Omotosho, 2014, 2015, Hughes and Perfect, 2006, Perfect, 2008, Jagne, 2015 and Faal, 2008).

The first British traders in the Gambia came in 1588. They began to explore the river in 1618 and eventually got control of St. Andrew's Island in 1661. It was re-named James Island after the Duke of York, later King James I, and has now been renamed Kunta- Kinteh Island. Trading companies were set up and they tried to control the trade of the river.

By the mid-seventeenth century, the slave trade had over-shadowed all other trades. The British and French competed for the control of the area's trade. In 1765, the forts and settlements were vested in the British crown and for eighteen years what is now The Gambia formed part of the British colony of Senegambia, with its headquarters in St. Louis at the mouth of the River Senegal. However in 1783, the greater part of the Senegambia region was handed over to France and the Gambian section ceased to be a British colony, being placed once more in the charge of the African Company.

With the British abolition of the slave trade in their settlements in 1807, they tried to look for a suitable location in The Gambia from where they would be able to monitor the river and stop ships from entering and leaving with slaves. Alexander Grant, sent out from Goree for this purpose, found the fort at Kunta- Kinteh Island to be too far inland and in ruins. He therefore entered into a treaty with the Chief of Kombo in April, 1816 for the cessation of the



detached sand bank known as St. Mary's Island. Originally called Banjulo by the Portuguese, Grant named the new settlement, Bathurst after the Colonial Secretary of the time Lord Earl Bathurst. Britain declared the Gambia River a British Protectorate in 1820.

Bathurst was at different times under the jurisdiction of the British Governor- General in Sierra Leone. For instance, within the periods of 1821-1843 the British settlements in The Gambia was placed under the administration of Sierra Leone under Charles McCarthy. And by 1843 – 1866 the British colonial settlements of Gambia, Gold Coast, Lagos and Sierra Leone were centralized. The Governor of Sierra Leone became the Governor –in- Chief of the settlements and, in the other colonies, administrators answerable to the Governor –in - Chief were appointed and Executive Councils were abolished.

In 1888, Gambia became a crown colony, and the following year France and Britain drew the boundaries between Senegal (by then a French colony) and The Gambia. With the slave trade at an end, the British were forced to come up with a new source of wealth to support the fledgling protectorate, which led to the planting of groundnuts. The groundnuts or peanuts are originally from South America and were introduced to West Africa (first into the Senegambia area) by the Portuguese in the 16th century. The harvested nuts are crushed to make oil, which is exported to Europe for use in food manufacture.

In the 1950s, Gambia's groundnut production was beefed up as a way to increase export earnings and make the country that much more self -supportive. Today groundnuts remain the chief crop of both The Gambia and neighboring Senegal. On the 18th of February 1965, The Gambia gained political independence from Britain and Britain's Queen Elizabeth II remained as its titular head of state. It was strongly felt that The Gambia would not be able to stand on her own and there were talks of forming a federation with Senegal, but this did not materialize at the time. Around the same time, two events occurred that enabled the tiny nation to survive and even prosper. For a decade after independence, the world price for groundnuts increased significantly, raising the country's GNP almost threefold. The second event had an even more resounding effect – The Gambia became a significant tourist destination and tourism became its main export.

The most important development before the birth of colonialism was the establishment of the British settlement in what is now known as *Banjul, Kombo Saint Mary*. Captain Grant who established the settlement 185 years ago in 1816 stated that a treaty was signed with the King

of Kombo to get the permission to settle. They paid him 103 bars of iron annually. This shows that up to 1816 the kings had effective control over their territories. They accepted the settlement to promote trade. The British merchants provided iron, tobacco, guns and gunpowder, rum, spices, corals, etc. in exchange for elephant tusks, bees wax, hides, timber, bullock horns and gold. It was a mutually beneficial trade. As a treaty between the acting Governor and the king of Kantalikunda stated, the people of England and the people of Kantalikunda agreed to trade together "*innocently, justly, kindly and usefully.*" (Available at <http://www.gambia.dk/serrek.html>)

Since the settlements appeared as centres for the promotion of trade in the eyes of the kings, the representatives of the monarch in England could be allowed to settle in MacCarthy Island in 1823 by the King of Lower Niani; one square mile was allotted at Barra point in Niumi in 1826 by the King of Niumi and Fatatenda in 1829 by the King of Wuli.

The British monarch saw these territories as colonies. Laws like the Imperial Act of 1843 were established to enable the British monarch to establish a government to govern the settlements. These settlements were to serve as the stepping stone to take full control of The Gambia. In a word, a net is thrown first before fishes could be caught. The settlements served as nets.

As the wars between the various kings of the area, and within their territories for succession increased, some of the kings sought the alliance of the administrators of the British settlements. For example, the King of Lower Niani at Kataba was attacked by the king of Upper Niani, Kementeng in 1840. The king of Lower Niani ( Kataba) sought the assistance of the administrator, of the British settlements and they united to combat Kementeng who resisted the penetration and colonization of his territory (The battle of Ndungusine). In 1844, the administrator of the British settlements requested one square mile from the king of Lower Niani to build a fort.

Hence, through seemingly offering protection to kings who were threatened by their neighbours or by internal feuds, the British administrators managed to bring such states under their protection and eventual domination. This became easy because between 1850 and 1890 wars intensified to overthrow the kings of many of the states. Maba Jahu's army changed the face of Baddibu Niumi and Sine Saloum. Foday Kaba's army changed the face of Jarra,

Kiang, Niamina and Foni. Foday Sillah's army changed the face of Kombo. Alfa Molloh's army changed the face of Jimara, Tumana and Fulladu area.

The intense wars disrupted trade to the point that values of imports and exports which stood at 153,000 pounds and 162,000 pounds respectively in 1839 dropped to 69,000 pounds and 79,000 pounds respectively in 1886. (Available at <http://www.gambia.dk/serrek.html>.)

Once most of the strong states were devastated, the administrator of the British settlements established a law in 1894 called *Protectorate Ordinance* to prepare the ground for complete colonial domination. Between 1894 and 1902, the administrator of the British settlement had the objective of ensuring the defeat of the strongest armies, that is, the armies of Foday Sillah, Musa Molloh and Foday Kaba Dumbuya. They succeeded in defeating the armies of Foday Sillah and took him to Goree where he died and is buried in Ngai Mbehe in Senegal, close to the Mauritanian border. They signed a treaty of non aggression with Musa Molloh and developed a defense agreement with the French to attack Foday Kaba at Medina. He was killed in 1901.

After the World War II, the British started granting concessions and reforms to their African colonies by allowing more representatives in the government of their countries. Another noticeable development during this period was the formation of political parties in The Gambia in the 1950s, to pave way for the election of natives into government seats and eventual final independence. In 1963, The Gambia became internal self –governing and thus set for final independence. In 1964, the independence Conference started at the Marlborough House, United Kingdom and after its useful deliberations, it was agreed that The Gambia would be independent on 18<sup>th</sup> Feb. 1965. It was also agreed that the country would continue to have genuine need for financial support by the British due to the fragile nature of its economy.

On attainment of independence in 1965, a move was made for the country to become a Republic in 1966, but the motion fell short under a referendum and so, the country could not become a Republic. However, on April 24, 1970, The Gambia became a Republic and the Queen ceased to have a representative under the Gambian government. As such, the president of The Gambia became both the Prime Minister and the Head of State. This placed the country under the Commonwealth of Nations.

The relative stability of the Jawara era was broken first in a violent coup attempt in 1981 which was led by Kukoi Samba Sanyang, who, on two occasions, had unsuccessfully sought election to parliament. After a week of violence, which left several hundred dead, Jawara, who was in London when the attack began, appealed to Senegal for help. Senegalese troops defeated the rebel force. In the aftermath of the attempted coup, Senegal and The Gambia signed the 1982 Treaty of Confederation. The result, the Senegambia Confederation, aimed eventually to combine the armed forces of the two nations and unify economies and currencies. The Gambia withdrew from the Confederation in 1989.

A major milestone in The Gambia's political history was the overthrow of the Jawara government in July, 1994, by young and junior officers of the Gambian military which had been built up by Jawara himself. The military officers, under the leadership of Lieutenant Yahya Jammeh (later Captain and then Colonel), alleged rampant corruption and incompetence as the main reason for overthrowing the Jawara led government. The military take-over was roundly condemned by the International community, most especially, because Jawara had in the almost 30 years of his rule managed to establish an international reputation for adherence to democratic rule and human rights. Following intense pressure from both within The Gambia, and without, the military-led government announced a timetable for transferring power to civilians in 1996, following, was a review of the constitution, were probes in the wealth of public servants, and later were elections, the latter, being the opportunities Yahya Jammeh utilized not just only to transform himself to a civilian ruler from a khaki boy, but also which he used in consolidating his regime and long stay in office.

A referendum was held on the 8th of August, 1996 and over 70 percent of those who voted endorsed the ratification of the Draft Constitution as the fundamental law of the Second Republic. On 26 September the presidential election was held after a ban on political parties was lifted. A decree was passed which disqualified former President Sir Dawda Kairaba Jawara, the former Vice-President and all former ministers of the People's Progressive Party (PPP) from contesting any political office. The other main political parties in the Gambia before the coup, the National Convention Party (NCP), and the Gambia People's Party (GPP), were also banned from participating in the election.

On 26 September 1996, presidential elections were held in which Jammeh won 55.76% of the vote. Ousainou Darboe took 35.8% and Amat Bah won 5.8%. Three former contenders, the PPP, The Gambia People's Party and the National Convention Party, blamed for The

Gambia's problems, were barred from competing. Two days later, Jammeh dissolved the Armed Forces Provisional Ruling Council, which he had formed upon taking power in 1994, and called for legislative elections in January 1997. The Alliance for Patriotic Reorientation and Construction won 32 of 45 contested seats (4 of the body's 49 are appointive). The elections were considered to have been relatively fair, although opposition candidates were harassed and there was almost no media exposure of any but the ruling party.

Four parties contested the Presidential elections. Alliance for Patriotic Reorientation and Construction (APRC) led by Yahya Jammeh who resigned from the military to run in the elections, United Democratic Party (UDP) led by Barrister Ousainou Darboe, Peoples Democratic Organization for Independence and Socialism (PDOIS) led by Mr. Sidia Jatta and National Reconciliation Party (NRP) led by Mr. Hamat Bah. Jammeh won 56% of the votes and thereby, become the first President of the Second Republic.

National Assembly Election was held on the 2nd of January, 1997 and the APRC won 33 seats out of 45. UDP won 7 seats, NRP 2 seats, and PDOIS 1 seat and 2 Independent Candidates. The last National Assembly Elections was held in January 2002 but was boycotted by the Three-party opposition alliance led by the main opposition party UDP and thereby, allowing APRC running unopposed in 33 PRC. Subsequent presidential, assembly and council/municipal elections conducted in the country till date are believed to have been marred by lots of irregularities following reckless, irresponsible manipulations and dominations by the ruling party, amidst in formidable and chequered opposition, caused by the systematic and coordinated arrangements of the APRC oligarchy and dictatorship. In 1998, tourism, the most important source of foreign currency, had risen to near pre-coup levels as Jammeh suppressed grumbling in the army, reestablished stability, and allowed some democratic reforms to move ahead. In February 1998, Jammeh made his first official visit to France. He signed a technical, cultural and scientific accord in Paris designed to reinforce Franco-Gambian cooperation. In 1999, Jammeh raised The Gambia's international profile by mediating between Casamance rebels and the Senegalese government. The ADB, OPEC, and the Islamic Bank approved a round of loans and credits for building and equipping schools and hospitals, and the IMF agreed to a second annual loan worth \$11.8 million under the ESAF.

However, in March 2000 the government was reeling from accusations of embezzlement of some \$2–\$3 million of Nigerian oil aid, the siphoning off of millions of dollars of a

Taiwanese loan, and money laundering in connection with the privately held peanut processing and marketing company, Gambian Groundnut Corporation (GGC). The government stepped up security measures and controls over the private media, which it justified on the grounds of an alleged coup attempt on 15 January 2000. The coup may have been stage-managed as a pretext for increased security measures. In mid-April, student protests ended with the deaths of 14 people. Local elections, scheduled for November 2000 were repeatedly postponed.

The 18 October 2001 presidential elections were conducted amidst charges of fraud, and thousands of Diola—members of Jammeh's ethnic group living across the border in Senegal—reportedly helped re-elect Jammeh who took 52.96% of the vote. Ousainou Darboe of the United Democratic Party (UDP), who had formed a coalition with the People's Progressive Party (PPP) and with The Gambia People's Party (GPP) of Hassan Musa Camara, came in second. Despite his allegations of voting and identity card fraud, Darboe conceded defeat. The EU, the Commonwealth, the United Kingdom, the UN, and Transparency International Observers said they were relatively satisfied with the conduct of the election.

In 1999, the HIV/AIDS adult prevalence rate was estimated to be below 2%, one of the lowest rates in sub-Saharan Africa. The 2002 UN Human Development Report ranked The Gambia 160th out of 173 countries on the basis of real GDP per capita, adult literacy, and life expectancy. In February 2004, government announced the discovery of large oil deposits, raising expectations of better economic times in The Gambia.

Presidential election was held on the 18th October 2001 in which President Jammeh polled 242,302 votes representing 52.96 percent of the total votes cast. President Alhaji Yahya Jammeh's main challenger in the election who led the UDP, PPP, GPP Coalition Mr. Ousainou Darboe polled 149,448 votes followed by the NRP leader and candidate Hamat N. K. Bah with 35,671 votes. The National Convention Party leader and candidate Sheriff Mustapha Dibba, a veteran politician whose party re-joined the political arena after being banned for seven years captured 17,271 votes while the People's Democratic Organisation for independence and socialism PDOIS had 13,841 votes. *Please see the update of elections results in the Gambia from May, 1960 prior to independence to March, 2012 when the last parliamentary elections were held. These highlight in sequential order how elections were conducted in the Gambia and won by the political parties with*

*released results by the electoral body. Indeed, the data gave insights to events post-dating 1917 assembly elections.*

### **1:5 Break down of Election Results in The Gambia**

#### **20-30 May 1960 House of Representatives Election**

Registered Voters      Not Available  
 Total Votes (Voter      Not Available (N/A)  
 Turnout)  
 Invalid/Blank Votes      Not Available  
 Total Valid Votes      69,048

<b>Party</b>	<b>Number of Votes</b>	<b>% of Votes</b>	<b>Number of Seats (19)*/**</b>
People's Progressive Party (PPP)	25,490	36.92%	9
United Party (UP)	12,497	18.10%	5
Democratic Congress Alliance (DCA)	3,526	5.11%	1
Independents	27,535	39.88%	4

19 members were directly elected and an additional 8 were reserved for protectorate chiefs.

Due to confusion over the party affiliations of some candidates, the distribution of seats won by each party in the election varies by source. The following seat distribution figures are cited by some sources: PPP (8), UP (6), DCA (3), and Independents (2), as well as: PPP (8), UP (8), and DCA (3).

#### **22-31 May 1962 House of Representatives Election**

Registered Voters      Not Available  
 Total Votes (Voter      Not Available  
 Turnout)                      (approx. 75%)  
 Invalid/Blank Votes      Not Available  
 Total Valid Votes      97,647

<b>Party/[Coalition]</b>	<b>Number of Votes</b>	<b>% of Votes</b>	<b>Number of Seats (32)**</b>
People's Progressive Party-Democratic Congress Alliance	60,523	61.98%	19

[PPP-DCA]			
People's Progressive Party (PPP)	(56,343)	(57.70%)	18
Democratic Congress Alliance (DCA)	(4,180)	(4.28%)	1
United Party (UP)*	37,016	37.91%	13
Independents	108	0.11%	-

The Gambia National Union (GNU) campaigned for United Party (UP) candidates in the election.

32 members were directly elected, an additional 8 were appointed by the governor and protectorate chiefs.

### 18-26 November 1965 Plebiscite\*

Main Points: Declaration of the Republic

Registered Voters 154,626

Total Votes (Voter Not Available (N/A)

Turnout)

Invalid/Blank Votes Not Available

Total Valid Votes 93,484

Results	Number of Votes	% of Votes
"Yes" Votes	61,593	65.85%
"No" Votes	31,921	34.15%

The proposal was rejected because it fell short of the required two-thirds majority.

### 17-26 May 1966 House of Representatives Election

Registered Voters 175,732

Total Votes (Voter Not Available (N/A)

Turnout)

Invalid/Blank Votes Not Available

Total Valid Votes 124,492

Party/[Coalition]	Number of Votes	% of Votes	Number of Seats (32)
People's Progressive Party (PPP)	81,313	65.32%	24
United Party-Gambia Congress Party [UP-GCP]	41,549	33.37%	8



United Party (UP)				7
Gambia Congress Party (GCP)				1
Independents	1,630	1.31%	-	

### 24 April 1970 Plebiscite

Main Points: Declaration of the Republic

Registered Voters 135,000 (approx.)

Total Votes (Voter Not Available (N/A)

Turnout)

Invalid/Blank Votes Not Available

Total Valid Votes 120,606

Results	Number of Votes	% of Votes
"Yes" Votes	84,968	70.45%
"No" Votes	35,638	29.55%

### 28-29 March 1972 House of Representatives Election

Registered Voters 136,521

Total Votes (Voter Not Available (N/A)

Turnout)

Invalid/Blank Votes Not Available

Total Valid Votes 103,851

Party	Number of Votes	% of Votes	Number of Seats (32)*
People's Progressive Party (PPP)	65,388	62.96%	28
United Party (UP)	17,161	16.52%	3
Independents	21,302	20.51%	1

32 members were directly elected; an additional 3 were appointed by the President. There were also 4 Chiefs' representatives and the Attorney general who was an ex-officio member.

### 4-5 April 1977 House of Representatives Election\*

Registered Voters 216,234

Total Votes (Voter Not Available (N/A)

Turnout)

Invalid/Blank Votes Not Available

Total Valid Votes 177,181

Party	Number of Votes	% of Votes	Number of Seats (35)**
People's Progressive Party (PPP)	123,297	69.59%	27
National Convention Party (NCP)	40,212	22.70%	5
United Party (UP)	5,403	3.05%	2
National Liberation Party (NLP)	4,095	2.31%	-
Independents	4,174	2.36%	-

In one constituency, the election was postponed due to the death of a candidate. The seat was won by the People's Progressive Party (PPP) in a May 1977 by-election, giving the party a total of 28 seats.

35 members were directly elected; the number of Chiefs' representatives and additional members appointed by the President is not available. The Attorney general served as an ex-officio member.

#### 4-5 May 1982 Presidential Election

Registered Voters Not Available

Total Votes (Voter Not Available (N/A)

Turnout)

Invalid/Blank Votes Not Available

Total Valid Votes 189,156

Candidate (Party)	Number of Votes	% of Votes
Dawda Jawara (PPP)	137,020	72.44%
Sheriff Mustapha Dibba (NCP)	52,136	27.56%

#### 4-5 May 1982 House of Representatives Election

Registered Voters Not Available

Total Votes (Voter Not Available (N/A)

Turnout)

Invalid/Blank Votes Not Available

Total Valid Votes 166,102

Party	Number of Votes	% of Votes	Number of Seats (35)*
People's Progressive Party (PPP)	102,545	61.74%	27
National Convention Party (NCP)	32,634	19.65%	3
United Party (UP)	4,782	2.88%	-
Independents	26,141	15.74%	5

35 members were directly elected; an additional 8 were appointed by the President. There were also 5 Chiefs' representatives and the Attorney general who was an ex-officio member.

### 11 March 1987 Presidential Election

Registered Voters Not Available  
Total Votes (Voter Not Available (N/A)  
Turnout)  
Invalid/Blank Votes Not Available  
Total Valid Votes 208,479

Candidate (Party)	Number of Votes	% of Votes
Dawda Jawara (PPP)	123,385	59.18%
Sheriff Mustapha Dibba (NCP)	57,343	27.51%
Assan Musa Camara (GPP)	27,751	13.31%

### 11 March 1987 House of Representatives Election

Registered Voters Not Available  
Total Votes (Voter Not Available  
Turnout) (approx. 80%)  
Invalid/Blank Votes Not Available  
Total Valid Votes 211,615

Party	Number of Votes	% of Votes	Number of Seats (36)*
People's Progressive Party (PPP)	119,248	56.35%	31
National Convention Party (NCP)	58,461	27.63%	5

Gambian People's Party (GPP)	31,604	14.93%	-
People's Democratic Organisation for Independence and Socialism (PDOIS)	2,069	0.98%	-
Independents	233	0.11%	-

36 members were directly elected; an additional 8 were appointed by the President. There were also 5 Chiefs' representatives and the Attorney general who was an ex-officio member.

### 29 April 1992 Presidential Election

Registered Voters 400,000 (approx.)  
Total Votes (Voter Turnout) Not Available (N/A)  
Invalid/Blank Votes Not Available  
Total Valid Votes 201,017

Candidate (Party)	Number of Votes	% of Votes
Dawda Jawara (PPP)	117,549	58.48%
Sheriff Mustapha Dibba (NCP)	44,639	22.21%
Assan Musa Camara (GPP)	16,287	8.10%
Lamin Bojang (PDP)	11,999	5.97%
Sidia Jatta (PDOIS)	10,543	5.24%

### 29 April 1992 House of Representatives Election

Registered Voters 400,000 (approx.)  
Total Votes (Voter Turnout) 223,200 (approx. 56%)  
Invalid/Blank Votes Not Available  
Total Valid Votes 201,095

Party	Number of Votes	% of Votes	Number of Seats (36)*
People's Progressive Party (PPP)	109,059	54.23%	25
National Convention Party (NCP)	48,845	24.29%	6
Gambian People's Party (GPP)	13,937	6.93%	2

People's Democratic Party (PDP)	9,291	4.62%	-
People's Democratic Organisation for Independence and Socialism (PDOIS)	4,632	2.30%	-
Independents	15,331	7.62%	3

36 members were directly elected; an additional 8 were appointed by the President. There were also 5 Chiefs' representatives and the Attorney general who was an ex-officio member.

### 8 August 1996 Constitutional Referendum

Main Points: Parliamentary Republic, Division of Powers, Lowering age of voter eligibility from 21 to 18

Registered Voters	447,062
Total Votes (Voter Turnout)	Not Available (85.9%)
Invalid/Blank Votes	Not Available
Total Valid Votes	383,937

Results	Number of Votes	% of Votes
"Yes" Votes	270,193	70.37%
"No" Votes	113,744	29.63%

### 26 September 1996 Presidential Election

Registered Voters	446,541
Total Votes (Voter Turnout)	394,537 (88.4%)
Invalid/Blank Votes	43]
Total Valid Votes	394,494

Candidate (Party)	Number of Votes	% of Votes
Yahya Jammeh (APRC)	220,011	55.77%
Ousainou Darboe (UDP)	141,387	35.84%
Hamat Bah (NRP)	21,759	5.52%
Sidia Jatta (PDOIS)	11,337	2.87%

### 2 January 1997 National Assembly Election

Registered Voters 420,507  
 Total Votes (Voter Turnout) 307,856 (73.2%)  
 Invalid/Blank Votes 0  
 Total Valid Votes 307,856

Party	Number of Votes	% of Votes	Number of Seats (45)*
Alliance for Patriotic Reorientation and Construction (APRC)	160,470	52.13%	33
United Democratic Party (UDP)	104,568	33.97%	7
National Reconciliation Party (NRP)	6,639	2.16%	2
People's Democratic Organisation for Independence and Socialism (PDOIS)	24,272	7.88%	1
Independents	11,907	3.86%	2

45 members were directly elected; an additional 4 members were appointed by the President.

### 18 October 2001 Presidential Election

Registered Voters 509,301  
 Total Votes (Voter Turnout) Not Available (approx. 90%)  
 Invalid/Blank Votes Not Available  
 Total Valid Votes 458,533

Candidate (Party) [Coalition]	Number of Votes	% of Votes
Yahya Jammeh (APRC)	242,302	52.84%
Ousainou Darboe (UDP) [UDP-PPP-GPP]	149,448	32.59%
Hamat Bah (NRP)	35,671	7.78%
Sheriff Mustapha Dibba (NCP)	17,271	3.77%
Sidia Jatta (PDOIS)	13,841	3.02%

### 17 January 2002 National Assembly Election\*

Registered Voters 167,817  
 Total Votes (Voter Turnout) 94,621 (56.4%)

Turnout)

Invalid/Blank Votes 35

Total Valid Votes 94,586

Party	Number of Seats (48)***
Alliance for Patriotic Reorientation and Construction (APRC)	45
People's Democratic Organisation for Independence and Socialism (PDOIS)	2
National Reconciliation Party (NRP)	1

Boycotted by the main opposition United Democratic Party (UDP) and several smaller parties.

Voter figures exclude the 33 constituencies where the ruling Alliance for Patriotic Reorientation and Construction (APRC) ran unopposed.

48 members were directly elected, an additional 5 members were appointed by the President.

## 22 September 2006 Presidential Election

Registered Voters 670,336

Total Votes (Voter Not Available

Turnout) (approx. 59%)

Invalid/Blank Votes Not Available

Total Valid Votes 392,685

Candidate (Party) [Coalition]	Number of Votes	% of Votes
Yahya Jammeh (APRC)	264,404	67.33%
Ousainou Darboe (UDP) [ARC]	104,808	26.69%
Halifa Sallah (PDOIS) [NADD]	23,473	5.98%

## 25 January 2007 National Assembly Election

Registered Voters 628,160

Total Votes (Voter 261,974 (41.7%)

Turnout)

Party/[Coalition]	Number of Seats (48)*
Alliance for Patriotic Reorientation and Construction (APRC)	42
United Democratic Party (UDP)	4

National Alliance for Democracy and Development [NADD]	1
Independents	1

48 members were directly elected, an additional 5 members were appointed by the President.

### 24 November 2011 Presidential Election

Registered Voters 796,929  
Total Votes (Voter 657,904 (82.6%)  
Turnout)  
Invalid/Blank Votes Not Available  
Total Valid Votes 657,787

Candidate (Party) [Coalition]	Number of Votes	% of Votes
Yahya Jammeh (APRC)	470,550	71.54%
Ousainou Darboe (UDP) [UDP-GMC-PPP-NCP]	114,177	17.36%
Hamat Bah* [UF]	73,060	11.11%

Hamat Bah ran as an independent candidate supported by the United Front (UF) coalition.

### 29 March 2012 National Assembly Election\*

Registered Voters 308,489\*\*  
Total Votes (Voter Not Available  
Turnout) (approx. 50%)  
Invalid/Blank Votes Not Available  
Total Valid Votes 154,950

Party	Number of Votes	% of Votes	Number of Seats (48)***
Alliance for Patriotic Reorientation and Construction (APRC)	80,289	51.82%	43
National Reconciliation Party (NRP)	14,606	9.43%	1
Independents	60,055	38.76%	4

The election was boycotted by most of the opposition.

Voter figures exclude the 25 constituencies where the ruling Alliance for Patriotic Reorientation and Construction (APRC) ran unopposed.

48 members were directly elected, an additional 5 members are appointed by the President.



**Note:** The reason for low numbers of invalid votes during elections in the Second Republic (1996-Present) are due to the country's unusual voting method that uses marbles called ballot tokens, which are inserted by the voter into a hole in a spout attached to the ballot drum of their choice. Very few, if any, tokens are rejected. This method was also used during elections held in the First Republic (1965-1994).

SOURCE: *AFRICAN ELECTIONS DATABASE*;  
<http://africanelections.tripod.com/gm.html>

Despite the economic poverty and political setbacks, The Gambia has always been active in the International arena, being a member of the United Nations, the African Union, and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). The Gambia has also provided troops to regional peace-keeping efforts, most notably in Liberia, as well as being an active participant in mediation efforts. This strong tradition of peacefulness, and respect for human rights was the reason why the African Center for Democracy and Human Rights Studies was created in 1989 by a bill of The Gambian parliament with the vision to "promote co-operation with other African and international institutions, the observance of human and peoples' rights and democratic principles throughout Africa".

The African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, an organ set up under the provisions of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights by the OAU in 1986, is also head- quartered in The Gambia. However, The Gambia's human rights record has deteriorated since the military takeover of 1994. The most recent being on the 10th and 11th April 2000, when security forces had used live bullets on innocent students, to break up protesting students, thus resulting in the killing of at least 14 people including a journalist who was working as a Red Cross Volunteer and more than 100 injured. The students were reacting to tendencies to abuse authority and honour of human values with disregard which led to the killing of Ebrima Barry a student who was allegedly tortured by the Fire Service Personnel and the reported rape of a 13-year old by a member of the security forces in March 2000.



Source: Goafrika.about.com/library

## 1:6 The Gambia: Profile Information

### 1:6.1 Climate

The country has a Sahelian climate, characterized by a long dry season (November to May), and a short wet season (June to October). Rainfall ranges from 850 - 1,200 mm. Average temperatures range from 18 - 30°C during the dry season and 23 - 33°C during the wet season. The relative humidity is about 68% along the coast and 41% inland during the dry season and generally about 77% throughout the country during the wet season. The prevailing climatic pattern favours only a short agrarian production regime (on average three months) which is the main source of employment and food supply for 80% of the population. Low rainfall and its poor distribution in the past two decades resulted in drought conditions that have affected the vegetation cover and food production potential.

### 1:6.2 Topography

The Gambia River, the country's major waterway, rises in Guinea and follows a twisting path for about 1,600 km (1,000 mi) to the sea. In its last 470 km (292 mi), the river flows through

the Republic of The Gambia, narrowing to a width of 5 km (3 mi) at Banjul; during the dry season, tidal saltwater intrudes as far as 250 km (155 mi) upstream. Brown mangrove swamps line both sides of the river for the first 145 km (90 mi) from the sea; the mangroves then give way to more open country and, in places, to red ironstone cliffs. The land on either side of the river is generally open savanna with wooded areas along the drainage channels. Elevation reaches a maximum of 73 m (240 ft).

### **1:6.3 Environment**

The Gambia's environmental concerns include deforestation, desertification, and water pollution. Deforestation is the most serious problem, with slash- and-burn agriculture the principal cause. In the 1950s, 34,000 hectares (84,000 acres) were set aside as forest parks, but by 1972, 11% of these reserves had been totally cleared. During 1981–85, deforestation averaged 2,000 hectares (5,000 acres) per year. Reforestation programs have been set in place, so that from 1990–2000, reforestation took place at a rate of about 1% per year. In 2000, 48% of the total land area was forested.

A 30% decrease in rainfall over the last 30 years has increased the rate of desertification for The Gambia's agricultural lands. Water pollution is a significant problem due to lack of adequate sanitation facilities. Impure water is responsible for life-threatening diseases that contribute to high infant mortality rates. The Gambia has 3 cu km of renewable water resources with 91% used for farming activity. Only about 53% of the people in rural areas have pure drinking water.

As of 2003, only 2.3% of the total land area was protected. Baobolon Wetland Reserve is a Ramsar wetland site. The Gambia's wildlife has been threatened by changes in habitat and poaching. According to a 2006 report issued by the International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (IUCN), the number of threatened species included 3 types of mammals, 2 species of birds, 1 type of reptile, 11 species of fish, and 4 species of plants. Threatened species include the African slender-snouted crocodile and the West African manatee.

### **1:6.4 Population**

The population of The Gambia in 2001 was estimated by the United Nations (UN) at 1,395,000, which placed it at number 144 in population among the 193 nations of the world. In 2003, approximately 3% of the population was over 65 years of age, with another 45% of the population under 15 years of age. There were 98 males for every 100 females in the country. According to the UN, the annual population rate of change for 2005–2010 was expected to be 2.8%, a rate the government viewed as too high. A National Policy for the Advancement of Gambian Women, established in 1994, provides services aimed at lowering the fertility rate, which was about five births per woman. The projected population for the year 2025 was 2,625,000. The population density was 141 per sq km (366 per sq mi). The majority of the population lives near the Atlantic coast with the interior of the country sparsely populated.

The UN estimated that 26% of the population lived in urban areas in 2005, and that urban areas were growing at an annual rate of 2.66%. The capital city, Banjul (formerly Bathurst), had a population of 372,000 in that year.

### **1:6.5 Migrations**

Each year, some 20,000–30,000 migrants from Senegal, Mali, and Guinea come to The Gambia to help harvest the groundnut crop. Gambians, in turn, move freely over national borders, which are poorly marked and difficult to police in West Africa. The Gambia also has an open-door policy for professionals, so it is used as a gateway to Europe and the United States.

In 2000 there were 185,000 migrants living in The Gambia. The migrants' stock made up approximately 14% of the population. By the end of 2004 there were 7,343 refugees and 602 asylum seekers, mainly from Senegal, in The Gambia. In addition, in 2004 over 500 Gambians sought asylum in Austria, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States. In 2005 the net migration rate was estimated as 1.27 migrants per 1,000 population, down from 13.3 per 1,000 in 1990.

### **1:6.6 Languages**

English is the official language, but there are 21 distinct languages spoken. The principal vernaculars are Wolof, Fula, and Mandinka, the latter spoken by the Mandingo. But Wolof language is widely spoken in the urban areas, while Mandinka in the rural areas.

### **1:6.7 Religions**

Islam, which was introduced in the 12th century, is followed by about 90%. The main Muslim branches are Tijaniyah, Qadiriya, Muridiyah, and Ahmadiyah. About 9% of the population are Christians, mostly Roman Catholics; they live primarily in the Banjul area. Protestant denominations include Anglicans, Methodists, Baptists, Seventh-Day Adventists, and Jehovah's Witnesses, along with other small evangelical groups and protestant worshipers. About 1% of Gambians practice traditional indigenous religions. In some areas, practices of animism are blended with Christianity or Islam. There is a small group of Baha'is. They are sometimes called 'The Marabouts' or 'The Traditionalists'. They are mainly idol worshipers and very fetish in acts and outlooks.

The constitution provides for freedom of religion and this right is generally respected in practice. Certain Muslim and Christian holidays are officially observed. Both Biblical and Koranic studies are offered in public and private schools; participation is voluntary. Suffice it to say here that The Gambia is a secure country as she has not adopted any official religion, until recently in 2016, when it was pronounced an Islamic state with political undertones by the administration of Yahya Jammeh. Indeed and without prejudice, The Gambia is a good example of a state with a high level of religious tolerance, promoted by both the government and the indigenes and which the country's constitution also recognizes and entrenches firmly. This has added to the peace the country enjoys and is known for worldwide.

### **1:6.8 Transportation**

The Gambia River not only provides important internal transport but is also an international commercial link. Oceangoing vessels can travel 240 km (150 mi) upstream. In 2004 there were 390 km (243 mi) of total waterways. Banjul, the principal port, receives about 300 ships annually. Ferries operate across the river and between Banjul and Barra.

With the construction of major all-weather roads on both sides of the Gambia River, the waterway has become less significant for passenger traffic. As of 2002, there were 2,700 km (1,678 mi) of roads, including 956 km (594 mi) of paved roads. There were 106,600 passenger cars and 142,300 commercial vehicles were in use. The Gambia has no railroads. In 2005, Gambia's merchant marine totaled four vessels of 1,000 GRT or more, with 30,976 GRT. There is an international airport (the country's only one) at Yundum, 26 km (16 mi) from Banjul. Air Gambia, 60% state owned, acts as an agent only. Foreign air carriers provide international service

### **1:6.9 Government**

Under the republican constitution of 24 April 1970, as amended, the president, popularly elected for a five-year term, was the head of state. Presidential powers included designating a vice president, who exercised the functions of a prime minister, and appointing cabinet members. The House of Representatives had 36 members elected by universal adult suffrage (at age 18), five chiefs elected by the Chiefs in Assembly, and eight appointed non-voting members; the attorney general was also a member *ex officio*.

The military junta suspended the constitution on 22 July 1994, but following presidential elections two years later, a unicameral National Assembly was instituted, consisting of 49 members, four of whom were appointed by the president with the remainder standing for election. As of 2005, the Assembly consisted of 53 members, 48 of which were popularly elected, and five of which were appointed by the president. They serve a five-year term. Presidential elections were due October 2006 and legislative elections in January 2007. In late 2005, the five main opposition parties resolved to form the National Alliance for Development and Democracy (NADD). NADD is envisaged as the single platform that would help the opposition overcome its differences and capture power from the ruling APRC. Its plans include the Save The Gambia Democracy Project (STGDP), by which NADD hoped to mobilize resources from home as well as from abroad to lay new institutional foundations for democracy in The Gambia.

### **1:6.10 Local Government**

There are five administrative divisions, each with a council, the majority of whose members are elected. The divisions—Central River, Lower River, North Bank, Upper River, and

Western—are subdivided into 35 districts administered by chiefs with the help of village mayors and councilors. Banjul has a city council.

### **1:6. 11 Judicial System**

The judicial system is based on a composite of English common law, Koranic law, and customary law. It accepts compulsory ICJ jurisdiction with reservations, and includes subsidiary legislative instruments enacted locally. The constitution provides for an independent judiciary, and although the courts are not totally free from influence of the executive branch, they have demonstrated their independence on occasions.

The Supreme Court, presided over by a chief justice, has both civil and criminal jurisdiction. Formerly, appeals from any decision of the Supreme Court went before the Court of Appeals, whose judgments could be taken to the UK Privy Council. The January 1997 constitution provided for a reconfiguration of the courts with the Supreme Court replacing the Privy Council.

Muslim courts apply Shariah law in certain cases involving Muslim citizens, and in traditional matters, chiefs rule on customary law and local affairs. District tribunals serve as appeal courts in cases of tribal law and custom. Cases of first instance in criminal and civil matters are handled by administrative officers who function as magistrates in courts located in each of the five administrative regions and Banjul.

### **1:6.12 Armed Forces**

During the early settlement of The British in St. Mary's Island (now Banjul) in 1816, Alexander Grant, the Military Administrator of the island came with 80 British soldiers of West Indian extraction who garrisoned the island before being absorbed into the West African Frontier Force. Before 1961 there was the Royal West African Frontier Force (RWAFF) formed in 1900 by the British colonial government of which The Gambia had a section, called the Gambia Company.

This was later changed to the Gambia Auxiliary Force and subsequently the Field Force. The Gambia Field Force was established in 1961, three years before independence.

The Field Force was disbanded in 1981, following the failed coup of that year. A new law was passed in 1984 called the Armed Act which established the armed forces, consisting of Gambia Army and the Gendarmerie, with the British Army Training Team (BATT) and the Senegalese Gendarmerie training the two arms of the service, respectively.

The GNA existed alongside the Gendarmerie, until 1994 when the two institutions were merged under one command structure. Prior to the 1994 coup, the Gambian Army received technical assistance and training from the US, UK, China, Turkey and Nigeria. The army has received renewed assistance from Turkey and new assistance from Libya and others.

In addition to the merger, further re-organization and restructuring of the GNA was undertaken in 1986 which resulted in its expansion, and the establishment of the three services under the Gambia Armed Forces: the National Army, Guard and Navy.

Each of these military services is overseen by a Commander, with the Chief-of-Defense-Staff and Chief-of-Staff at the top under the President who is also the Commander-in-Chief.

The Gambia's armed forces had 800 members in 2001, all of whom comprised the Gambian National Army, which was made up of two infantry battalions, one engineer squadron and a company of the Presidential Guard. The 70-member naval arm had three coastal patrol boats. The Gambia provided observers to five other African nations. The defense budget in 2005 totaled \$2.3 million. (Available at [www.encyclopedia.com/topic/Gambia](http://www.encyclopedia.com/topic/Gambia).)

### **1:6.13 International Cooperation**

The Gambia was admitted to the United Nations on 21 September 1965 and is a member of ECA and all the non-regional specialized agencies except IAEA. It also belongs to the WTO, the African Development Bank, the ACP Group, the Commonwealth of Nations, the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), ECOWAS, G-77, the Community of Sahel and Saharan States (CENSAD), the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), and the African Union. The government is participating in efforts to establish a West African Monetary Zone (WAMZ) that would include The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone. The union, has been scheduled to come on-stream in January 2003, but has been rescheduled for December 2009.



An agreement of confederation with Senegal, signed on 17 December 1981 and effective 1 February 1982, called for integration of the security services and armed forces of the two countries under the name Senegambia. The presidents of Senegal and The Gambia became president and vice president of Senegambia, respectively. The confederation was dissolved in 1989. The Gambia has played an active role in ECOWAS efforts to resolve the civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone. The country contributed troops to cease-fire monitoring groups in 1990 (ECOMOG) and in 2003 (ECOMIL). The Gambia has also supported UN operations and missions in Ethiopia and Eritrea (est. 2000), Burundi (2004), and Côte d'Ivoire (2004). The Gambia is a part of the Nonaligned Movement and participates in the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.

In environmental cooperation, The Gambia is part of the Basel Convention, the Convention on Biological Diversity, Ramsar, CITES, the Kyoto Protocol, the Montréal Protocol, MARPOL, the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, and the UN Conventions on the Law of the Sea, Climate Change, and Desertification.

#### **1:6.14 Economy**

The Gambia's light sandy soil is well suited to the cultivation of groundnuts, which is the country's principal agricultural export. About 75% of the population is engaged in crop production and livestock- raising. However, groundnut production has fallen in recent years, and in 1990, tourism overtook groundnut exports as the nation's number one export earner. Significant export revenues are earned from fishing and re-export trade.

The military's takeover of the country in 1994 resulted in a loss of \$50 million in aid from the West, equal to about 10% of national income. In addition, tourism declined dramatically; and Senegal, which surrounds The Gambia on three sides, closed the borders because of smuggling. As a result of the 1994 CFA franc devaluation, The Gambia's goods were no longer competitive in the re-export trade. During the late 1990s, the tourism industry rebounded, as did trade. Tourism declined in 2000, but record crops supported healthy economic growth in 2001. Tourism in 2002 accounted for 10–15% of GDP.

Average annual growth of GDP was at 2.7% for 1988 to 1998, but GDP growth was 5.7% in 2001. The GDP growth rate in 2005 was estimated at 7.1%. Corruption remains an ongoing

problem, and the pace of privatization was slow in 2006. The inflation rate stood at 8.8% in 2001. Unemployment and underemployment rates remained extremely high.

### **1: 6.15 Income**

The US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) reports that in 2001 The Gambia's gross domestic product (GDP) was estimated at \$3.1 billion. The CIA defines GDP as the value of all final goods and services produced within a nation in a given year and computed on the basis of purchasing power parity (PPP) rather than value as measured on the basis of the rate of exchange based on current dollars. The per capita GDP was estimated at \$1,900. The annual growth rate of GDP was estimated at 7.1%. The average inflation rate in 2005 was 8.8%. It was estimated that agriculture accounted for 35.5% of GDP, industry 12.2%, and services 52.3%.

According to the World Bank, in 2003 remittances from citizens working abroad totaled \$40 million or about \$28 per capita and accounted for approximately 10.9% of GDP. Foreign aid receipts amounted to \$60 million or about \$42 per capita and accounted for approximately 16.2% of the gross national income (GNI).

The World Bank reports that in 2003 household consumption in Gambia, The totaled \$293 million or about \$206 per capita based on a GDP of \$366.0 million, measured in current dollars rather than PPP. Household consumption includes expenditures of individuals, households, and nongovernmental organizations on goods and services, excluding purchases of dwellings. It was estimated that for the period 1990 to 2003 household consumption grew at an average annual rate of 3.8%. It was estimated that in 1998 about 57.6% of the population had incomes below the poverty line.

### **1:6.16 Labour**

In 2002, Gambia's workforce numbered about 300,000. Approximately 75% of workers were engaged in agriculture, with industry, commerce and services accounting for 19% of the labor force. The government provided jobs to 6% of the workforce in 2002. There was no unemployment data available.

The Labor Act of 1990 allows all workers (except civil servants, police, and military personnel) to form associations and trade unions. Approximately 10% of the workforce is

unionized, which is about 30,000 workers. Strikes are permitted with 14 days' notice (21 days for essential services) to the Commissioner of Labor. Collective bargaining occurs even though unions are small and fragmented. Minimum wages and hours of employment are set by six joint industrial councils (commerce, artisans, transport, the port industry, agriculture, and fisheries), but only 20% of the labor force is covered by minimum wage legislation. The minimum wage was \$.66 per day in 2002. Most Gambians pool their resources within extended families in order to meet their basic needs. The statutory working age is 18, but because of limited opportunities for secondary schooling, most children begin working at age 14.

### **1:6. 17 Agriculture**

The soil is mostly poor and sandy, except in the riverine swamps. On upland soils the main food crops, besides groundnuts, are millet, manioc, corn, and beans. Most landholdings range between five and nine hectares (12 and 22 acres). Agriculture supports about 80% of the active population, and contributed about 30% of GDP in 2003. Irregular and inadequate rainfall has adversely affected crop production in recent years.

The principal cash crop is groundnuts, grown on some 111,000 hectares (275,000 acres). Production totaled 73,000 tons in 2004. That year, the paddy rice crop was estimated at 22,000 tons. Other food crops in 2004 included an estimated 25,000 tons of corn and 90,000 tons of millet. Mangos, bananas, oranges, pawpaw, and limes are grown mainly in the Western Division. Oil palms provide oil for local consumption and kernels for export; palm oil production was estimated at 2,500 tons in 2004, and kernels at 2,000 tons.

### **1:6.18 Mining**

The mineral industry was a minor component of Gambia's economy. Clays for bricks, laterite, silica sand, cockleshell, and sand and gravel were exploited for domestic construction needs. Production of silica sand was estimated at 1,530,000 metric tons in 2004, down slightly from 1,534,000 metric tons in 2003. The Gambia had significant glass and quartz sand deposits, and resources of ilmenite, rutile, tin, and zircon. The government has encouraged exploration for gold. Large deposits of ilmenite were discovered along the coast in 1953, and were exploited by UK interests from 1956 to 1959. A new mineral and mining act was being developed.

### **1:6.19 Energy and Power**

In February 2004, the government announced the discovery of large oil deposits. The country must import all of the fossil fuels it consumes. In 2002, consumption and imports of refined petroleum products each came to 1,980 barrels per day. There were no known imports or consumption of natural gas products or coal. All electric power is produced at thermal stations. Installed capacity in 2002 totaled 29,000 kW, with electricity output at 135 million kWh in that year. Electric power consumption that same year came to 126 million kWh.

### **1:6.20 Industry**

There is little industry in The Gambia. Industries include groundnut processing, fish processing, the processing of hides, building and repair of river craft, village handicrafts, and clothing manufacture. There are candle factories, oil mills, a soft drink factory, a distillery, a shoe factory and a soap and detergent plant. Although the government provides incentives for industrial development, progress on that front has been slow. In February 2004, the government announced the discovery of large oil deposits. The Gambia produces industrial minerals for local consumption. Privatization has been slow, except in the tourism and banking sectors. The largest industrial complex in the country, the Gambia Groundnut Company, formerly owned by the Alimenta group based in Switzerland, was taken over by the government in 1999. This led to a protracted legal battle and out-of-court settlement, after which the parties agreed to a compensation plan. The government subsequently re-privatized the company.

### **1:6.21 Science and Technology**

The United Kingdom's Medical Research Council operates a field station (of its Dunn Nutrition Unit Laboratory in Cambridge) at Keneba, West Kiang, and a research laboratory on tropical diseases at Fajara, near Banjul. Gambia College, founded in 1978, has schools of agriculture, nursing and midwifery, and public health. The Gambia Ornithological Society, founded in 1974, is devoted to bird watching.

### **1:6. 22 Domestic Trade**

The marketing of the groundnut crop for export is handled by the Gambia Produce Marketing Board. About 75% of the population is employed in subsistence farming. Manufacturing is

primarily based on agriculture and serves a domestic market. Cooperative banking and marketing unions finance the activities of a network of cooperatives in the groundnut-growing areas. Re-exportation of goods through the port of Banjul is a major contributing factor to the economy. Normal business hours are from 8 am to 4 pm, Monday through Thursday, and 8 am to 12:30 pm on Friday. Banking hours are from 8 am to 1 pm, Monday through Thursday, and from 8 to 11 am on Friday. Shopping takes place between the hours of 9:30 am and noon, and 2:30 to 6 pm, Monday through Friday, and from 9 am to noon on Saturday.

### **1:6. 23 Foreign Trade**

Peanut products are by far The Gambia's leading export. However, peanut exports were depressed in the early 1980s, first by drought and then by low world prices. Other exports include fish, cotton lint, and palm kernels. The leading imports are food, manufactured goods, raw materials, fuel, machinery, and transport equipment.

In 2004, The Gambia's primary export partners were: India (23.7%), the United Kingdom (15.2%), France (14.2%), Germany (9.6%), Italy (8.3%), Thailand (5.9%), and Malaysia (4.1%). The primary import partners in 2004 were: China (23.7%), Senegal (11.6%), Brazil (5.9%), the United Kingdom (5.5%), the Netherlands (4.5%), and the United States (4.4%).

<b>Country</b>	<b>Exports</b>	<b>Imports</b>	<b>Balance</b>
World	16.2	189.4	-173.2
Senegal	6.4	5.2	1.2
Guinea-Bissau	1.9	...	1.9
Belgium	1.7	6.6	-4.9
Germany	1.4	42.5	-41.1
South Africa	1.4	...	1.4

Country	Exports	Imports	Balance
United Kingdom	1.1	14.5	-13.4
Netherlands	0.4	11.8	-11.4
Spain	0.4	3.7	-3.3
United States	0.3	7.6	-7.3
Cameroon	0.3	1.4	-1.1

(...) data not available or not significant.

Source : [www.encyclopedia.com/topic/Gambia.aspx](http://www.encyclopedia.com/topic/Gambia.aspx)

### **1: 6. 24 Economic Investment**

Joint ventures have been encouraged in The Gambia, but with the stipulation that a portion of the profits must be reinvested. Under an ordinance passed in 1964, developing industries are exempt from profits tax for five years.

In 2002 the government embarked on a new effort to attract foreign investment, called the Gateway Project, financed by a World Bank loan. The Gambia Investment Promotion and Free Zone Agency (GIPZA) was established, with the first free zone planned for Banjul Airport. Gambia's foreign investment regime is open door and nondiscriminatory, with foreign companies treated the same as local companies. Incentives for locating in the free zones include exemptions from taxes and customs duties, a ten-year tax holiday, and a reduced 10% corporate income tax rate for investments in the tourist sector. The government's priorities for foreign investment are agriculture, fisheries, tourism, light manufacture and assembly, energy, mineral exploration and exploitation, and telecommunications.

### **1:6. 25 Economic Development**

Development goals have been focused on transport and communications improvements, increases in rice and groundnut yields, and production diversity.

The historical importance of Great Britain to The Gambia has declined, as Gambia has turned increasingly to the IDA and the European Development Fund, France, Germany, Switzerland, Japan, and Arab donors for aid. When Western aid ceased after the 1994 military takeover, The Gambia turned to Taiwan, Libya, Cuba, Nigeria, and Iran for economic support.

In 1999, the EU intended to spend \$20 million on poverty alleviation, and the African Development Bank sponsored a \$1 million rehabilitation program for the fishing industry. In 2000, The Gambia was slated to receive \$91 million in debt relief under the International Monetary Fund (IMF)/World Bank Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative, intended to reduce poverty and stimulate economic growth. The IMF began a three-year \$27 million Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) Arrangement with The Gambia in 2002. As of January 2005, the World Bank had approved a total of 31 IDA credits for The Gambia for a total of approximately \$272.7 million. The government has directed spending to social sectors in recent years, including agriculture, education and health. A girls' scholarship program began in 2001 and was met with great success, enrolling girls from poor households in school.

### **1:6.26 Social Development**

A national pension and disability system covers employed persons in quasi-government institutions and in participating private companies. The retirement age is 55, with early retirement at 45. Worker's compensation laws have been in effect since 1940. Benefits include medical, surgical, hospital and nursing care, and medication. A special scheme exists for civil servants and the military. Agricultural workers and subsistence farmers are excluded from coverage.

Women play little part in the public life of this conservative Islamic country. Arranged marriages are common, and polygamy is practiced. Women face discrimination in education and employment. Inheritance rights, moreover, favor men. The painful and often life-threatening practice of female genital mutilation continues to be widespread and is opposed by organized women's rights groups. Domestic violence is widespread, and considered a family issue. Education for children is compulsory, in theory, but this provision is not enforced in practice. Child labor and trafficking children persists.

Human rights are improving but there are still significant problems in many areas. There were reports of arbitrary arrest, detention and torture. The court system remained inefficient and corrupt.

### **1: 6.27 Health**

The Gambia has hospitals in Banjul (Royal Victoria) and Bansang and a health clinic in kombo, St. Mary. The country provided 62% of its people with safe water and 37% with adequate sanitation in 2000. Health conditions are poor: in 2005, average life expectancy was estimated at only 53.75. Nearly half of all children die by age five, primarily because of malaria and diarrheal diseases. Malaria, tuberculosis, trypanosomiasis, and schistosomiasis are widespread.

In 2005 the infant mortality was estimated at 73.07 deaths per 1,000 live births. The Gambia has a higher than average maternal mortality rate, with an estimated 1,100 maternal deaths during childbirth or pregnancy per 100,000 live births. Contraceptives were used by 12% of married women ages 15–49. As of 2004, there were fewer than 4 physicians per 100,000 people. There were as few as 12 nurses per 100,000 population. Dentists and pharmacists were also scarce, numbering fewer than 1 per 200,000 people. Total health care expenditure was estimated at 3.7% of GDP (Zeilig, Leo and David Seddon, 1999)

Female genital mutilation is performed on nearly every woman in The Gambia. The government published a policy opposing female genital mutilation, but there had been no specific laws prohibiting it. The most recent immunization rates available for children under one year old were as follows: tuberculosis, 98%; diphtheria, pertussis, and tetanus, 90%; polio, 29%; and measles, 87%.

The HIV/AIDS prevalence was 1.20 per 100 adults in 2003. As of 2004, there were approximately 6,800 people living with HIV/AIDS in the country. There were an estimated 600 deaths from AIDS in 2003.

### **1:6.28 Education**

Primary school is free but not compulsory and, as of 2002, lasts for nine years. Secondary schooling covers six years in two stages of three years each. The academic year runs from September to July. Primary school enrollment in 2003 was estimated at about 79% of age-



eligible students. The same year, secondary school enrollment was about 33% of age-eligible students; 39% for boys and 27% for girls. It is estimated that about 68% of all students complete their primary education. The student-to-teacher ratio for primary school was at about 38:1 in 2003; the ratio for secondary school was about 26:1. In 2003, about 21% of all secondary students were enrolled in private schools.

The University of The Gambia was established in 1999 with four faculties and Gambia College, which in turn has four schools (agriculture; science; education; and nursing, midwifery, and public health). The adult literacy rate for 2003 was estimated at about 40.1%, with 47.8% for men and 32.8% for women.

As of 2003, public expenditure on education was estimated at 2.8% of GDP, or 8.9% of total government expenditures.

## **1:6. 29 Media**

In 2003, there were an estimated 28 mainline telephones for every 1,000 people; about 10,600 people were on a waiting list for telephone service installation. The same year, there were approximately 73 mobile phones in use for every 1,000 people.

In 2004, the government operated one radio station and one television station. There is one private satellite TV station available. There were four private radio stations broadcasting throughout the country. In 2003, there were an estimated 394 radios and 15 television sets for every 1,000 people. Also in 2003, there were 13.8 personal computers for every 1,000 people.

There is one daily newspaper, *The Daily Observer*, with a 2002 circulation of 2,000. Though nominally independent, there have been allegations that editorial content was swayed toward promotion of the Alliance for Patriotic Reorientation and Construction (APRC). Other newspapers include *The Gambia Daily*, which, in spite of its name, is actually published three mornings per week, by the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting; the *Foroyaa*, a weekly with a circulation of 1,500; *The Gambia News and Report*, another weekly, also with a circulation of 1,500; and *The Point*, published twice a week, with a 2002 circulation of 4,000.

The old and new constitutions provide for free expression, but the government is said to prohibit all dissenting political publication and broadcasting.

### **1:6. 30 Tourism, Travel, and Recreation**

All visitors need a valid passport and visa. Vaccinations against yellow fever are required if traveling from an infected area. Tourism significantly increased during the 1990s; however, outside of Banjul, facilities are limited and very basic. Main attractions are the 19th-century architecture in Banjul and the ecotourism along the Gambia River. Popular sports are football (soccer) and wrestling.

In 2005, the US Department of State estimated the daily expenses for staying in Banjul from November through April at \$185. Outside the capital, travel costs were significantly less expensive, averaging \$20 per day.

### **1:6. 31 Economic Policies and Trends.**

The main features of The Gambia's economy are its small size, narrow economic base and heavy reliance on agriculture, with limited number of cash crops, mainly groundnuts. This makes the economy vulnerable to the vagaries of the climate and to price changes in the international markets for these products. In the late seventies and early eighties, the country experienced significant decline in economic growth. To address this situation, The Gambia embarked on a series of structural adjustment programmes aimed at restoring macro-economic balance and economic growth. Despite the gains recorded under these programmes, the structure of the economy remains weak and highly vulnerable to external shocks due mainly to the volatile nature of the major sources of revenue, namely re export trade, ground nut export and tourism.

### **1:6. 32 Macro- economic policy and strategy.**

The Gambia continues to implement free market policies and strategies as enshrined in Economic Recovery programme (ERP) and its successor programme, the Program for Sustained Development (PSD). These two development programmes were subsumed into a long-term development strategy, known as Vision 2020. A number of reforms have been and

continue to be undertaken on both the fiscal and structural fronts. On the fiscal front, public finances will be strengthened through a further reduction in the budget deficit and an improvement in the structure of government revenue and expenditure, including a reduction of import tariffs. The structural measures will include encouraging private sector development, attracting foreign investment, facilitating economic diversification, deepening financial intermediation and upgrading the soundness of the banking system, resuming public enterprise reform, reforming the energy sector, strengthening the agricultural sector, strengthening the institutional capacity of the public administration, and implementing a comprehensive social agenda, especially in the education and health sectors. The Gambia's medium term strategy is embedded in the Policy Framework Paper, which has been replaced by the PRSP. An interim PRSP (SPA II) has been prepared and was launched in November 2000 and the final document was prepared and adopted in 2001. The PRSP defines and outlines a people-centered approach to the eradication of poverty. It sets out the poverty reduction strategy and the implementation modalities for Vision 2020.

#### **1:6.34 Human Development and Poverty.**

According to the 2000 National Human Development Report (NHDR, 2000), HDI for The Gambia is 0.363. The Life Expectancy Index (LEI) is 0.5, Educational Attainment Index (EAI) is 0.364 and the Real GDP Index (RGI) is 0.226. The figures reported in the global HDR are slightly different from those in the NHDR. The Global HDR (GHDR) reports an HDI of 0.396, an LEI of 0.37, an EAI of 0.37 and an RGI of 0.45. In terms of gender, the GHDR reports a gender-related development index of 0.388, while NHDR reports an index of 0.340. It must be noted that the GHDR figures have a two to three year time lag while those of the NHDR have a one-year lag.

Life expectancy at birth is still low at about 53 years overall, 52 years for men and 55 for women. Infant mortality was 73 per 1000 babies born in 2000, down from 159 per 1000 babies born in 1980. The under-five mortality rate is about 110 per 1000 children. Prevalence of malnutrition declined to 30% in 2000. About 62% of total population, (53% in the rural and 80% in the urban areas) have access to safe water supply. Sanitation services are available for 37% of the total population (35% of the rural population and 41% of the urban population below for additional health indicators for The Gambia)). In the area of education, the overall illiteracy level stands at 63% and that for females at 78%. Industry and

manufacturing sectors account for 12% and 11% of GDP, respectively. The services sector, which is dominated by the hotel industry and a vibrant informal sub sector, contributes about 67% of GDP and is the main foreign exchange earner.

The growth rate of the services sector is 4.3%. Rapid population growth and increasing urbanization have posed a threat to the environment and put pressure on limited natural resources, thus aggravating environmental problems such as soil degradation, loss of forest cover, loss of biodiversity and poor sanitation. Coastal erosion has become a serious problem. For example, in some areas along the Atlantic coastline, the beach has been retreating at a rate of 1-2 m per year for the past thirty years while severe coastal erosion has produced sandy cliffs two meters high in other areas. Soil salinity is another threat to the environment. Saltwater intrusion has destroyed many farmlands making many farming households poorer.

#### **1:6 .35 Analysis of general country situation.**

The Gambia is classified as one of the Least Developed Countries (LDC) in the world. The UNDP Human Development Report 2001 (UNDP, 2002) ranks The Gambia at 149 out of 161 countries, with a Human Development Index (HDI) of 0.396. The country has a GNP per capita of US\$ 340 and a GDP per capita of US \$1,100. The GDP growth rate in the 1999-2000 period was an impressive 5.6%. About 64% of the total population lives below the national poverty line,

whereas 59.3% of the population live below US\$ 1 per day, and 2.9% live below US\$ 2 per day. The agricultural sector employs about 75 % of the labour force and contributes 21% of GDP with a growth rate of 2.7%. The sector is characterized by low productivity stemming largely from poor rainfall and over reliance on outdated technology. Structural and cultural problems hamper the development of the sector thus frustrating efforts to achieve food security. Of those who are extremely poor, 91% work in agriculture. According to the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP), groundnut farmers in The Gambia are the poorest of the poor.

As a percentage of GDP, the tourism industry grew by 3.7% as against 7.5% in 1998. The sector's contribution increased from 5.4% in 1998 to 5.7% in 1999. The telecommunication industry once again registered a significant growth of 8% and has emerged as the second most important industry in 1999 contributing 27.3% to the GDP.

The electricity and water industries combined, grew moderately and registered a 2% growth, while the trade industry, the third most important in the economy contributed 21.1% to GDP. The total road network in The Gambia is 2,700 km long, of which 956 km are paved. The Gambia has 400 km of waterways, which include the Gambia River, the most navigable river in West Africa. Preliminary estimates indicate the balance of payments accounts recorded an overall surplus of 101.2 million Dalasi in 1999. This positive upturn is, however, largely attributed to an improvement in the capital account as a result of the increase in official loans and grants. The current account deficit including official transfers deteriorated, slightly, from 3% in 1998 to 3.8% in 1999 of GDP reflecting the influence of the merchandise trade deficit. During 1999 the total value of international trade was about 2.8 Billion Dalasi, a 5.4% increase over the 2.7 Billion Dalasi recorded for 1998. In 1999, total imports were valued at 2.6 Billion Dalasi, a 7.6% increase over 1998 while total domestic exports were valued at about 239 Million Dalasi.

This resulted in a trade deficit of about 2.4 Billion Dalasi. The Gambia's total outstanding external public debt amounted to US\$420.8 million in 1999. The World Bank and Debt Relief International have indicated that The Gambia is entitled to 18 to 20% of debt relief. Worthy of mention is the fact that no external arrears were accumulated. The IDA, IMF and ADB have indicated their commitment to giving debt relief to the Gambia. The Government of the Gambia is also engaging bilateral development partners in negotiations for more relief. It is envisaged that the Gambia will benefit about US\$67 million in debt relief. The Gambia has been operating a liberal exchange rate system since 1986, with the Dalasi floating within the context of an inter-bank market. There are no exchange controls or restrictions on current or capital accounts. In 1999, the Dalasi depreciated against all the currencies traded in the inter-bank market.

## **1: 7 Statement of Problem**

Electoral and democratization process in The Gambia are vexed issues that have not been given empirical research and critical analysis for determinacy of performance in development. As such, elections and democratization process in the country continue to elicit more than casual interest by scholars and researchers. This is based on the fact that only credible electoral and democratic process can consolidate and sustain the country's fragile

democracy. It is in this context that this research makes a comparative analysis study of the electoral and democratization process in the Gambia from 1965 to 2015 with a view to determining performance ratios between the first democratic republic under Jawara and the second democratic republic under Jammeh, while visualizing possibilities for future democratic prospect in a new dispensation.

Over the years, The Gambia continues to witness with growing disappointments and apprehension inability to conduct peaceful, free and fair, open and credible elections whose results are widely accepted and respected across the country and by the international community. In fact, the political landscape of The Gambia is littered with mass rigging and fraud. All the elections that have ever been conducted in The Gambia since independence have generated increasingly bitter controversies and grievances on a national scale because of the twin problems of voters' registration and irregularity that have become central elements of the history of elections and of the electoral process in the country

Since independence in 1965, there has been a gradual, but concerted attempt to reverse the trend of political despair and disillusionment, which hitherto characterized political life in the country. This attempt manifests in the demand for political pluralism and democratization. The long years of political misrule and of course bad governance exemplified by personalized political regimes and ruthless dictatorships left The Gambia politically demobilized and economically de-capacitated with a miserable population ravaged by poverty, illiteracy and disease. Regrettably, Gambia harbors the highest stock of the world's poorest people. The debilitating poverty of the people accentuated by economic corruption seems to have provided a basis and indeed, a common platform in the demand for democratic change by the people. Thus, the struggle for democratization change in The Gambia has relevance not only in liberalizing the political arena and achieving civil and political liberties, but also to ensure better living standards and social welfare for the Gambia people. In other words, achieving the object of good governance is the crux. However, the extent to which the current democratic project with its frailties, uncertainties and sometimes reversals, could usher in a viable democracy and ensure good governance particularly in the 21st century remains an issue of speculation. In other words, what has democracy been in The Gambia and what is the future of democracy and good governance in the country.

## **1: 8 Objective of the Study**

The objective of this study is:

- 1 to assess the electoral and democratization process in The Gambia with a critical comparative survey for a determinate performance between the first and second republics,
- 2 to appraise the patterns of the electoral and democratic system of the country's First and Second Republics, their overall achievements and challenges under the two regimes,
- 3 To ascertain if low illiteracy level was attributable to the poor performance index ratio under the two regimes and how this occurred?
- 4 to find out if the ethnicity and power politics in the country were a factor in the poor democratization and electoral process in the country,
- 5 to ascertain if lack of institution-based electoral and democratic system actually was and is still a result of poor democratic governance performance for state-building, and,
- 6 to proffer solutions that will advance and stabilize a sustainable and viable electoral and democratic system and process in the Gambia.

## **1: 9 Research Questions**

1. What are the electoral and democratic impacts of The Gambia's First and Second Republics?
2. What are the achievements and challenges of the First and Second Republics Gambia?
3. Would the low level of democracy in The Gambia be attributable to the predominant illiteracy in the country?
4. What considerable remedies would be practically suitable for improving the Gambia's electoral and democratic process?

## **1: 10 Hypotheses**

As a result of these research questions, the following Hypotheses have been drawn for this study:

### **Hypothesis 1**

Null (Ho): The First Republic Gambia was not better than the Second Republic.

Alternative (H1): Null (Ho): The First Republic Gambia was better than the Second Republic

### **Hypothesis 2**

Null (Ho): High illiterate level was not responsible for low democratic growth in The Gambia

Alternative (H1): High illiterate level was responsible for low democratic growth in The Gambia

## **1: 11 Significance of Study**

This research expects to offer insights with promising potentials to enhance knowledge production by researchers and political scientists in the Gambia. It can produce new perspectives and models for policy makers and elections administrators in understanding and improving democratic governance in The Gambia. However, the comparative assessment of the electoral and democratic process in The Gambia within the Gambia democratic science system is specifically important for the following reasons:

1. The thesis will be of considerable value to policy makers in understanding the benefits of different governance model and structures, and the implications that the governance system could have for democratic practices or political behaviors. Therefore, the research would hopefully warrant the need to reform and improve the Gambia democratic system, through overhauling.



2. The findings and conclusions of this research can help research organizations in the Gambia including the University of the Gambia to increase research effectiveness by choosing their governance structures wisely in order to foster suitable and well informed political behavior/decision that optimizes performance at the micro/individual level. Besides, individual researchers can find strength in the insights provided by this work to increase interest in this very important research policy area.

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3. The conclusions and recommendations of the thesis will encourage collaborative exchanges and external networks, which have promising potentials to improve competences at the individual and team levels and to enhance democratic performance.

4. Finally, the thesis can open a new window for optimal and effective use of tools and strategies in the administration of credible elections in The Gambia and development activities, which can increase democratic growth within the Gambia public science system.

However, since a study of this nature cannot claim to have exhausted the contextual relevance of electoral and democratic process in this country, it is envisaged that it will provoke the hunger for further research on other missing links. This study may go a long way therefore, to dispelling or confirming the strongly held view that the root-cause of poor democratic growth in The Gambia was largely due to the illiteracy level of the country.

## **1: 12 Research Scope**

This study will be basically anchored within a given political and historical time frame (1965 -2001); a period that marks the commencement of independence democracy and the military transformation or infusion into democratic politics which ended The Gambia's 29 years First Republic. It will cover all the five political and administrative regions of the country: North Bank Region (NBR), West Coast Region (WCR), Central River Region (CRR), Lower River Region (LRR) and the Upper River Region (URR) and the Kombo St. Mary's Region; which is made up of Banjul and Kanifing Municipalities.

## **1. 13 Methodology to Research**

The methodology of this research will be broadly diverse; as it combines both qualitative and quantitative designs. The study will employ the use of survey questionnaires and structured personal interviews to obtain data from the population sample in all the political regions and administrative

regions of The Gambia. Equally, secondary data (information) will largely be used to address the research issues. Materials from these sources include scholarly and professional works on electoral and democratic issues, research reports, academic journals and other published works. These will be duly acknowledged and listed in the bibliography. To achieve the set objectives of this research the National Archives and National Library in Banjul respectively would be frequently consulted.

A 5- point Likert-type Questionnaire will be designed to elicit responses classified into: [Strongly Agree (SA), Agree (A), Undecided (UD), Disagree (D), and Strongly Disagree (SD)] from the sample population.

To analyse the data, descriptive statistical measure of central tendency will be employed for Hypothesis 1. Whereas the one -tailed Pearson's product- moment correlation coefficient at 0.05 level of significance ( $H_0 = 0$ ;  $\alpha = 0.05$ ) will be used to establish the relationship, if any, between illiteracy and democracy in the country in hypothesis 2

## **Chapter Two**

### **2.0 Review of Related Literature**

#### **2:1 Introduction**

This chapter reviews relevant and related literature in the domains of Electoral and Democratization process. Specifically and broadly, this session assesses the electoral and democratic process in The Gambia, patterns of the electoral and democratic system of the First and Second Republics, achievements and challenges of the First and Second Republics Gambia, Low – level democracy and mass illiteracy in The Gambia and recommendations for democratic survival in The Gambia.

It is certainly no claim to say that evidence from this study will immensely add to the existing volumes of literature on electoral and political studies in The Gambia, more especially as none had focused on it previously. Despite the obvious fact that there has never been a specific work on this topic, there is however some works which appear relevant to this current one. What follows here therefore, is overview of some of these. Even though, the review will not claim to be too exhaustive, however, the ones to be featured here will give some indicative guide from which solid methodological foundation will be built. Evidences from literature on electoral and democratic process and its comparative analysis within a wider dimension underline not only the relevance of research of a general perspective, but also pinpoint the democratic challenges that The Gambia has to grapple with. Asides, evidence from literature in Electoral and Democratic process studies in a developing country like The Gambia, may generate and or provoke further search for answers to many electoral and democratic questions that hinder meaningful political and economic development. In particular, this important chapter examines previous studies on electoral and democratic process in The Gambia by way of making a comparative analysis of the First and Second Republics Gambia and the implications for future electoral and democratic development in The Gambia.

In all, a major thrust of this dissertation argument is that empirical approach to research on electoral and democratic science generally has the potentials to enhance knowledge based production by researchers who understand the process and goals of research content (Ozor,

2012). This connotes independence for scholars/researchers who combine both qualitative and quantitative research; which leads to creative, critical and ground-breaking research outcomes. Suffice it to say that the literature evidence provides pertinent insight for data design of this work.

Elections are instruments of democracy to the degree that they give the people influence over policy making and the choices of those policies by the policy makers, believed to be people-based and public-driven (Powell, 2000). One of the fundamental roles of elections is the evaluation of the incumbent government in terms of performance and delivery. Citizens use elections to reward or punish the incumbents by voting for/or against continuity as was the case in the Nigeria's just concluded presidential election of 28<sup>th</sup> march, 2015, when the electorate in the country voted out of office for a second term the government of Dr. Goodluck Ebele Jonathan of the People's Democratic Party which had ruled the country hopelessly for good 16years with no credible and substantive deliveries of dividends of democracy and good governance to the people. Citizens who have more positive attitudes about their ability to directly control by choosing between prospective members of parliament are more likely to show positive attitudes toward the legislature. On the other hand, the language of elections as instruments of citizen influence is more often associated with a vision of dispersed policy-making power. In this vision elections play a more indirect role in policy making and indeed a direct one as the people's elected representatives in the parliament use policy instruments through a dynamically vibrant legislative process to decide what is and/or what ought to be. The essence of the vision is that the election brings representative agents of all the factions in the society into the policy-making arena. These agents then bargain with each other in a flexible and accommodative fashion. The dispersed influence emphasizes the representation of all points of view brought into an arena of shifting policy coalitions. In turn, citizens' perceptions of the representation (that is, how well the members of parliament (MPs) reflect the views of voters) have a significant impact on their attitudes toward the legislature. Moreover, I attempt to explore the interaction of electoral systems with those two different perceptions (accountability and representation) of elections to determine if such interaction shapes popular trust in legislature.

Electoral and democratic process is considered as defining an unavoidable element of any peace-building process. They are clear, identifiable and newsworthy events. They are thus highly likely to be over-emphasized by the international community, which has often

regarded them as the benchmark point for its exit strategy from a peace-building effort - getting out before international politics moves on to the next great cause and before domestic political and financial pressures grow to declare victory and go home.

## **2:2 Overview of the Electoral and Democratic Process of The Gambia's First and Second Republics**

The Gambia is a country covering a mere 4,000 square miles with a population of only 1.7 million, both the economic and political viability of the country was in question. Several colonial and post-independence initiatives to integrate The Gambia into neighboring Senegal failed because of different colonial legacies and disputes over leadership of the Senegambia Confederation.(Senghor, J. 2008).

Elections in the First and Second Republics Gambia have been vexed issues. This is because they have always been accompanied with agitations, acrimony, contestations, bitterness and rancor among others. This is because such elections are usually marred with a lot of flaws that lay no credibility for their fairness and transparency, a situation that worsened under the Second Republic of President Yahya Jammeh. The last elections held in The Gambia under the British colonial rule were in December 1962. The elections ushered in The Gambia's independence on February 18, 1965, while the first post - colonial general election took place in December 1970.

### **2:2:1 The First Republic**

In 1962, Jawara became Prime Minister, which laid the foundation for the People's Progressive Party (PPP) and Jawara domination of the Gambia's political landscape. With Jawara's rise to power after the 1962 elections, the colonial administration began a gradual withdrawal from the Gambia, with self-government granted in 1963. Jawara was appointed Prime Minister in the same year, and independence came on February 18, 1965. This completed the Gambia's peaceful transition from colonial rule. Gaining independence in 1965, The Gambia was Britain's last and oldest colonial possession in West Africa to do so, after Ghana, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone.

President Jawara, along with a small cabinet, a coterie of civil-servants, and very limited resources, worked to put in place an open-market system predicated on a functioning

democracy. Unlike many African leaders of the immediate post-independence 1960s, who invested primarily in massive popular national projects, Jawara instead implemented modest development goals that sought to improve basic health, education, and physical infrastructure. In time, access to education improved, as did life-expectancy, and before long this relatively well-governed nation began to enjoy Western financial support. (Saine, A. 2012:28).

Yet, characteristic of his generation of African leaders, Jawara's leadership became increasingly personalist, be-deviled by patronage, the co-optation of opposition political leaders, and institutional deterioration. A foiled 1981 coup, in which an estimated 500 people were killed, forced Jawara to undertake key political and economic reforms, but these were not enough to assuage a deepening divide between social classes. While a World Bank-sponsored economic recovery program succeeded in curbing inflation and set the economy on a course to recovery, unemployment and underemployment increased on an alarming rate with poor infrastructural educational facilities to bridge the gap for provisions of innovative and quality human capital development. (Saine, A. 2012:28).

Political reforms, which were never as far-reaching as the economic reforms, deepened political factionalism and eroded government legitimacy, a situation worsened by ethnic politics and class interest which characterized the Jawara led-regime and among those challenges that paved ways for subsequent military incursions and counter-coups until the one of July, 1994 came into effect and bring about the emergence of a second republic. The resulting toxic political environment added to the general perception of political ineptitude and decline. These political and economic forces, as well as the fallout from the failed Senegambia Confederation, led to President Jawara's ouster by the army in 1994. (Saine, A. 2012:28).

Independence had its many challenges, as years of colonial neglect left the Gambia with only two government-owned hospitals and high schools, and a poor infrastructure. Unfortunately, the Gambia also faced limited natural resources, a mono-crop export sector and poor social services. At independence, almost all African countries had evolved economies that were extremely vulnerable and heavily dependent on colonial markets and former colonial powers. Thus, Jawara and his cabinet inherited serious problems that influenced the subsequent course of politics in the Gambia.

With a small civil service, observably, staffed mostly by the Akus and urban [Wollofs](#), Jawara and the PPP sought to build a nation and develop an economy to sustain both farmers and urban dwellers. Many in the rural areas hoped that political independence would bring with it immediate improvement in their life circumstances.

These high expectations, as in other newly independent ex-colonies, stemmed partly from the extravagant promises made by some political leaders and could not be fulfilled. In time, however, a measure of disappointment set in as the people quickly discovered that their leaders could not deliver on all their promises.

As one of the most marginal nations in the capitalist periphery at the time of independence and with collaborations with the donor powers and their hegemonic influences, the Gambia was incorporated into the world capitalist system as a supplier of agricultural exports (largely groundnuts) and tourism. Since independence, there has been little change in the structure of the economy, which remains very heavily dependent on groundnut production. Agriculture and tourism are the dominant sectors and also the main sources of foreign exchange, employment, and income for the country. Following or resulting from the growing economy, the government introduced in the 1970s the policy of '*Gambianisation*', which led to an expansion of the state's role in the economy. There was a 75 percent increase in total government employment over the period from 1975 to 1980. (Available on: <http://allafrica.com/stories/200608160905.html>).

In mid-1985, The Gambia under Jawara initiated the Economic Recovery Program (ERP), one of the most comprehensive economic adjustment programmes devised by any country in sub-Saharan Africa. With the aid of a team of economists from the Harvard Institute for International Development and the International Monetary Fund, the Gambia greatly reformed the economic structure of the country. Under ERP, in 1985–86, the deficit was 72 million Dalasis, and it increased to 169 million Dalasis in 1990–91. (*Budget Speech, 1990*).

However, by mid-1986, just a year after the ERP was established, the revival of the Gambian economy had begun. The government reduced its budget deficit, increased its foreign exchange reserves, and eliminated its debt service arrears. (*McPherson, M. F. & Radelet, S. C. eds. 1995*). Under the ERP, money-seeking opportunities became more abundant, and many private businessmen and public officials turned to illegal means to make profit. Corruption created a serious legitimacy crisis for the PPP. Several cases of corruption were

revealed and these seriously indicted the PPP regime. The Gambia Commercial Development Bank collapsed, largely due to its failure to collect loans. An Asset Management and Recovery Corporation (AMRC) were set up under an Act of Parliament in 1992, but the PPP government was not willing to use its influence to assist AMRC in its recovery exercise. This was particularly embarrassing because the people and organisations with the highest loans were close to PPP. In an embezzlement scheme at the Gambia Cooperative Union (GCU), fraud was revealed in Customs, and through the process of privatisation, it was discovered that many dummy loans had been given to well-connected individuals at GCDB. (McPherson, M. F. & Radelet, S. C. eds. 1995). All of which were encouraged by the bourgeois Jawara-led regime approach.

A group of para-statal heads and big businessmen closely associated with the PPP (nicknamed the Banjul Mafia) were seen as the culprits responsible for corruption in the public sector. (Sallah, T. M. 1990: 621-648). Driven to make profit, many elites did not refrain from manipulating state power to maintain a lifestyle of wealth and privilege. Corruption had become a serious problem in the Gambia, especially during the last two years of the PPP rule, and which the government under Jawara was weak to control.

By 1992, The Gambia was one of the poorest countries in Africa and the world, with a 45-year life expectancy at birth, an infant mortality rate of 130 per 1000 live births, a child mortality rate of 292 per 1000, and an under-five mortality rate of 227 per 1000. At that time, 120 out of every 1000 live births died of malaria. The Gambia also had a 75 percent illiteracy rate, only 40 percent of the population had access to potable water supply, and over 75 percent of the population was living in absolute poverty. (*Demographic Profile of The Gambia*)

Structural adjustment programmes implemented in response to the economic crisis resulted in government fragmentation, privatization, less patronage in co-opting various groups and growing corruption. The 30 years the PPP regime operated with diminished resources and therefore could no longer rule as it always had. The credibility of the competitive party system was severely challenged as Jawara's PPP was unable to show that good economic management could lead to benefits for the majority of society. Everything resulting from lack of dynamism in policy thrust and proper-laudable statesmanship.



To combat the myriad threats to political survival, a leader needs resources. Despite the existence of both state- and time-specific variations, it is possible to identify a range of resources leaders may employ to prolong their rule. African leaders have access to two types of resources: domestic (by virtue of their access to the state) and external (foreign aid, loans, and so forth). Given states' widely disparate levels of domestic resources, with some possessing valuable mineral deposits and others confined to agricultural production, generalizations are unwise, although an accurate case-by-case assessment of a leader's domestic resource base is clearly an important factor when explaining political survival.

### **2:2:2 The First Republic's Regime Survival**

In The Gambia, the prolonged survival of the PPP regime owed much to its leader. There existed an intimate, almost inextricable link between the survival of Sir Dawda Jawara and the survival of the regime, Jawara's apparent indispensability reflected his uncommon ability to maintain subordinates' loyalty without forfeiting popular support. Jawara's rule created and sustained a predominant position within the PPP.

With Jawara's precarious hold on power at Gambian independence, his low caste status constituted a grave handicap and one which threatened to overshadow his strengths (most notably, a university education). The two pre-independence challenges to Jawara's position demonstrated his vulnerability and illustrated the fact that he could not rely upon the undivided loyalty of the party's founding members. At independence Jawara's lieutenants regarded him as their representative, almost a nominal leader, and clearly intended him to promote their personal advancement.

Given these circumstances, Jawara's task was to overcome his low caste status, assert his authority over the party and secure control over its political direction. In doing this, he did not use coercion. Politically inspired "disappearances" were never an element of PPP rule; neither opponents nor supporters suffered harassment or periods of detention on fabricated charges. That Jawara was able to eschew coercive techniques and still survive reflected an element of good fortune, and yet his skillful political leadership was also crucial. Within his own party Jawara was fortunate to be surrounded by individuals willing to refrain from violence to achieve their goals, and yet much of the credit for this restraint must go to Jawara—his skilful manipulation of patronage resources, cultivation of affective ties and shrewd balancing of factions within the PPP. Lacking the coercive option, and given that

affective ties, which had to be earned, were a medium- to long-term resource, Jawara initially relied heavily on instrumental ties and distribution of patronage. His limited resource base posed an obvious, though not insurmountable, problem. Within the ruling group, ministerial positions—which provided a generous salary, perks and for some, access to illicit wealth—constituted the most sought after form of patronage and yet, before 1970, the number of ministerial posts did not exceed seven. (*Hughes, A. 1959-1973*). By 1992 the number remained a comparatively modest fourteen. Despite these limits, Jawara skillfully used all the various permutations of patronage distribution (appointment, promotion, termination, demotion and rehabilitation) to dramatise his power over subordinates' political futures and entrench himself as leader.

After independence, in response to the pre-1965 challenges to his authority, Jawara moved to reduce the size, cohesion and authority of the founding members as a group. Many of the party's earliest adherents (even those who showed no outward sign of disloyalty) lost ministerial posts during the early years of PPP rule. Jawara may not have used force, but neither was he hampered by sentiment; his pragmatism and willingness to demote, or even drop, former supporters in order to strengthen his personal political position was apparent. Jawara further strengthened his political position with the incorporation of new sources of support within the ruling group. (*Jawara, D. K. 2009*).

His enthusiasm for political accommodation stemmed from the closely related imperatives of weakening the influence of the PPP's original members and avoiding political isolation. The original group resented the fact that newcomers had not participated in the early struggle for power and yet were now enjoying the fruits of their labor. The secondary factor of ethno-regional considerations compounded this resentment; those who were co-opted came from all ethnic groups in the former colony and protectorate.

Jawara's popular support and cultivation of effective ties were crucial for easing the pressure on scarce patronage resources. Although the skilful distribution of patronage and associated tolerance of corruption (to be discussed later) played an important role in the PPP's survival, Jawara did not rely on elite-level resource distribution as heavily as some of his counterparts.

### **2:2:3 Personal rule and Public support**

Given Jawara's prolonged political survival under difficult circumstances, one might expect the Gambian leader to have possessed exceptional political qualities. Jawara did possess three advantages; the same advantages which had prompted his selection as party leader in 1959. First was his protectorate birth and Mandinka ethnic identity; Jawara personified the PPP's early electoral appeal to protectorate, and specifically Mandinka, sensibilities. His personal connections in the rural areas cultivated during his travels as a senior veterinary officer during the second half of the 1950s were seen as an additional electoral asset. Eclipsing both these attributes, however, was Jawara's graduate status. Whereas most PPP members shared the same ethnic background, few could claim to have been educated beyond high school. Jawara's university education both distinguished him from his colleagues and outweighed the fact that it was others who had initiated political activities within the protectorate.

In contrast to these advantages, however, Jawara possessed the decided disadvantage of low caste. As a member of the leather workers' caste, Jawara's social standing was much lower than many of his colleagues, which provoked doubt as to his suitability for the position of leader. Some regarded caste as a more important consideration than education and lobbied for the selection of the chief's son, instead.

It is assumed that long-surviving political leaders do think in strategic terms, that they have some sort of "game plan" for pre-empting and countering threats to their position. That is not to downplay the importance of less tangible factors, intuition for example, but simply to say that on some level, successful leaders consider how they might prolong their rule, and respond accordingly. Secondly, it is assumed that leaders possess sufficient authority to implement their chosen strategies and that degree of skill they bring to bear on a situation will influence the outcome.

Accounting for the importance of leadership, scholars typically point to the absence of established constitutional rules, effective political institutions or widely shared values, all of which, to varying degrees, characterized African states. The impact of these characteristics has been analyzed in a study by Jackson and Rosberg. Adopting the classical concept of a political institution as "an impersonal system of rules and offices that effectively binds the conduct of individuals involved in them," they suggest that, in most African states, non-institutionalized governments "where persons take precedence over rules" prevails.

Conceptualizing African politics in this way caused Jackson and Rosberg to identify a distinctive type of political system which they labeled “personal rule.” Subject to certain modifications, the theory of personal rule provides a useful framework for the study of leadership and survival, not only explaining why leaders frequently play such a key role in the elite political sphere but also identifying the specific threats that they might expect to confront.

With the backing of effective institutional rules, a personal ruler is undoubtedly vulnerable. Without Nevertheless, if elites generally are unrestrained by rules, the same is equally true of leaders. Constrained only by the power of other “big men,” the political liberation supplied by a system of personal rule enables a leader to utilize strategies (designed to strengthen his grip) that would be unthinkable in institutional systems. Moreover, the political rules may be changed, as in the establishment of a single-party state to suit a leader’s personal political convenience. He may also utilize constituent components of the system of personal rule, including clientelism, patronage and purges, to perpetuate his rule. Adopting these strategies, a leader attempts to prevent politics from deteriorating into a violent fight, a fight he may well lose. Whether or not he succeeds is primarily dependent upon political skill. Jackson and Rosberg’s theory addresses threats to a regime’s survival, possible strategies to deal with threats, as well as the defining factor, or skill, which determines a leader’s success or failure. (*Jackson, R. & Rosberg, C. 1982*). Somewhat surprisingly, this theory does not truly describe the state of Jawara’s leadership in the Gambia. Whereas systems of personal rule generally lack effective institutions and are “inherently authoritarian,” in the Gambia, Jawara’s adherence to democratic norms was responsible for both a non-authoritarian approach to power retention and a degree of institutionalization.

Although the theory of personal rule cannot be applied wholesale to the study of Gambian politics, and is subject to certain modifications, it remains a useful model. The first general point, for example, is Jackson and Rosberg’s depiction of African politics as an “institution less” arena. Although this perspective illuminates central features of the African political process, it is important not to lose sight of the variations between states.

States other than The Gambia have, at different times, exhibited varying degrees of institutionalization, some have undoubtedly enjoyed a “purer” form of personal rule than others, and in this sense it is possible to envisage an abstract scale of personal rule. The Gambia, though occupying a low ranking, would not, during the years of PPP rule, have been

off the scale altogether. President Jawara was, in many ways, a typical personal ruler due to the pivotal political role he occupied, the threats he faced and the strategies he used attest to this.

One strategy or approach Jawara failed to adopt was authoritarianism. Jackson and Rosberg, noting the “widespread removal of constitutional rights and protection from political opponents, the elimination of institutional checks and balances, the termination of open party politics and the regulation and confinement of political participation, usually within the framework of a “single party,” describe systems of personal rule as “inherently authoritarian.” Jawara, on the other hand, retained a multi-party system (at least in theory), a choice which can be likely explained in one of two ways. First, it may have reflected Jawara’s perception of the political advantages of a multi-party system. If so, the theory of personal rule retains its utility. Thus, Jackson and Rosberg argue that personal rulers only follow rules when they “have been changed . . . to suit his . . . personal political convenience”. (*Jackson, R. & Rosberg, C. 1982*). In Jawara’s case the rules were already “convenient”—there was no need to change them.

Conversely; it is possible to speculate that had the rules become a hindrance (had an opposition party won a general election, for example), Jawara’s commitment to a multi-party system was such that he would have agreed to step down. Though hardly the action of a typical leader practicing personal rule, this would nevertheless have been a personal decision. Nevertheless, although Jawara may have adhered to the rules which as a result of his personal skill as a leader had been retained, there was little to prevent him following the same route as other African leaders and instituting a series of authoritarian reforms. Indeed, many of his subordinates would have welcomed such a move. The element of restraint Jawara demonstrated with regard to political opposition was not dictated by fully established institutional rules. Rather, he chose a non-authoritarian approach. Jawara’s choice held important implications for the PPP’s survival. Perhaps most significantly, it compelled the cultivation of popular support, a feature not incorporated into Jackson and Rosberg’s theory of personal rule, which suggests that mass support is of negligible importance to a personal ruler’s survival. Though popular support may not be a necessary component of survival, it may be a significant factor in the longevity of both single-party and multi-party regimes. (*Jackson, R. & Rosberg, C. 1982*).

The public support enjoyed by the PPP stemmed, in part, from Jawara's personal popularity. A fundamentally pragmatic and flexible individual, Jawara was no ideologue and did not possess a charismatic hold on the populace. However, he did possess the ability to inspire trust. An important aspect of this was Jawara's accessibility (assisted by the small size of the Gambia). He undertook annual "meet the farmers" tours, during which he listened to people's problems and explained government policy as well as periodic meetings with sections of the Banjul Community.

Despite the increased security surrounding the State House after the 1981 coup attempt, Jawara remained available to individuals or delegations seeking audience. In addition to being fairly accessible, Jawara remained "in touch" with his people. His lifestyle, though obviously comfortable, did not feature the insensitive extravagance of some African leaders, yet allowing his officials to be corrupt without fear of being tried spelt doom for his regime. Whether distributing gifts or inspecting projects, he demonstrated a seemingly genuine concern for his people. As time passed Jawara's longevity and seeming invincibility also worked to his advantage. Many Gambians simply could not imagine life without him as he became their doyen.

## **2:2:4 Treatment of the Press**

Jawara's non-authoritarian approach, as obtained in the current regime, to political survival extended to his treatment of the press, as evidenced by the fact that he eschewed the tactics favoured by many other African leaders. He allowed newspapers to operate free of coercive legislation or government censorship, police harassment or frequent court appearances. Jawara's tolerance reflected his readiness to risk legitimacy-deflating exposes in order to sustain his legitimacy-inducing reputation (both at home and abroad) as a peaceable democrat.

The risk was lessened, too, by Jawara's ability to keep corruption within limits, mass illiteracy and newspaper's perennial lack of resources for investigative journalism or even producing issues on a regular basis. Almost certainly some ministers wished to see what one local observer described as a more "respectful" press, but as long as Jawara retained his commitment to press freedom; a change of direction remained unlikely.

Of course, the press was not only a benchmark to the PPP but also served as a useful survival resource. Government-controlled newspapers, and Radio Gambia even more so, served as a

useful communication and legitimization tool during elections or periods of difficulty for the regime, such as labor unrest and the introduction of the ERP. While opposition groups were not denied all access to the radio during elections and most major events in between received coverage, broadcasts were primarily a government tool and a degree of self-censorship was practiced within the polity in the republic.

## **2:2:5 The Gambia's Second Republic**

The Gambia's Second Republic came in 1997 after a general election that saw the Alliance for Patriotic Orientation and Construction (APRC) winning the election. On 22 July 1994, the Armed Forces Provisional Ruling Council (AFPRC) seized power in a military coup d'état, deposing Jawara's government. Lieutenant Jammeh, chairman of the AFPRC, became the Head of State. International reactions to the military take-over were generally unfavorable and The Gambia was placed on the agenda of the Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group (CMAG) pending a full return to democracy and constitutional rule.

A constitutional referendum took place on 8 August 1996. More than 70% of voters were reported to have endorsed the proposed draft constitution. A presidential decree shortly thereafter lifted the ban on party political activity for all but three pre-coup parties; the People's Progressive Party (PPP) of former President Jawara, the National Convention Party (NCP), and the Gambian People's Party (GPP). These parties were banned from contesting the forthcoming elections under Decree 89, as were all holders of executive office in the 30 years prior to the 1994 military take-over. The only pre-coup parties authorized to contest the elections were the PDOIS and the People's Democratic Party (PDP).

The effective ban on participation in the restoration of elected institutions of all those associated with political life prior to July 1994 provoked strong criticism from CMAG, on whose agenda The Gambia remained. A presidential election was held in 1996. The 22 July Movement (formed in 1995 to mark the anniversary of the coup) transformed itself into an official political party - the Alliance for Patriotic Reorientation and Construction (APRC) - to support Jammeh's campaign for the presidency.

A Provisional Independent Electoral Commission (PIEC) was established in 1996 to conduct national elections, that which did not exist in the defunct republic under Jawara for conduct of credible, transparent and balanced elections. The PIEC was transformed into the

Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) in 1997 and was given additional responsibility for registration of voters. Jammeh and three rivals contested the presidential election on 26 September 1996. Jammeh took 56% of the vote, becoming The Gambia's second elected president in 31 years of independence. Ousainou Darboe of the United Democratic Party (UDP) took 35%. Elections for the National Assembly were held on 2 January 1997. The APRC took 33 of 45 contested seats, the UDP took seven seats, the National Reconciliation Party (NRP) two seats, the PDOIS one seat, and independents took the remaining two seats.

In July 2001, the ban on Jawara-era political parties and politicians was lifted; Decree 89 was repealed and The Gambia was taken off CMAG's agenda. CMAG, nonetheless, called on the Government of The Gambia to take further measures to create an environment in which all political parties and individuals could freely participate in the political process. Four registered opposition parties participated in the 18 October 2001 presidential election, which the incumbent won with almost 53% of the votes. Ousainou Darboe of the UDP, who had formed a coalition with Jawara's PPP and the Gambia People's Party (GPP), came second.

The UDP boycotted the parliamentary elections held on 17 January 2002 citing bias on the part of the IEC. The APRC, who ran unopposed in 33 out of 48 constituencies<sup>2</sup>, secured 45 of the elected seats (in addition to the 5 appointed by the President). The opposition PDOIS secured two seats for the first time, while the last seat went to the NRP. Jawara was allowed to return from exile in September 2002, on condition that he does not participate in party politics.

Ahead of the next presidential election, in January 2005 the National Alliance for Democracy and Development (NADD) was launched (and later registered as a single party). NADD consisted of the country's four main opposition parties: the UDP, the NRP, the PDOIS, and the National Democratic Action Movement (NDAM). In legislative by-elections in September 2005, the NADD won three seats in the National Assembly; it appeared that the coalition was gaining support. However, in February 2006 the NADD began to unravel when the leaders of its two largest members, Darboe of the UDP and Hamat Bah of the NRP, left the coalition amid rumours of disagreements over the selection of a single presidential candidate. These two parties formed an alliance to contest the 2006 presidential election. That election was held against the backdrop of a Commonwealth-brokered Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) for political parties, which sought to create a peaceful election



environment and to encourage dialogue between government and opposition through the Inter-Party Committee.

Prior to the elections, however, two incidents placed The Gambia on the regional and international radar: in March 2006 there was an alleged coup plot against President Jammeh, following which government security forces arrested a number of military and police officials, and clamped down on some private media organisations. The second incident was the African Union Summit held in Banjul in July 2006, which focused attention on the political environment ahead of the elections. In the September 2006 presidential election, President Jammeh received 67% of the vote. Darboe of the UDP secured 27% of the vote, while Halifa Sallah of the PDOIS received 6%. Voter turnout was 58.8%. In the 2007 parliamentary elections which ushered in the current parliament, the APRC won 42 seats; the UDP won four and the NADD one. An independent candidate secured one seat and five members were appointed by the President.

The preamble to the 1997 Constitution affirms the protection of fundamental rights and freedoms, including respect for human rights. This is echoed in Chapters 4 and 5 of the Constitution, which guarantee, among other rights, freedom of speech, conscience, assembly, association and movement; political rights for every citizen of full age and capacity without unreasonable restrictions (Article 26); and equal rights for women in political, economic and social opportunities. The Gambia has also acceded to a number of international human rights instruments, including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).

As a member of the Commonwealth, The Gambia has committed itself to the organisation's democratic values contained in the Affirmation of Commonwealth Values and Principles adopted at the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) in Trinidad and Tobago in November 2009. President Jammeh promised after the 1994 coup to institutionalize accountability, transparency, and probity in government, with the aims of stemming rampant corruption and political decay. He invited Gambians and the media, in particular, to serve as watchdogs over this revolution; however, Jammeh and his ruling council soon turned to severe repressive measures in order to contain challenges to his rule. The newly formed Armed Forces Provisional Ruling Council (AFPRC) faced mounting domestic and international pressures to restore democratic norms and end military rule. In 1995, the council designed a two-year timetable to transition back to civilian rule. A hastily drafted constitution was adopted in August 1996 to replace the 1970 constitution. The new

constitution exhibited several key flaws, including the absence of presidential term limits, despite popular support for term restrictions; lowering the presidential age requirement from 40 to 30 years; the retention of military rule-era laws that imposed limits on press freedom; and the restoration of the death penalty. Jammeh also imposed new criteria on potential presidential candidates that they make a \$1,000 deposit and have at least 5,000 signatures to be considered eligible to run, which proved unattainable to many presidential aspirants except for the incumbent president. (Perfect, D. 2010: 53 - 63).

The two-year transition program back to civilian rule culminated in the 1996 presidential and National Assembly elections in 1997 that were marred by the provisions of the new constitution, an electoral commission appointed by Jammeh in 1995, and a political network that included the now disbanded vigilante group, the “Green Boys”, that were mobilized to help ensure Jammeh's continued rule. By and large, president Jammeh enjoys unrivaled political and economic power as a consequence of the new constitution. In contrast, opposition political parties are sidelined and allowed little political space in one-sided electoral contests in which Jammeh is assured of victory. Jammeh's hold on power is aided by the poor financial base and the personal, political, and sometimes ideological differences among the opposition. Opposition political parties and their leaders are subject to frequent arrests, intimidation, and legal harassment, and they devote what little financial resources they have at their disposal to fight legal battles. Thus, elections are lost long before the first ballot is cast on the election day.

A repressive political environment, aided by security agencies like the National Intelligence Agency (NIA), manufacture a culture of silence that reinforces compliance and coercion through arson attacks against media houses, assassinations, attempted assassinations, and abductions that result in the disappearance of journalists and citizens, which occur at random. President Jammeh also uses the courts to imprison his perceived enemies, sometimes for life. He manipulates the population, including civil servants and regime supporters, with hoax coup attempts that are foiled at the eleventh hour, only to be followed by yet another wave of arrests, firings, and detentions at Mile II, the country's notorious prison.

Electoral laws exist on paper to guarantee universal suffrage, free and fair elections through secret balloting supervised by an Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) and monitored by domestic and international observers. However, following the 2001 presidential election in which he won a second five-year term, President Jammeh once more amended the

constitution to a 'first-past-the-electoral system to replace the required 51 percent margin of victory needed to become president. (Saine, A. 2002:167-172). Jammeh was never threatened politically, but he uses the new law to further limit what little opportunity exists for political change, leadership rotation, or redress of popular and opposition political party grievances.

The absence of campaign finance laws disenfranchises Gambians, robbing them of their voice and right to choose their leaders. Already advantaged by incumbency, the ruling APRC party uses state and personal financial resources to wage strong national political campaigns. In addition, Jammeh's campaign finances are boosted by foreign governments, as well as domestic business contributions. Taiwan's quest for international recognition and representation at the United Nations is critical in its decision to provide financial support for the Jammeh regime and bankroll its elections, whereas Libya's former President Mu'ammar al-Qadhafi was driven more by a desire for continent-wide power and influence. (Saine, A. 2000:73 - 88). This interest convergence gives Jammeh an aura of invincibility and further weakens his opponents. The continued presence and activity of South American drug cartels also infuses illicit funds and foreign influence into the political process. Non-governmental organization (NGO) and civic group participation and influence on pending government policy are minimal. Where it exists, as in the cases of the Gambia Bar Association, Amnesty International and sub-regional bodies, the regime routinely ignores or dismisses them, branding the organizations unpatriotic and bent on destabilizing the country. President Jammeh frequently issues threats of severe retribution to these organizations and their leadership.

Gambia's political environment is hostile to journalists and privately-owned media, resulting in self-censorship, non-free press and biased political communication. (Amnesty International, 2011). The only television station in the country, Gambia Radio and Television Services (GRTS), which is state-owned and controlled, along with the *Daily Observer*, believed to be owned by the president, and the *Gambia Daily*, a government-owned newspaper, serve as propaganda tools for the regime. In response to the crackdown on the media and its use as a tool of repression, Gambian online newspapers and radio stations established by self-exiled journalists have mushroomed to shed light on corruption and human rights violations committed by the regime. Seeking to maintain its power against a growing Gambian political community, the regime has countered with technologies to limit

citizen access to online newspapers and hacked the *Freedom* newspaper in the U.S., and *The Gambia Echo*, an online newspaper based in the U.S. is blocked, during the period under review, in The Gambia and cannot be accessed by general readers. (Sankareh, E. ed. 2012).

The constitution calls for the protection of citizens from physical abuse, torture, extrajudicial executions, state-sponsored terror, and unjustified imprisonment; however, the state routinely violates these rights in practice. Political prisoners and political and social activists suffer severe beatings, electric shock, and sometimes rape that sometimes end in death. (Amnesty International, 2011). Mile II prison is notorious for its inhumane conditions. Security officers suspected of disloyalty to the regime suffer extrajudicial deaths in suspicious car accidents or poisonings. On paper, peaceful protestors have the right to assemble; however this is controlled by the police's refusal to issue the necessary permits. Femi Peters, propaganda secretary of the main opposition political party the United Democratic Party (UDP), served a one-year prison sentence for holding a political rally without a permit. Dr. Amadou Jammeh received a life sentence for possessing political material that advocated peaceful democratic change. (Amnesty International, 2011). State-sponsored political violence, the judiciary's excessive sentencing practices, and vigilante group violence combine to limit fundamental freedoms.

The state generally cannot protect citizens from crime and threats to personal security. Newspapers have focused on the increased prosecutions of crimes; it is not clear whether the increased reporting on criminal cases indicates a rise in criminal activity or the regime's commitment to fighting crime and protecting citizens. There were several reported arrests of terrorist suspects, perhaps to attract Western financial assistance. There were also reports of alleged money-laundering activity by some foreign businesses in support of terrorist groups in the Middle East. (The Point Newspaper, 2011). The regime also allegedly gave safe passage and sanctuary to South American drug cartel members who used the national airport to ferry drugs to the U.S. and Europe.

Human trafficking has not been a major challenge and the government has been vigilant in curbing prostitution and related activity. Child prostitution in particular was reported to be high in urban and coastal tourist areas, though cases of child sexual abuse are prosecuted.

The amended 1996 constitution has several mechanisms in place for redress of citizen grievances. These mechanisms include the Office of the Ombudsman, where citizen grievances could be addressed, and the courts. Citizens are also accorded the right of appeal. The courts, including the Supreme Court, are mandated to protect the rights of citizens. However, the courts are often subject to executive interference, influenced by prejudicial comments by the president on pending cases, or the dismissal of judges who rule against the state.

The African Center for Democracy and Human Rights Studies (ACDHRS), based in Banjul since 1989, is a continent-wide NGO devoted to the protection of human rights and the promotion of democracy. Its bi-yearly NGO forum provides a platform for over 200 organizations engaged in human rights and democracy promotion to discuss government performance on rights established in the African Charter for Human and People's Rights and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights' Convention on Civil and Political Rights. Several domestic human rights NGOs highlighted human rights abuses in the country. (Available on: <http://www.acdhhs.org>). Despite domestic and international legal protections, most citizens lack effective means to petition the government and its related agencies for redress. A coterie of indemnity provisions, statutes of limitation, and excessive executive intervention often serve as obstacles, especially when government or its agencies are implicated in the abuse of human rights or the commission of crimes.

Gambia's constitution includes protections for women and girls. There is a rich body of past and recent legislation backed by constitutional guarantees to empower women and girls. In practice, the government on the surface did much to protect women's rights and appointed many women to positions of authority, in addition to its support for the education of girls. In 2010, a Women's Bill was passed by the National Assembly that reinforced earlier international human rights instruments such as the Convention to eliminate all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), which Gambia ratified in the early 1980s to protect the rights of women. (*Rourke, J. T. 2012: 315-322*). Despite these provisions, the employment opportunities for Gambian women are restricted by traditional social and religious beliefs, especially in matters of inheritance and divorce. Violence against women also occurs often and is socially sanctioned and, until recently, ignored by law enforcement. Female circumcision, though a dying tradition, is justified by the president and Muslim clergy as an African tradition that needs protection. Female circumcision was once common

among some members of Mandinka, Fula and Jola ethnic groups, but growing opposition to it by NGOs and gender activists scored numerous victories toward ending the practice. (*Hernlund, Y. & Shell, B. 2007: 43-47*).

Under the First Republic, most groups except President Jammeh's Jola ethnic group enjoyed relative social equality and protections under the law. Religious tolerance and freedom of religion served as the glue for Gambia's diverse ethnic mosaic. However, following the 1994 coup, ethnic harmony eroded because of perceived discrimination against other ethnic groups. Many believe that steps need to be taken to uplift the Jola, who generally face low socio-economic status and have fewer opportunities in education and employment. However, as more Jola are appointed, or promoted to positions of power, this view is beginning to change. This attests to the claim that ethnocentric politics has persisted in the Gambia from the first republic to the current republic, which as a latent force has generated a source of worry for the development of the underdevelopment of the small, but relatively diverse sub-Saharan African nation at its take-off.

There are no laws to protect homosexuals, who are threatened with death, physical violence and incarceration. The president was vocal in his opposition to gays and lesbians and termed homosexuality "un-African," and "unnatural." (*Saine, A. 2012:28*). Many have been forced underground for fear of violence.

Even as slavery was abolished over a century ago, individuals and families of slave ancestry continue to suffer mild social stigmatization. While this is most problematic for marriage arrangements, it is not a basis for discrimination in employment, job promotion, education or residence.

Muslims in The Gambia are predominantly Sunni, and they constituted 90 percent of the population, while Christians make up about five percent. The remaining five percent of Gambians practice indigenous religions. Since independence, a culture of religious tolerance predicated on the separation of mosque and state has flourished. Freedom of conscience and belief are guaranteed by the constitution, along with freedoms of speech, assembly, protest, and association. Religious freedoms are seldom constricted, but other groups face violence. Opposition political parties and their members are often harassed, beaten, arrested, and sometimes killed by the authorities and vigilante groups. In practice, the regime frowns upon groups and political parties that participated in violence. Protestors need to acquire permits

from the police, who, under heavy political pressure, often deny them. When granted, peaceful rallies are under heavy police supervision.

Civic and religious groups are tolerated, but only if they are apolitical, although some have faced criticism from executive and religious leadership. The Supreme Islamic Council (SIC) and some of its executive members are instruments of government propaganda. The Gambia Committee on Traditional Practices Affecting the Health of Women and Children (GAMCOTRAP) was singled out for veiled threats of violence and severe criticism by the president and some Muslim clergy because of its opposition to female circumcision. In October 2012, GAMCOTRAP's two female executives, Dr. Isatou Touray and Amie Bojang Sissoho, were accused of corruption by a foreign donor agency and charges were leveled against the two in court. A verdict is pending as of this writing. (Available on: <http://www.foroyaa.gm/index.php/national-news>)

Gambia's constitution guarantees freedoms of expression, life and liberty, assembly, and protection from arbitrary arrest. Protections are extended to all citizens, irrespective of ethnicity, religious, or political affiliation. The constitution also guarantees the right to legal counsel and prohibits the detention of individuals beyond 72 hours without charge, these are seldom enforced. Gambia is a signatory to the African Human Rights Charter, also known as the Banjul Charter, named after Gambia's capital. (*Jeng, B. in Saine, A. ed. 2012*).

In principle, Gambia's constitution guarantees the separation of powers between the three branches of government, the executive, legislative and judiciary. They enumerate countervailing sites of power and measures to prevent the single domination of any branch. During the First Republic, this principle was adhered to with little executive interference, a rare accomplishment in Africa at the time. The principles of separation of power and rule of law were severely eroded following the 1994 coup, when the executive gained supremacy without the needed checks to curb excessive executive activism and interference. While Jawara was the dominant figure in the political system, there was little to no executive interference in judicial and legislative matters. Appointments to positions of power were, for the most part, made by a professional civil service commission that was deemed to be fair. There were cases of nepotism under Jawara, but nothing close to the order under Jammeh. Jammeh has built his entire regime on favoring his co-ethnic Jola. Suffices to say that the alarming occurrence of ethnocentrism in the political order became more glaring under president Jammeh, who and his co-coup plotters had accused former president Jawara and

regime of perpetrating and which was viewed threatening to national unity and security in 1994. This position therefore appears quite contradictory in the sense that there is no justification therefore for the emancipatory revolution embarked upon for the change of government in July, 1994.

Judges who rule against the regime are sometimes dismissed, accused of corruption, and sacked. This severely weakens and exposes the judiciary to executive manipulation for political ends. President Jammeh's "hire and fire" policy also effectively reduces the civil service to a branch of his ruling party. Civil servants campaigned and donated to his re-election bid in 2011, and worked on his farms without pay. The aggrandized economic blueprint of '*Grow What you eat and eat What you Grow*' is believed to be ill-conceived for political gains and the economic enslavement of the Gambia populace, whose greater percentage is highly illiterate and politically conservative. Any form of acute competition, especially by a few well-meaning individuals with the president is frowned at and dislodged. Promotions, rather than being based on merit, rested on ethnicity or loyalty to him. Consequently, the bulk of secretaries of state, top civil servants, as well as high-ranking military and senior security personnel, belong to President Jammeh's Jola ethnic group. (*U.S. Department of State, 2010*)

Civil society groups, including the Gambia Bar Association, spoke out against the conviction of Former High Court Judge, Moses Richards, and the excessive use of foreign judges, whose impartiality, competence and judicial independence were questioned. (*U.S. Department of State , 2011*). Gambian magistrates are also under executive pressure to rule in the regime's favor and hand out stiff prison sentences and exorbitant fines. (*International Bar Association, 2006: 41-47*).

The domination by the executive means presidential directives often trumps established legal procedures. Presumption of innocence, while guaranteed by law, is often sacrificed to curry favor with the president. The accused can have counsel, but only if they can afford it on their own. Prosecution of public officials is often politically motivated, either to settle scores or to eliminate a perceived threat to Yahya Jammeh's rule and person.

Lack of democratic accountability and transparency, as well as judicial, legislative and civilian controls over the military remain key features of the post-1994 coup security environment. Having come to power through a coup, President Jammeh relies on security



forces to remain in power. The NIA serves as the repressive arm of government, notorious for atrocious torture techniques used to extract confessions trials and arrests. Security forces suffer policy and institutional incoherence as a result of the high turnover of senior personnel. Former security officers are constantly intimidated and accused of plotting against the government, which leads to dismissals or imprisonment to stem the likelihood of a military coup. (*Saine, A. 2008: 95*). The administration consolidates on the strengthening of the individual authority of Mr President than institutional strengthening, paving ways and sustaining the dictatorship of the Executive arm of government and rendering the rest two organs to tutelages and caprices. This process and development no doubt cast doubt on the genuine practice of democracy and good governance in The Gambia under the second republic.

Retired military personnel act as heads of security institutions, such as the NIA, army, police, and the Interior Ministry, but decision-making is almost exclusively in the president's hands. These institutions constitute the repressive apparatuses of the ruling government and keep opposition political parties under surveillance. (*Saine, A. 2008: 96*). Anyone or group found or detected to be promoting anti-APRC or even conducting an opposition rally or gathering, even, if such is for another foreign country, is put under serious watch of the security agents and the intelligence officers as they are viewed as security threats to the nation.

Poor training of military and security personnel result in the routine violation of fundamental human rights. Military personnel are above the law unless they run afoul of the president, who dismisses or jails and rehires them after they swear loyalty to him. A 2010 drug bust, conducted by British intelligence agents working with their Gambian counterparts, uncovered a cache of drugs and arms worth \$1 billion dollars. (Available on: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10268510>). Several foreigners, key military, and security personnel were tried and jailed. It was clear that they were scapegoats to protect the military top brass and possibly the president himself, who is suspected of having a role in the drug trade. (*Saine, A. 2008: 97*). Though not a producer, the country's porous borders and complicit leadership has turned the country into a major transit point for illicit drugs into the U.S. and Europe.

The state generally respects the rights of citizens to own, sell, inherit, and exchange property. Property rights law is generally respected, but is often mired in legal battles when communally-owned land tenure systems, typically the purview of lower religious courts,

conflict with state property laws. Legal battles also ensue when communally-owned land is sold by one or more individuals, sometimes to different private parties. In this regard, property laws lag behind land ownership and use practices. The state generally compensates parties whose property is taken over for public housing, road construction and extension, or other issues pertaining to eminent domain. President Jammeh allegedly confiscated personal property and land without compensation for his personal use. (Available on: <http://thegambiavoice.blogspot.com/2011/>)

Corruption in Gambia is pervasive throughout all levels of institutions. Bribes are expected as a matter of course to speed or ease what otherwise would be excessive bureaucratic regulations. One pays bribes for water, electricity hook-ups, and other services. The government-owned energy company, the National Water and Electric Company (NAWEC), as well as the Customs and Port Authorities and the Lands Office, are generally deemed most corrupt. Twenty years into his tenure, corruption under President Jammeh is more rampant than it ever was under the First Republic. One of the wealthiest heads of state in Africa, he owns homes in the U.S., Guinea, Morocco, and Gambia. (Available on: <http://thegambiavoice.blogspot.com/2011/05/gambia-newsveteran-politician-questions.html>.)

Jammeh controls the regulatory roles of the state. He disburses financial allotments to ministries, oversees the sale and privatization of state-owned enterprises, from which he is reported to receive a 15 to 20 percent pay-off. (*Sanneh, A. K. 2009*). He uses the state legal apparatus to extort bribes, takes over businesses, and enters into unsavory business deals with 'legal' backing. Thus, the state remains insolvent and borrows heavily, as taxes collected are never enough to provide services. Tax collection agencies at the national, regional, and municipal levels are riddled with graft. Gambians pay taxes for services that are poor and irregular. The Gambia's Central Bank and other government-owned banks, or banks in which government has interests, serve as President Jammeh's personal bank accounts. Scant separation exists between the public domain and personal interests. (Available on: [http://www.omct.org/files/2011/07/21336/the\\_gambia\\_mission\\_report.pdf](http://www.omct.org/files/2011/07/21336/the_gambia_mission_report.pdf).) These remain the order under President Jammeh as a result of personality strengthening against institutional strengthening in the state which are usually justified by the aspects of the constitution that have been distorted for political gains.

No official special courts or tribunals are in place to fight corruption. Generally lenient sanctions are imposed on civil servants convicted of corruption; some are deployed to other

positions later, aggravating an already precarious situation. ( Saine, A. 2009: 92, 204,112). Corruption commissions set up to investigate graft investigate everyone but Jammeh. Since coming to power in 1994, Jammeh has set up numerous commissions to investigate corruption. In response to International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank pressures to curb the prevalence of corruption in government, an anti-corruption effort dubbed "*Operation No Compromise*," was launched in 2004. Senior civil servants, along with secretaries of state, were required to provide accounts of their assets to determine whether they had been acquired illegally. President Jammeh did not submit such an account. Several officials were dismissed from their jobs as a result of the investigations. The most recent anti-corruption and tax evasion campaign targets lawyers and senior government officials. As in "*Corruption No Compromise*," Jammeh's latest efforts have hardly made a dent on an endemic problem. (Available on: <http://www.jollofnews.com/20120624gambias-tax-commission-under-the-microscope.html>.) In the end, the commissions are tools in Jammeh's hands to oust or disgrace his political enemies. Victims of corruption, foreign and domestic, receive no redress, as these actions are accepted as expected risks of doing business in Jammeh's Gambia.

The media were silent or indirect in their coverage of official corruption. No tradition of whistle-blowing exists and it is widely frowned upon. No institution was insulated from corruption. One pays a bribe to gain admission for a child in a good school, even if the child's grades do not measure up. Teachers pay bribes to teach in choice schools and locations. Headmasters are notorious for pilfering and selling donated food-aid by the U.S., and European countries, and meant for school-feeding programs. Food-aid items are also given as bribes by teachers to senior education officers to secure promotions, or a transfer to a coveted school.

Few Gambians seek government redress as they believe that nothing is likely to come of communicating their grievances. Fear of government retaliation and poor familiarity with laws and government regulations dissuade many from engaging the state or its agencies; rural Gambians, in general, try to escape the reach of the state.

Each year, the Secretary of State for Finance presents a budget speech to dignitaries, including EU, U.S., and other country representatives. These budget speeches are known for their fabricated data and spin to mask dire domestic economic conditions, and the use of the global economic downturn to rationalize poor domestic economic performance. Regional and

municipal budgets, often shrouded in secrecy, cover up systemic graft. Economic performance reports mask endemic poverty and system-wide poor performance. (*International Monetary Fund, 2011*).

Distribution of foreign aid falls under the president rather than state institutions. Aid is issued by the president to reward political constituencies that support him. In doing so, he reinforces patron-client ties, and conveys the impression that the aid items, including trucks, tractors or food, are donations from him. Most rural Gambians, and some urban ones, as well, are not sufficiently informed to know the difference. Corruption is the outcome, as aid becomes a tool to manipulate public opinion. Even donated items from Gambia's diaspora in the U.S. and Europe become instruments of government propaganda.

The period under review witnessed a country at the brink, unable to provide basic services and security for its citizens. A constitution with democratic pretensions to guarantee fundamental rights failed to deliver. The consequence is poor governance, and the economic mismanagement of valuable and limited resources depleted further by endemic corruption. Low support for agriculture, the country's backbone and source of income for over 65 percent of the population, is in shambles, with resulting crop failures in the 2011 farming season that left 500,000 or more Gambians teetering on famine. (Available on: [http://www.gm.undp.org/SITREP\\_CROPFailure\\_UNSYSTEM\\_8MAR2012.pdf](http://www.gm.undp.org/SITREP_CROPFailure_UNSYSTEM_8MAR2012.pdf)).

### **2:3 Patterns of the Electoral and Democratic system of the First and Second Republic Gambia**

When we talk of patterns, we mean the ways, methods and manners in which the electoral and democratization systems of the first and second republic Gambia are designed and shaped by the political gladiators and actors who have ruled the country from independence and the concomitant effects of such political maneuverings on the advancement and growth of The Gambia's political culture and process to date. Essentially, therefore, this research focuses more on the various mechanisms, strategies and antics that the two helmsmen in their respective regimes, that is Sir Dawda Jawara of the first republic and Yahya AJJ. Jammeh of the second republic have employed in their democracy to consolidate and sustain their rules toward their nation's electoral and democratic growth and survival. Through reviews of

relevant literature and other available data sources, the research strives to make a comparative studies and analysis of occurrences between the two regimes in determining relative similarities and glaring differences that clearly explicate and accentuate how they actually pursued their respective individual objectives. Concerns are raised regarding the implications and by extension the grievous consequences that these patterns have constituted to the very root of survival for a credible democratic and electoral system in the small nation. Theoretical intellectual analyses are advanced to explaining these patterns for an objective generalization, the patterns that take the forms of methodological approaches designed to suit hegemons' purposes and desires for ultimate rule elongation. It is pertinent to note that both Jawara and Jammeh as Heads of state of The Gambia at different republics have respectively devised means during their individual regimes to perpetuate a prolonged rule over their subjects contrary to constitutional provisions and democratic principles that lay the very foundation for good democratic governance, through the available measures and ploys which are designed to realize this, given the circumstances that surround their stewardships. For example, at independence when Jawara came on board as Prime Minister initially and later from 1970 when he became a fully elected President, The Gambia's electorate had a significantly record low illiteracy and traditionally manipulative designed voting behavior, ideology and electoral principle of "*Drums and Marbles* " by dropping tokens that show a vote has been cast automatically. Although, while this electoral policy was designed by the colonial master prior to the 1960 general elections as a result of the recognition of the literacy inadequacy and weak political participation by the electorate, Sir Jawara capitalized on this porosity to deny his people the needed level of political consciousness and education for galvanization of political gains for his regime. Consequently, he elicited elitist policy system that are not understandable by an average and or illiterate Gambia voter. Jawara deliberately gave least attention to educational developments by not establishing required schools especially at tertiary level toward improving standards and merit in the election engineering process.

On his own part, Dr. Yahya Jammeh was comfortable with the designed voting system because it succumbs to his political needs for manipulative elections held periodically and which help to easily discover and threaten any individual or constituency that refuses to vote for his party APRC or that opts to vote for an opposition party. Individuals or areas that refuse to vote for the president party or believed to be pro-opposition are denied development and infrastructures. Their youths are denied placements for jobs in government offices or

admissions in schools and if they are already in them, they are fired or marginalized as they are considered security threats to the government. Most appointments are given to government loyalists who are willing to sing praise Mr President or engage in the art of gossiping to detect anti-loyalists within the rank and file of the government and the general society. This policy marginalizes and deprives majority of Gambians from not only exercising their civic rights lawfully and in the atmosphere of freedom, but are rendered apolitical, apathetic and poor, as they could not have equal access to opportunities and state benefits that in principle are believed to belong to all. Worsened by this trend is the mutual closeness everybody has to each other as well as the close biological ties that bring them together everywhere, given the size of the country that makes it impossible for anyone to do anything secretly without being discovered. This is what has made gossiping to be rampant in the political systems, which in Human Resources and Personnel Management, professionals and experts have given the word “*Grapevine*” to, but the two variables seemingly do not work exactly the same way. Coupled with this cancerous political life is the high level of illiteracy and conservatism among the people as well as the religious doctrine/belief that the people share on divine right to leadership as well as the forbidden of rebellion against a divine ruler upon them.

### **2:3:1 The Sir Dawda Kairaba Jawara’s First Republic (1960-1994), Patterns of Governance and Struggle with Survival.**

In the Jawara regime, the patterns of democratization and the electoral process were characterized by a number of political and administrative devices which were put into use by former president Jawara and his PPP in prolonging stay in power up till 1994 when the president was successfully ousted from reign. This occurred, despite the home and international appraisal of the regime as the most viable and stable multiparty democracy of its time in the sub-Saharan Africa, with a satisfactory human rights record and free media. Basically, the regime was patterned along elitist rule that gave a lot of privileges to cabinet members and the well-to-do in the society or polity. This eventually institutionalized corruption and other malpractices in the political process.

As Edie, C. J. (2000: 168-169) observes... ‘For more than a quarter of a century, The Gambia was one of sub-Saharan Africa’s longest standing multiparty democracies, perceived along with Botswana and Mauritius as an ‘exception’ on an African continent where authoritarianism and military regimes have been the norm’. According to him,... ‘Apart from

the aborted coup of 1981, The Gambia had enjoyed relative peace and stability since it attained independence from Britain in 1965. In 1994, The Gambia was perceived again as a deviant case when a military coup 'd etat toppled Sir Dawda Jawara's Peoples Progressive Party(PPP) government, thereby, bucking the post-1989 sub-Saharan African trend away from authoritarianism towards multiparty politics'. Should the collapse of the PPP have been expected as it did happen, it was not an enough, if not, substantiated ground for the entrenchment and consolidation of an enduring democracy and democratization process hindrance before, during and after Jawara era. Consistent procedural exercise of elections as observed earlier as being unique and traditional in form, and former president Jawara's known commitment to human rights and as well the multiparty democracy were no sufficient ground for democracy entrenchment and consolidation in The Gambia(Edie, C. J. 2000: 162). The world's attention appeared diverted by this euphoria and claim of governance performance and satisfactory human rights record credited to Jawara and his PPP government from the regime's hegemony which was maintained and consolidated on till 1994 when it was ousted, and this the PPP had achieved through the continual use of the ballot boxes without alternation of administration between parties, culminating into a one-party dominant rule inadvertently within the electoral system and democratization process, as the machinery of government remained under the control of Sir Dawda Jawara and his PPP. The electoral system hence became a one-party elitist and dominant system in which the opposition parties were fragmented and put under constant pressure of co-optation or regulation by the dominant PPP. This was the situation of things and the political climate until a volatile political and voting environment emerged from 1981 to 1994, when a successful coup was launched against a democratically elected government presumed the longest surviving multiparty politics of its time in the region, the trend that became worsened in the post-coup era of 1994 with a monumental abuse of democracy and electoral integrity, both during the short stay of the military in power, 1994-1996, and when the transition ended.

Under Jawara and his PPP regime, it was difficult to criticize the government because the civil society was weak and the country lacked strong independent print and broadcast media. Election conducts were in the hands of a few selected individuals believed to have loyalty to the PPP regime and Jawara within the Executive arm of government and not in the hands of a viable independent electoral commission. Not until 1996 was a provisional electoral body PIEC established for subsequent electioneering processes. Though, some economic reforms were introduced in 1985 following experience got from the aborted coup to embark on

meaningful pro-active development efforts that allayed fears of economic dooms and accelerated poverty rate growths and reductions in economic crimes that were becoming rampant in the government circle, the living standard of the vast majority of Gambians remained extremely low and pitiable. A survey of available opportunities for satisfying political, civil, and economic rights revealed that conditions required for the entrenchment of democracy were lacking during the Jawara years. Had the Jawara government taken necessary steps and formulated appropriate policy measures to prevent any possible military engagement, through constitutional advancements, most probably, the latter wouldn't have got any excuses to advance and justify any military take-over that will receive home support and legitimacy. This was because once such was rejected by the people at home they would probably have enjoyed international support and backing. But, since the electorate were tired at home with the leadership style that was neither opposition friendly, but, tactically tolerant and non-development-oriented, they decided to succumb to an eventual military option that came to effect the needed and desirable change.

The Gambia was granted independence in 1965 and thus became the last of Britain's West African colonies to attain independence. A limited franchise existed from 1880 to 1960, and allowed educated Africans in the colony in the urban area of Banjul formerly called Bathurst to have representation on the Legislative Council. Britain granted a new constitution in 1960 which allowed for the extension of the franchise to the Protectorate that is provinces outside the urban area. This granted universal adult suffrage, gave liberty to the protectorate to form its own party, the People's Protectorate Party (PPP), which joined the former Colony parties the Democratic Party (DP), the United Party (UP), and Muslim Congress Party (MCP). As the Gambian political elites prepared for independence, they accepted the British-derived competitive party politics as the ideal mode of state power that they had to replicate in their new nation (Edie, C. J., 2000).

Competitive party politics was introduced in the context of the Colony/Protectorate geographical division which coincided with a clear pattern of ethnic demographic distribution that was ethnically configured in 1963 with Mandinka having the largest 42percent, followed by Fula with 18percent, Wollof 16percent, Jola 10percent Serahuli 9percent, and the rest minority 4percent and the non-Gambians just 1percent, going by the 1963 Census data of the country. Islam was the major and domineering religion with over 85percent of the population being muslims while the remaining percent made up the Christian community and the



traditional worshipers. The Colony was predominantly inhabited by the urban Wolloffs and the Akus, the latter being the ex-slave arrivals made up of the Yorubas who were dumped along the cities all along the coasts as they could no longer locate their original place of captivities, of which Bathurst now Banjul was among. There were also small groups from the rural Fula, Mandinka, Jola and Serahuli communities. In the Protectorate, the Mandinka constituted the largest group which gave loyalty to the PPP, which Jawara later belonged and exercised strong influence, followed by the Fula and the Jola, with a significant number of rural Wolloffs (Nyang, 1974:247, Edie, C. J. 2000: 162-168).

While preparing for the 1962 election, party politics became intense as the new political leaders appealed to voters along Colony/Protectorate line and rivalry with ethnic and religious allegiances showing up for ethnic candidates. All the Colony parties drew their support from the urban areas while PPP depended on the rural areas for its support base. PPP had a strong identification with the Mandinka just as UP did with the Wolloffs in Banjul and Fulas outside of Banjul. Realizing that in the long run it would need the support of other ethnic groups to ensure electoral victory, PPP adopted a less parochial name-the People's Progressive Party-and a new ethnic-inclusive style of politics. Thereafter, PPP leader Dawda Jawara's style of politics became one- based on coalitions and alliances (Hughes, 1975, 2000, Nyang, 1974, 1983 and Edie, 2000). He immediately sought to form an alliance with the urban Wolloffs and Aku-dominated state bureaucracy whose technical and administrative skills were suspected to be critical of his administration. PPP successfully mobilized the Mandinka and Jolas to challenge the dominant and popular urban-based UP in the 1962 elections. After its election victory, the party formed a temporary coalition with the only successful DCA candidate (MCP having merged with DP to form DCA) who stepped down for PPP. In 1963, both PPP and DCA agreed to invite UP to join the government coalition, thereby, reinforcing PPP's power-sharing strategy. PPP's new strategy of limiting ethnic divisions prevented from regionalism from becoming a factor of national division (Nyang, 1974). This made it possible for PPP to emerge as the dominant party with significant weakened opposition that lacked the forcefulness and vibrancy to challenge it for a long period not until coups came. In essence, Jawara and his PPP ruling party had engaged an elitist and one party rule that was urban-based but with enormous voter-population support from the rural Mandinka majority allied by Fula and Jola rural settlers for regime consolidation. He also maintained a soft-spot on freedom and free press which avoided clamping down unnecessarily on journalists and civilians who expressed opinions. As a

result, illegal arrests, sudden disappearances of activists and people perceived as regime enemies, court proceedings manipulations among others which are the order of the day in the current regime seldom occurred in the first republic. Jawara also engaged politics style of coalitions and alliances, coupled with the co-optation policy of the opposition parties in order to make it very difficult for any opposition coalition not to unseat him in an imminent competitive general election. This fragmented the political parties and weakened their possible force of an emergent stiff opposition in the polity. PPP eventually became the overwhelming dominant party with enjoyment of enormous support from the society and which the electorate feared not to vote against, as any vote for the opposition tended to appear as a waste of 'vote resources' (Rice, 1967; Hughes, 1975; Nyang, 1974, Edie, 2000). The ruling party with its enormous influence and political antics attracted top opposition party echelons and gladiators with lucrative cabinet appointments amidst other opportunities for enhanced status. As Nyang, 1974, observes also... 'these developments represented an incipient process of opposition co-option which had serious implications for the future of party politics in the small nation Gambia. The National Convention Party (NCP) founded in 1975 by one Sherif Dibba had been a former high-ranking member of Dawda Jawara cabinet, who left PPP after a conflict within the leadership. NCP's initial strength was based on its mobilization of discontented rural Mandinka, who were not happy or became disgruntled with PPP's leader neglect of their interests in favour of urban elites and other ethnic interests. Ideologically, little could we notice as difference between PPP and NCP as both were committed to capitalist development and liberal democracy, both favored a development strategy with heavy reliance on Western financing for development and both supported government ownership of utilities and some productive enterprises (Wiseman, 1985). NCP won 5 of the seats 34 seats in the 1997 election and only 2 in the 1982 election. In 1987, some efforts were made as it obtained about one third of the votes cast, but won just 5 seats as it was in a close race with PPP and two newly-formed opposition parties (see Table 1 and 2). The Gambia People's Party (GPP) and the People's Democratic Party (PDP) were newer strong challenges to PPP.

The most significant differences between Gambian political parties emerged only in the late 1980's when the People's Democratic Organization for the Independence and Socialism (PDOIS) emerged as an organization committed to radical socialism with stiff opposition to neo-liberal economic reforms, non-aligned position in international politics and sympathy to "Third World" socialist states and commitment to a powerful state apparatus controlling

economic development (Foroyaa, 1991-1992). PDOIS later became the voice of the opposition that challenged PPP on a daily basis during its last few years in the second republic championing the cause of Human Rights Protection and Press Freedom. With PDOIS, there was for the first time a clear difference between the capitalist ruling party and the socialist opposition which maintained a low profile of opposition between 1988 and 1994. *Table one and two* below indicate that in all the elections held between 1966 and 1992, PPP was overwhelmingly dominant, consistently obtaining 55 to 70percent of the popular vote and an overwhelming majority of seats.

**Table 1:** General Election Results (%), 1966 - 1992

<b>Parties</b>	<b>1966</b>	<b>1971</b>	<b>1977</b>	<b>1982</b>	<b>1987</b>	<b>1992</b>
<b>PPP</b>	65.32	63.84	69.79	61.73	54.50	54.47
<b>UP</b>	33.37	15.69	*	2.88	*	1.43
<b>DPA</b>	**	----	----	----	----	----
<b>GPP</b>	----	----	----	----	15.50	7.96
<b>NCP</b>	----	----	27.87	19.65	28.83	21.00
<b>PDP</b>	----	----	----	----	----	4.81
<b>PDOIS</b>	----	----	----	----	1.05	2.72
<b>INDEPENDENT</b>	1.31	20.56	2.34	15.74	0.12	7.60
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>

**Source:** Gambia News Bulletin, 1966 – 1992 and The Gambia Gazette, 1966 – 1992(as quoted in Edie, C. J.2000:166).

**Table 2:** Seats Won By Political Parties In The General Elections (1966 - 1992)

<b>Parties</b>	<b>1966</b>	<b>1971</b>	<b>1977</b>	<b>1982</b>	<b>1987</b>	<b>1992</b>
<b>PPP</b>	24	28	27	27	32	25
<b>UP</b>	8	4	2	----	----	----
<b>DPA</b>	----	----	----	----	----	----
<b>GPP</b>	----	----	----	----	----	----
<b>NCP</b>	----	----	5	3	4	6
<b>PDP</b>	----	----	----	----	----	----
<b>PDOIS</b>	----	----	----	----	----	----

<b>INDEPENDENT</b>	----	----	----	5	----	3
<b>TOTAL</b>	32	32	34	35	36	34

**Source:** Gambia Gazette, 1966 – 1992(as quoted in Edie, C.J. 2000:166).

Four political parties are now (in year 2000) on the political scene in post-Jawara Gambia. The ruling Alliance for Patriotic Reorientation and Construction (APRC), led by (retired captain) Yahya Jammeh, the United Democratic Party (UDP), led by prominent lawyer and vice-chairman of the Gambian Bar Association, Ousainou Darboe, and the National Reconciliation Party (NRP), led by Hamat Bah, were all formed in 1996 in preparation for elections leading to the restoration of civilian rules. PDOIS, led by Sidia Jatta, is the only party from the Jawara era, all the others having been banned. With the exception of the socialist PDOIS, the other three parties were hardly different in policy positions or ideology. The incumbent President, Yahya Jammeh, advocated support for his programmes and pledged to continue the work he had begun during the transitional period. Table 3 indicates that in the 1996 Presidential election, APRC obtained 55.8 percent of total votes, UDP, 35.8 percent, NRP, 5.5 percent, and PDOIS, 2.9 percent. The National Assembly elections followed in January 1997 and APRC continued to dominate the process, with 33 of the 45 contested seats. UDP won 7; NRP, 2; PDOIS, 1, and the Independent candidates, 2. President Jammeh nominated another 4, thus bringing the total number of Members of Parliament (MPs) to 49, (Wiseman 1998: 68 – 69, Edie, 2000: 166).

**Table 3:** Votes and Seats won by Political Parties in the 1996 Presidential and 1997 National Assembly Elections.

<b>Parties</b>	<b>1996 Votes Cast (%)</b>		<b>1997 Seats (%)</b>	
<b>APRC</b>	220,011	55.8	33	52
<b>UDP</b>	141,387	35.8	7	34
<b>NRP</b>	21,759	5.5	2	2
<b>PDOIS</b>	11,337	2.9	1	8
<b>Independent</b>	N/A	0	2	4
<b>TOTAL*</b>	<b>394,494</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>45</b>	<b>100</b>

**Source:** *Provisional Independent Electoral Commission (PIEC): Banjul, 1996, 1997(as quoted in Edie, C. J. 2000:167).*

The results of these elections showed continuity in the post-independence pattern of domination by the incumbent party (Tables 1 and 2). APRC captured from the Opposition approximately the same percentages of votes and seats, as did its predecessor. The 1996 Presidential and 1997 National Assembly elections returned the Gambia to the electoral context of the Jawara era with regard to the level of support for the Opposition. Many Gambians did not believe that APRC ‘won’ these elections fairly (Wiseman 1998), but that did not reflect a change in credibility of the electoral process (Edie, 2000:167). The nature and dynamics of this competitive politics façade is explored below.

### **2:3:2 State Limitations on Competitive Politics: The First Republic’s Experience.**

This dynamics of the nature of state limitations is explainable by the design of Jawara’s PPP anti-competitive party and electoral politics, where these existed with a wide range of parties, permitted to participate in principle, in what was to be a relatively open competition for state power through secret balloting and the adopted and adapted universal adult suffrage, but, in reality or practice, what we had was a charade of competition with one party dominance centered around the dominant personality of Sir Dawda K. Jawara. As Edie, 2000 has observed, power contenders were permitted to exist outside the political directorate so far such political interests posed no threats to PPP and its government to govern the state. As a result, political parties that were not on regime or in power were weakened and constantly threatened and of course branded subversive once their competitive political activities became hostile to the regime in power, that is the Jawara government and his People’s Progressive Party in the state. The opposition parties were thus allowed to function mainly for constitutional requirements for multiparty elections to hold, a development that made the whole process of election conducts a façade and nonsensical. In a normal, if not ideal political situation, competitive party politics tolerates sharp disagreements, opposition and dissent, just as recently recorded in the Nigeria’s last presidential election which took place all over the country, including the already recovered Boko Haram- North-East territories, where fears were exercised that the exercise might not hold, where a vibrant and dynamic coalition opposition of The All Progressive Congress Party(APC), which had Gen. Mohammedu Buhari as its standard bearer, who engaged the incumbent President Goodluck Ebele Jonathan and his ruling party, the Peoples Democratic Party in a stiff competition both before and during the election and eventually defeated the incumbent in the March 28<sup>th</sup>,2015 presidential election. The incumbent Goodluck Jonathan in a show of good

statesmanship and of course sportsmanship in election conduct and nation-building, swiftly congratulated his opponent Buhari (now president-elect), wishing him a good and peaceful tenure in office. One party dominant systems, like that of the Jawara's PPP are known to manipulate the machinery of government, weaken the opposition and silence their voices in order to reduce or eliminate a stiff opposition to contest and their removal from regime and consolidation of the status quo. This will now help the one party hegemony to properly re-consolidate and guarantee continued stay in power to the disadvantage of the polity and all its stakeholders in the state. True democracy may not thrive in this respect.

Under Sir Dawda Jawara, the opposition was not given a level playing ground to campaign and contest in elections throughout his regime, it was denied equal access to State resources needed for a successful challenge of the ruling hegemony by the PPP, it was denied state financial assistance in line with constitutional provisions and it was also constrained because of all these stated reasons to have equal access to courts and election tribunals for fair hearings in challenging contestable election verdicts. Aside, the Ministry of Information was under constant instructions of the president and the minister to censor opposition parties' coverages of news, campaigns, rallies and other programs by ensuring that these did not contravene the ruling party's interest. In a sense, the opposition was strictly restricted from equal access to the media and free use of the press in the state under Jawara's rule. As a result, reaching out to their own numerous supporters through amiable and friendly media as well as the rest of the general public and the electorate was a difficult task to achieve. As an alternative medium and in response to all the antics of the ruling party and electoral corruption, PDOIS in the 1980's set up an opposition newspaper, The FOROYAA, its circulations were very restricted in the Banjul and Greater Banjul areas, including Serrekunda which was the stronghold of the ruling PPP.

In contrast to the role played by the opposition in most parliamentary democracies including that of Britain, The Gambia's opposition was reduced to a rubble under Sir Jawara as it was powerless to ensure balanced contests in a fragile democracy with a universal status and acceptance. Hence, it could not service the democratic system and was hence viewed by the electorate with little respect within the political system. The electorate on discovering this saw voting for the opposition as a wasted exercise/effort, since such a vote would not count or go anywhere to effect a meaningful desirable change of government at the centre. This was because no matter what, the chances of the opposition winning was very remote if and

resource allocations even budget allocation. Such an area is completely forgotten by the centre. As this was also the order of the day in the second republic when the political and electoral situations by extension too became more severe, the development processes in the Gambia have been greatly impeded and devastated to the detriment of the citizenry up to the present. One could therefore say that corrupt and inept electoral as well as faulty democratization process in the Gambia as experienced in both the first and second republics' was a direct factor to the development of the underdevelopment of the small but rich nation Gambia in the sub-Saharan Africa, perpetrated and perpetuated by the periphery bourgeoisie and oligopoly that existed at different era with different personalities and institutions. In the second republic under president Jammeh, it was as if the people were yet to see worst as experienced under the former toppled president. As the government of Yahya Jammeh has increasingly committed severe human rights abuses and media censorships with killings, illegal arrests and imprisonments of political opponents as well as those perceived as threats to the Jammeh regime survival. This situation became chaotic up to sudden disappearances of innocent citizens and closures of media houses. What we saw here and believed to still be happening is a reckless display of military dictatorship brought into a civil regime with apparent arrogance of political attitudes into political life to intimidate and completely silent any form of challenge to APRC hegemony. Today, people do not just find it difficult to express feelings as public opinions but can just not do so if they need their lives. Sir Jawara regime did not go too far this way as people were still talking and expressing differing views and opinions through the institutions of the media without being kidnapped, killed or jailed without due process and justice ably.

Another electoral pattern exhibited by the Jawara administration was vote buying. This was alleged as far back as the 1962 elections, when MCP leader I. Garba-Jahumpa believed he lost his seat to the UP member because the latter paid for many of his votes (Rice, 1967:336, Edie, 2000). Jawara PPP continued this legacy up till the 1992 elections in the state until the junta struck in 1994. There was also the problem of voter registration which created a legitimacy crisis for the polity. It was a widely-held view and belief that the incumbent PPP mobilized illegitimate voters to ensure its own victory in the polls. This continued unabated despite the outcries of the opposition and election observers. PPP regime under Jawara turned deaf ears to all these cries and persisted its acts, and this made a mockery of the election exercises making them to be generally flawed and nonsensical. Courts decisions on poll verdicts were manipulated and turned in favor of the PPP ruling party, when election

results were challenged by the aggrieved candidates. In 1991, PDOIS went to court to challenge the voter registration lists in several constituencies, charging that approximately 10 percent of those registered to vote in Banjul did not live there. People were found to be registered under fictitious addresses such as the Mohammedan School, or Albert Market, where they could not reside. PDOIS challenge was dismissed on a technical ground, but, the action had succeeded in exposing all the gimmicks the PPP were exhibiting to ensure poll victories every election in the state (The Nation, April 20, 1991).

There were also charges that traditional authorities were co-opted by PPP and integrated into the machinery that suppressed the opposition. As (Edie, 2000:168-173) remarked... 'The Alkalo (the village head) has a respected role in the Mandinka communities of the Gambia. The Alkalo has had a clear administrative role in the post-colonial period. He collected local taxes on behalf of the area councils, facilitated the implementation of development projects and represented the village at district meetings'. During the Jawara PPP administration, the regime capitalized on the influence wielded on the Alkalos to perpetrate aggrandized political interests. The Alkalo served as a broker for the government, by assigning voter registration cards to eligible voters. As a result, the people under an Alkalo would not want to disobey their local head as this sometimes amounted to a taboo believed to be punishable by divine rights and so would have no option than to collect voter cards from their ruler for blessings and therefore vote for the ruling party and only the ruling party supported by the village head. Again, These people in the community who were dependent on their Alkalo for resources coming from the central government controlled by the PPP for community development would not want to vote against the Alkalo choice of party, in order not to block development efforts that would come down on them as punishment if refused to vote for the candidate their Alkalo was supporting in an election. The opposition often accused the Alkalos in their areas of fraudulent registration practices that flawed the election exercises on the whole (Davies et al, 1994:262). In the rural areas, Divisional Commissioners, Alkalos and Seyfolus (Chiefs) were almost exclusively, if not bluntly/openly supporting Jawara's party with their antics because of patronages from the ruling party, lest they would be neglected (Davis et al,1994, Edie, 2000, The Nation, April 20, 1991).

One party dominant system requires control, co-option and regulations of private and public centers of power in the political system (Stone, 1980). In the post abortive coup environment of 1981, PPP became increasingly authoritarian, placing curbs on expression and closely



scrutinizing the opposition. The government won libel suits against prominent journalists and there was known incidents of independent press muzzling by the government. Independent newspapers were hard-pressed to survive because of the difficulty in obtaining income from advertizing in a private sector closely allied with the ruling PPP, The government owned most of the newspapers and these tended not to report stories that were embarrassing to it .At a time and around late 1980's, independent weeklies emerged, attempted to be aggressive and reported the shortcomings of the PPP and prominent amongst them were the Foroyaa, The Gambia Onward, The Observer etc. (Stone, 1980, Edie, 2000:272). The Broadcast media in the country consisted of three radio stations, namely, Radio Gambia primarily owned by the government, Radio Syd and Radio One, privately owned and run conventionally for commercial ventures. The Jawara regime only used mouth to establish a television station in the country. Not until 1995 when the government of Yahya Jammeh came to office as a military regime was a state television station established known as The Radio and Television Services popularly called GRTS.

The Jawara regime gradually became cold to public opinions and the development of a vibrant secular broadcast media as their operations became threats to PPP regime survival because of their articulate voices on issues of public concern. This limited political participation in the polity and legal order could not guarantee enough political freedom and the rule of law as contained in the nation's constitution. The Executive arm of government had eroded the powers of the other two organs that are the Legislature and the Judiciary with the majority seats controlled by the PPP in the Chambers and with most judicial appointments politicized against professionalism and constitutional obligations. This eroded justice in the justice system and accountability and responsiveness in the executive via a vibrant and pro-active, people-oriented National Assembly. Given all these occurrences, it is non-prejudicial to assume that the history of electoral politics and democratization system in the small nation Gambia from independence period to the present time, with its attendant crises of ignominious practices are of grave concern, as they are characterized with riggings, manipulations, opposition fragmentations, bribery and corruption and other flaws that are quite unexplainable. However, the country has remained peaceful and political situation somewhat calm because the Gambian people have always been generally peaceful, tolerant and understanding with their constituted authorities. To therefore claim that the electoral politics and democratic governance system in The Gambia is normal and devoid of serious crises that could ignite violence is incorrect and a hollow sham. On reports of human rights

abuses and media free limitations in the state under the Jawara's PPP administration, mixed reports were received based on our reviewed literature. However, the ones that confirmed gross constitutional violations and electoral laws and policy had an intense authentication and validity. In this research, efforts had been made to give a wider coverage of reviews that enable us arrive at the accurate facts analysis for objective generalization and validation of the research work's questionnaires and various conducted interviews in the course of the research work.

The majority of Gambians may have valued the institutions in place where a level playing ground is guaranteed since the independence time. However, at the time PPP was removed from office, commitment to those institutions and values had declined considerably to a low level. Many appeared to have lost faith in a government that was unable to show that a system based on competitive party politics could lead to benefits for the majority of the society. There was much cynicism and distrust of political leaders by the end of the People's Progressive Party (PPP)'s rule (Edie, 2000:173).

### **2:3:3 The Gambia's Political Economy and Its Democratization and Electoral Process Under The First Republic: Nature and Impact.**

In the Jawara regime, the astronomical level of electoral and other political corruption filtered into the economic and social spheres or sectors of the society, due to the fact that, the established elitist ruler ship at the center and luxurious/ostentatious lives that cabinet ministers and other government officials under Jawara were living shored up tremendously to economic crimes, majority of which the government refused to check and bring before public trials. Majority of those found wanting of these kinds of crimes were allies of the government or their loyalists in the polity whom government felt should not be touched. This development increased the level of corruption in all sectors of the economy, and stifled the economy to the ground. The Gambia from independence is not a mineral resource-based economy. It is not even a well-fortified agriculture-based one that has varieties of crops for exports like her other counterparts in the region such as Ghana, Nigeria, Ivory Coast, Togo, Sierra Leone and so on which have agricultural produces like cocoa, kola nuts, cotton, palm oil, timber, hides and skin, yam, cassava to mention a few. It possesses mainly groundnuts for exports which did not give her an appreciable foreign earnings that could leverage on sustainable national development efforts by the state, except with the support of the tourist products it possesses which the first republic did not fully invigorate or tap into and except

the aids it received from friendly nations and international organizations that extended assistance to it from time to time, which were frequently mismanaged by the government of the day and its associates. These assists were meant to support infrastructural and rural development projects like road constructions, building of schools, provisions of good health care system, potable water, power generation, office equipments, boosting of agriculture like supplies of manures and tools to local farmers and fishermen e.g. canoe constructions and provisions of flying boats. When these items were secured, officials of the state in charge of many of them, sometimes converted them to private uses since nothing would happen to them under their “*Baba*” (meaning *God Father*) as Dawda Jawara was fondly called, meaning *an elder statesman and the one that feeds us*. Jawara was known for his magnanimity of distributing rice, sugar and sometimes fish money to his people through their Alkalos, the sefulous and religious leaders who passed on these items to every home/compound to feed on, and this he did regularly, which had kept the people lazy for decades and through which the people were always pledging their loyalties for the government to continue. This was another antics that Sir Dawda Jawara exhibited as part of his strategy to prolong his rule over the people, but which boomeranged as a result of unkempt conditions that his army officers were kept due to poor salaries and denials of improved living and working conditions. This instigated the soldiers against him coupled with the wind of contagion blowing from other African countries and the Asia, where coup’ de’ tats had been frequent and successful and are ruling their countries. It suffices to say therefore that the lack of initiatives of Sir Kairaba Jawara to have foresight in planning ahead, coupled with his conservatism and crude practices, despite his level of education as a first class University of Edinburg veterinary graduate and seasoned civil servant and politician who knew what administration and management was all about in the colonial regime, indubitably led to his downfall and regime collapse. He successfully created the channels for his enemies to bring him down from office when he should have ruled well, left legacies that were meaningful and productive and quitted the stage at the right time by allowing credible elections to hold through competitive party politics and an enduring electoral system. This chagrin development furthered the development of the underdevelopment of The Gambia’s political economy to present. The situation that came to be worsened by the military take-over of July 1994 now fashioned as “*The July 1994 Revolution*” under the leadership of its main actor and the regime ruler Yahya Jammeh.

Under Jawara, with the worsening state of the economy and decayed polity, his government was now surviving through loans, the loans at a point that his administration could not survive in paying back but to ask for rescheduling and or cancelations of them. Inflation went up, unemployment increased, the people's living standards and wellbeing declined considerably to the point that even the regular food items from the government house were not regular as before, and the people's addictions to laziness due to attire drinking, womanizing and alcoholism by their men and a majority of their women taking to either petty prostitution or vagabond life with the exception of a few who were doing menial jobs of house maids for a few well-to do and foreigners living and working in the country. Many of the youths who wanted to go to school could not afford it because of either lack of funds or the school was not there. The Jawara administration gave a leap service to education development and the up-bringing of the young ones through school system. This increased the illiteracy level in the state and practice of bad habits, e.g. leaning on relations to survive or uncles, niece, aunties, brothers and guardians as well as tubas (whitemen) to sustain career life or feeding. The Yahya Jammeh administration came to address majority of these household problems that have become national norms and practices by trying to change the people's mentality away from them, while inculcating national values of hard work for self-sufficiency and self-reliance. He engaged the people in meaningful and productive work and service, by cultivating in them the culture of national development, consciousness and values for nation-building. Indeed, the Yahya Jammeh regime gambianized most commercial ventures and services like transport, communications and business registrations to the extent that only the indigenes can engage in them or be the head. For example, commercial driving was legalized only for Gambians and Business registration can only pass through when a Gambian is made to be the head of that enterprise on most occasions. Commercial banking was invigorated which brought many banking institutions to the country especially from a big country and ally like Nigeria, but their operators were and still under stringent policies of employing only indigenes into them with the exceptions of key technical areas that would need expatriates which the government heavily taxes. Market opportunities were created to attract foreign investments and create enviable commercial environments for businesses to thrive in order to jack up the country's gross national and domestic products. More schools were built and qualified teachers were employed, both expatriates and indigenes at all levels including the sighting of the University of the Gambia in 1999 for all Gambians to receive higher education. These gigantic moves did not only generate massive employment to many Gambians, especially their youths, but reformed a society that used to be primitively-based.

To this effect the Yahya Jammeh government encouraged everybody to go to school and improve themselves toward contributing quotas to national development that is sustainable. While the youths are assisted with funds in form of government scholarships and the president's private gestures to attend higher education, others already in service are released to return to school through grants and government magnanimities to further their self-improvements. Education for the Girl Child was launched to encourage the female ones to school and stop prostituting and vagabond life. Vocations were encouraged both in public and private life to encourage enterprising and stop joblessness both for boys and girls. This invented tradition by Yahya Jammeh inculcated discipline into public life and maintenance culture as many Gambians now value what they have and how to maintain them. They also began to appreciate the culture of working and being reliant and self-sustaining. Before, the people's culture toward maintenance of public utilities was very poor, but when the government of Yahya Jammeh came to office, a new orientation signaled the very necessity, if not compulsion of maintenance culture and good health. Because of this poor living style and porous hygiene, mortality rate was very high as people died so young or at the slightest disease attack or mosquito bites. With the introduction of Celcetta (a monthly cleaning exercise), introduced by the government, Gambians' hygiene life styles and health conditions improved drastically and this improvement leveraged on the development processes of the country through concerted efforts in the public and private life. Much will still be said under the second republic when looking at the patterns of electoral politics and democratic system in the second republic.

As noted by Dieke, 1994 and just as commented by Edie, 2000:173, The Gambian nation was incorporated into the world capitalist system with a marginally periphery capitalist economy at independence, largely as a supplier of agricultural exports( mainly groundnuts) and more recently as a tourist resort concern or area. Since independence there has been little change in the structure of the economy, which remains very heavily dependent on groundnut production. Agriculture and tourism hence became the dominant sectors as well as the main sources of foreign exchange, employment and income for the smiling coast, with each accounting for 23.1 percent and 12 percent of the GDP in 1990/1991 respectively.

Modest rates of economic growth were achieved during the first decade after independence due to an increase in groundnut production. Production increased considerably in 1968/69 and a stable producer price was maintained. The value of the country's exports increased

from 2.5million pounds in 1960 to 7.1million pounds in 1968/69; imports were generally in line with exports and the foreign exchange rate was relatively stable (Annual Economic Review, 1970:20; World Bank, 1985). The economy improved with an average rate of 4 percent; inflation was at bay, foreign debt was small, the government's recurrent budget was balanced and foreign exchange reserves increased (Dieke, 1994 and Edie, 2000:173-4). With the growing economy, the government introduced in the 1970s the policy of Gambianization, where the government increased state participation, through public-private partnerships, and its role in the national economy, contrary to what obtained before the nationalization policy. To this end, employment greatly increased in the country to almost 100 percent with the civil service recording the highest percentage rate. For example, the personnel in the civil service was believed to have doubled above 4000 in number and contract and or non-permanent staff from 2,000 to 5,000 between 1975 and 1985 (Hadjimichael et al, 1992:19, Edie, 2000:173-4). While urban and rural development and capital investments increased tremendously, with the growth rates recorded in public sector management and commerce, much more concentrations were made in the urban areas of Banjul particularly, creating a widening gap in income and access to essential facilities that favored minority population resident in the greater Banjul, Serrekunda and Brikama, especially in the areas of transport and communications, industry, banking, finance, education, health and other selected services and business investments. The greater population of the people that were settled in the rural areas was still left undeveloped and not really catered for in the first republic (Gambia Weekly, January 26, 1990, p.6). The educated middle classes and professionals in the urban areas, for example, benefitted from public sector expansion just like their counterparts in the other sub-regional post-independence period as well as other developing countries undergoing serious democratization and electoral process in the global system.

However, with the growing international economic meltdown that began in the international political economy, midway into The Gambia's Second Five-Year Economic Plan(1981/82-1985/86) of the first republic, Jawara administration, not strategic enough, abandoned this noble objective and policy instrument, by shifting attention from physical infrastructural development to the productive sectors of the economy like agriculture with greater budgetary allocations amounting to 30 percent of the projected expenditure. The ceilings imposed on development expenditure and the bans placed on commercial loans coupled with reduced imports, as well as the drought in the Sahel which affected agricultural products adversely, the price of groundnuts (Gambia's main export earnings) on the international market

plummeted considerably, causing mayhem and economic catastrophe for the Gambian economy, that was trying to get up from its limping. This ground down the economy (Sallah, 1990) and brought the unfolding economic blueprint pursued by the PPP regime to a halt. To this effect, the government went bankrupt, foreign reserves became empty, the productive sector of the economy the administration was beginning to give priorities to stagnated, there came deficits in both fiscal and foreign exchange, inflation went up daily with a rate higher than ever experienced before, unemployment that the expanded public sector management had already been taken care of soared like a commodity and all what the government could do was to seek debt cancelations as she could no longer cope with rescheduling or payment due to lack of funds. The government now lived on grants from donor countries and institutions which agreed to help her out of the crises (Sallah, 1990, Edie, 2000, Jabara, 1994:320 and Gambia Weekly, January 26, 1990, p.6).

Government reverted to an optional economic development model to revamping the doomed economy called Sustainable Development Programme(SDP) which was preceded by an IMF-sponsored Economic Recovery Program(ERP) all geared towards recovery efforts that will bring normalcy to the system and inject funds into the economy for revitalization and cushioning. These programs also aimed at fulfilling conditionality given by the IMF and other creditors for normalization of relations and further assistance. Public expenditures were cut down, retrenchment of workers were embarked upon, with the retirement age being compelled for retirees in the public service. Budgetary allocations were reduced and in some instances not available for use due to budgetary deficits (Sallah, 1990, Jabara, 1994:230, Edie, 2000:175, Budget Speech, June 15, 1990). Against this backdrop, inflation rose as prices of consumer products and other essential services soared marginally, most especially, food items, health products like drugs and vaccines, public transport prices, oil and lubricating items' prices as well as tariffs. Between 1986 and 1994, things were not easy with both the government and the citizens until the nation was greeted with a military palace coup led by Col. Yahya Jammeh in July, 1994. Before the takeover, the poverty level in the country had increased by hundred percent as subsidies were removed from the oil sector and food supplies to the communities as well as rate of unemployment and those laid-off from their work. This situation sneaked in illegal money-seeking opportunities and corrupt practices both within public and private sectors of the economy which gave unwarranted opportunities to public officials under Jawara to embark on either illegal businesses or public stealing. This corruption level created a serious legitimacy crisis for the Jawara led-

government as the authorities under him found it difficult to implement the code of conduct against corruption in trying corrupt state officials. Most of those found wanting were his government loyalists who Jawara government found difficult to expose and punish. Many of these officials collected government and bank loans in huge sums and could not pay back, utilized them for personal businesses and other private commitments. One of these banks, The Gambia Commercial Development Bank (GCDB) collapsed as most borrowed monies could not be retrieved. Despite all recovery efforts for the economy and the financial sector, since little or no efforts were made by the administration to fight corruption and deal with the culprits, essentially presumed to be known to the government, the situation degenerated to a loss of public confidence in the government legitimacy, culminating into a state of anarchy, which brought the military ousters (Yeebo, 1995, Sallah, 1990, Jabara, 1994:316, Edie, 2000:176 and Hughes, 1991). As Edie, 2000:180 stated... “The 29 year PPP regime operated with diminished resources and found it intractably difficult to cope with the governance needs, bringing about reduced credibility of the Jawara personality and the popularity his PPP government enjoyed”. Competitive party system became challengeable with the shrinking legitimacy of the ruling oligarchy of the PPP by the opposition, which could have given an upper hand to the latter to campaign for elections and win in the country’s next general elections, as it did occur in the Federal Republic of Nigeria this March 28<sup>th</sup>, 2015, when the dominant coalition opposition All Progressive Party (APC) defeated the ruling Peoples Democratic Party, if the military had not struck. The coming of the military to many Gambians was timely and a blessing, but for those who knew the dangers of military rule and the threats they posed to peace and development, this well-informed elements had preferred the status quo to remain until elections came to effect the desired change in the state.

#### **2:3:4 The Second Republic under President Yahya AJJ. Jammeh (1994-2014): An Appraisal of the Patterns of the Electoral and Democratization Process.**

In the words of Hughes ...

*“A ‘democratic Audit’ of The Gambia since the return to civilian rule reveals the ambiguous nature of re-democratization under military direction. The military radicals, under Yahya Jammeh, ostensibly seized power to restore democracy and good governance, yet their continued rule in elected guise not only perpetuates the*



*neo-patrimonial leadership which they so despised under the deposed head-of-state, Sir Dawda Jawara, but also displays a level of intolerance and coercion towards political opposition and public criticism, never found previously in The Gambia".* (Hughes, 2000:35).

### **2:3:5 The Period of Transition (1994-1996)**

Several literatures abound on how the military junta obstructed the polity in 1994, two years after the 1992 election that returned the Jawara PPP to power, amidst economic and political crises that rocked the vessel of state governance under president Jawara. There were conflicting arguments on reasons advanced by the junta for taking over the government and the pledges they made to return the state to democracy and sustain it. Aside, there were also conflicting reports on the state of the nation under PPP rule, regarding the deteriorating economic system and competitive party politics that had not been alternating among varying political parties in the state for 29 years under Jawara. While some write-ups tended to welcome the army intervention based on the fact that, the state of the nation had been deplorable in the existing democracy and so any means available to effect changes and bring about election to return to popular rule was most welcomed and acceptable, others were skeptical about the sincerity of the soldiers to fulfill that, based on the experience around the world in the affected Third World countries that had the military ruling them. Some even felt, that there was neither any justification for the termination of the electoral politics and democratic system nor did the regime deserve it at all by the military described by the political scientists as aberration in politics. The political scientists are always arguably saying... *"the worst civilian regime is better than the best military regime".* (Hughes, 2000).

Hughes, (2000:35) maintains that the military coup of 27 July, 1994 in The Gambia brought to an end one of the most "open" political systems in the political history of the sub-Saharan Africa after a period of unbroken competitive party government dating back to independence in February 1965, being a position maintained also by Wiseman, 1996:917-40, in his own write-up. The scholars maintained that despite, the freest and fairest election of 1992 as described by both local and international observers in the West African sub-region by that time which returned Jawara PPP government to power for another five year term, a group of putschists (as Hughes describes the soldiers) seized power, claiming to have done so to save democracy and the electoral process, which they claimed the Jawara regime had messed up and which they had come to restore for The Gambians describing themselves as 'soldiers

with a difference' and promising to return the state to its democratic process within a shortest possible time. For the sweet talks of the juntas and given the inflationary rate in the country amidst some pockets of political distress that was ostensibly galvanized by gale of corruption in the official circle, the coup by the Armed Forces Provisional Ruling Council (AFPRC) led by Lt. Yahya Jammeh received a warm reception by many at home, especially the youths and the supporters of the ousted regime who later discovered that, the regime had no resistance internally and externally and had come to stay.

Advancing his own reasons and justifying them with intellectual tradition and perspective analysis, Edie, 2000:180-182, claimed that the increasing muscles and vex anger within the military as a result of the upgrading of the small paramilitary Field Force and its Police counterpart to an established Gambia National Army (GNA) and a full Mobile Police Force, following the fears emitting from the 1981 abortive military coup'de 'tat by the Jawara administration which empowered the soldiers to contend with the political authority while envying the Jawara throne, and with the concomitant grievances on conditions of service as well as those ones surrounding some new military postings in the army which favoured mainly Nigerian battalions to key top military positions over the indigenes, coming from a few military conspirators who decided to topple the administration, some of whom were close aide to the president, especially Lt. Jammeh. Other reasons advanced by Edie were the claim of poor state of the nation's economy which had elicited serious economic hardships on the average Gambians and which the army officers claimed to correct and leave. Coupled with this was the claim of the military of gamut of corruption both in the public service and within the rank and file of the army and which had been described by the ousters as inimical to growth and dangerous for national security of the nation. Just as observed by Hughes, wiseman and other scholars, so Edie and Sallah stressed that for lack of no internal and external resistance within days the juntas struck and Jawara was said to have given up also, the coup was greeted with ovation and support by the populace and major political gladiators, especially those working with Jawara, coming out and openly declaring their support for the new regime. However, the professionals and certain segments of the urban classes who were deeply disturbed by the new development, having sensed what might likely be ahead but unclear to others in the polity, though exercised some restraints and maintained calm, advised the military not to delay transition to civilian rule for sake of national unity and growth of the nation in the interest of all (Wiseman, 1996, Edie, 2000, Da Costa, 1995, Radelet and Mcpherson, 1995a; Sallah, 1990). While Edie named Lts. Jammeh, Hydara, Singhatey and

Touray Yankouba as the militants who led the coup and formed the initial government, Omotosho, 2014: , Perfect, 2000:431 and Hughes and Perfect, 2006, 2008 named Lts. Yahya Jammeh, Sana Sabally, Saidou Hydara and Edward Singhatey as well as Yankouba Tuoray who they said joined the arrangement later and formed the new government with a provisional ruling status under the fiat military. Meanwhile, Hughes and Perfect as well as Perfect in his own personal research, as did Omotosho had also commented that the coup plotters' given excuses to unseat the democratically elected Jawara was the rumpus within the polity musing around over the failure of his regime to effectively continue to govern the country, arguing that the regime itself had showed significant signs of weakness and inability to continue to govern, hence, the need for the military to intervene for national security sake. According to them, the level of corruption, the regime claimed, in the country and the failure of the Jawara regime to tackle it and deal decisively with the shrinking economy and declining living standard of the people, coupled with the alarming rate of the state indebtedness to the outside creditors, especially the Bretton Wood's giants, chiefly the IMF were all significant signs of a failed regime. The scholars, with different arguments and analyses, but sameness of logicalities and perspectives, observed also that the army claimed to have been attracted to the political stage following disaffections in the army against the regime on military postings that left the indigenes in the lower commands but putting the foreign attaches from the sister republic of Nigeria in the army over them on top military command postings who had been seconded to the Force(GNA) since 1992 among other unexhausted reasons. Perfect noted that the coup was generally popular, particularly among the youth and was welcomed by the main opposition parties, believed to have been long marginalized in the quest for political power and resource allocation, going by Harold Lasswell and David Easton's assertion of... *"Who gets what, why and how", ... "The authoritative allocation of values"*. The values being the resources of the state and power distribution which the opposition had claimed neglected or denied by the main ruling PPP government. As a savior now came, hence, the need to be joyous and support it definitely. In addition to these analyses, it is worthwhile to note that this writer's earlier position on the remote and immediate causes for the success of the coup in 1994 was the porous nature of the Jawara regime as well as its failure to strategize enough not to allow her weakness both within the ruling party and the general public, coupled with Jawara style of leadership, with over reliance on the new GNA to save her from any imminent coup(s) were said to have been the immediate reasons for the success of the coup this time around. This development was worsened by the failure of The Nigerian Government, or The Senegalese Authorities as

they did for her in 1981, or the army rescue operation from The US Naval Base on the coast to come to her rescue in intercepting the militants until it was dawn that external intervention to stop the coup plotters was not feasible. Such impossibility could also be viewed from another dimensional thought as signs to allow the Jawara regime go. This could however be disputed with no strong empirical facts to prove it right. Evidence also proved that the entire populace were tired of the regime at a time that people began to find living and sustaining increasingly hard and unbearable in the country, which necessitated the reason for a change.

After the evening of the coup and announcements had been made by the AFPRC, the leaders settled down for work. They dissolved all political parties, banned all political movements and activities including campaigns, meetings and gatherings, abolished the constitution and made some significant arrests of suspected corrupt government officials for criminal economic trials and other various lingering offences in the state (Omotosho, 2014). A purge of the civil service was also carried out and a few months later, the electoral process was put back into force to commence journeys to civil rule through the electoral means (Omotosho, 2014). While Edie, 2000:182, was quick to observe that... 'The military leaders thought that their undemocratic seizure of power would be legitimized by their tactfulness to play on the disaffection of the public for their acceptance and popularity which was to justify and or initiate their legitimacy and which made them to pronounce several promises they could not or even planned to fulfill, Hughes affirmed that the juntas, in an effort to seek for legitimacy, styled the administration in a civilian way by carefully modeling it as a diarchy with a measure of civilian co-optation to lend credence to its reform program and carefully planning towards a popular but charade presidential and parliamentary election in 1996 in which the coup leader Lt. Jammeh succeeded himself. This was when it became dawn on the electorate and the general public of the game and antics the coup plotters had had to hatch for mischievous political ambition. On the democratic audit criteria mentioned by Hughes in an excerpt above, the author avowed clearly that the chicken-pox and flawed transition program which the soldiers put up to return the nation to another republic ran short of the criteria set out in David Beetham's 'Democratic Audit'. Delving more on the details of the content of the audit, Hughes maintained that apart from the fact that the administration merely succeeded itself, on succeeding itself, before and after, the process was a gamut of political denials, opposition edging or elimination, human rights abuses and media curtailments which all violated the said audit criteria for an enduring democratic governance. According to Hughes, going by Beetham's definition of a democratic system of government which says, it's a

system of decision-making that treats its citizens equally; that is sensitive to their opinions and interests; that prefers persuasion and compromise to the assertion of will and arbitrary fiat; that guarantees basic liberties; and that allows for societal and political renewal without massive upheaval and cataclysm. In short, it is a government that is not just representative but responsible, as all powers reside in the people who elected those that formed the government into power. (Hughes, 2000:36). Hughes rubbished the electoral and democratization program under Yahya Jammeh under four discreet headings, namely, the Electoral Process, Openness, Accountability and Transparency, Civil and Political Rights and finally Democratic Society, describing the whole exercise of governance under the regime both before the transition, during and after the transition a charade and absolute waste of public resources and efforts. Hence the paradox of military affirmation of replacing a functioning but dead democracy and all the pledges of non-totalitarian rule by the juntas on ascending power that they coveted for aggrandized and inordinate reasons, became fallacious and mere rhetoric. While the government during the transition employed all antics and tact to succeed itself by deceiving the entire nation of being people-based and people-savior, it followed the footsteps of the government it accused and toppled and adopted most, if not all, and over, of the regime's patterns to democratize and consolidate in power. This some scholars have frowned at and described as *'not necessary, but came to be necessary in the midst of no option'*. Yahya Jammeh government at coup point in 1994 was an imposed government by virtue of its nature of ascendancy to power and by virtue of its participation in the electoral process by the ballot which was coaxed for legitimacy and undue tenure prolongation.

The electoral process initiated in the second republic and which saw the first general elections in 1996-97 held (both presidential and parliamentary), are believed to be flawed, upon presumptions that some of its features met the democratic 'audit' requirements of David Beetham, with the promulgated new constitution, the revised registers voters and return to a multi-party politics, it is not representative enough in terms of democratic participation and its conducts. This has been largely due to the high illiteracy level in the country which still pervades in the post-Jawara administration which debars many from exercising their voting right, especially the rural populace and most particularly women who could not be appointed into public offices. The women in the Gambia, who constitute more than half of the nation's population as at 1996 and with a long established role in political life and requirement for gender equality remain largely excluded from elected office. However, a balancing ratio became very significant, with the massive educational policies that Yahya Jammeh

administration later embarked upon to ameliorate this deficiency, through education for the girl child and large involvements of women in politics. President Jammeh has consolidated on the use of women as a political strategy to win elections periodically and in achieving this, his administration has devoted more attention to their welfares and gender satisfaction. His belief has been, making use of women to achieve political gains is equivalent to carrying along all the members of each family or household, since women exercise strong influence at home over their children and their husbands and whatever that which serves their interests will be supported by every member of the family. This is the culture in the average Gambian rural settlement (Hughes, 2000, Omotosho, 2014). Still on flawed situation of the second republic's electoral process, is a more widespread constraint which the AFPRC ruling party created by edging out the opposition from what is to be a competitive multiparty politics. This confirms a continual pattern of the electoral policy of the first administration. The Jammeh administration achieved that by many means as well. Firstly, by increasing candidates' deposits from 200dalasis to 2,500dalasis to contest an election, which the opposition parties or candidates saw as a device to edge them out of contest as it was a stringent requirement and or financial obligation to meet by them in view of the appalling income gap and the access the president and his party members have to state funds. Secondly, the deliberate exclusion of the previous ruling party, the PPP and the two other major opposition parties the National Convention Party (NCP) and the Gambia People's Party (GPP) from the race and thirdly the barring of former political office holders in the first republic especially, the offices of Mr. president, Vice- president, Ministers and special Aides, intended nominally to punish these categories for corrupt practices of the past by the administration they served , but, was viewed by the affected as a political calculation by the new regime to eliminate them from contest for fear of competition and possible future dictatorship. According to Hughes, 2000:38, it was a ploy to decapitate the opposition and render them ineffective and irrelevant in the new dispensation. Only two minor parties which had never won any parliamentary election before, PDP and PDOIS were allowed by the law to register and contest. Above all, the decision by the military's AFPRC to turn itself into a political party over night and present the ruling army leader Lt. Yahya Jammeh as its standard bearer in the new election was viewed as the highest conspiracy of the military oligarchy and hatching of a prolonged dictatorship. This eventually manifested. Hughes posited... 'These para-political organizations came to acquire notoriety for intimidation and violence, both during and after the elections which formed the basis of an Amnesty International report on The Gambia on power and human rights abuses, aptly entitled '*Democratic Reform without*

*Human Rights*'. These manifested in the forms of calculated and segmented attacks carried out on the main opposition UDP party convoys two days to presidential election on 24<sup>th</sup> September, 1996, under its party leader and presidential standard bearer Lawyer Ousainou Darboe on their way to Banjul to pay homage to their leader who just returned from a provincial election tour. Three persons were feared killed, several seriously injured and hundreds detained and charged for illegal rally and public disturbance. Lawyer Ousainou Darboe himself had to seek an asylum at the Senegalese High Commission in Banjul for protection throughout the election, on hearing of the threats of assassination to his life (Hughes, 2000:38). The opposition again had to grapple with the inadequacy of time for political rallies and campaigns created for them by the political fragile political climate as the ban on political activities was lifted just two weeks to the election time, that is on the 24<sup>th</sup> August, 1996. The scale of violence against the opposition increased with denials of permits by the police to conduct political meetings, illegal arrests and tortures of their members in various detentions especially at Serrekunda and Denton Bridge, continual attacks on them by the security forces in their meeting venues on the orders of the Head of state among other brutalities. This development confirmed the replacement and existence of a military democracy in place of the civil rule of the first republic with flagrance of human rights abuses, severe intolerance and perpetrations of ostensible criminalities that deciphered the military dictatorship in civilian form. A level playing ground multiparty politics was not only made difficult but was seen as strange. This has not made the APRC to be deposed in credible elections held every five years since the last 20 years because a peaceful and competitive party politics environment is neither created nor allowed to thrive since 1996. Worst still, incumbency as under the Jawara regime, was also used to distribute state patronage in respect of development project priorities to pro-government localities while others are denied. Hence, the considerable increase in development spending on rural amenities, while timely, admirable and commendable by political watchers are not commensurate with geo-political distribution needs and people's comfort. Political spin is the order of the day to promote propaganda and self-praises in the second republic. Opposition areas are constantly harassed and threatened of non-development for being disloyal. The resources of the state could therefore not circulate accordingly due to partisan resource utilization and distribution in the state by the APRC government which negates the principle of equity and equal opportunities for all within the content and deliverables' components of good governance and a viable and veritable democratic government in a state. It calls into question therefore the very claim of

the second regime of promoting economic democracy and total emancipation of its rural populace from inception (Hughes, 2000:39-40).

Another breach of constitutional propriety was the application of pressure on or disregard of the PIEC, an independent body charged with the responsibility of conducting a free, fair and credible election at any election, by the ruling party APRC and its manipulations for party sentiments. The PIEC was accused by the opposition parties of failing to stand up to the government. Its integrity as an independent electoral institution was not only undermined but compromised by its officials who showed loyalties to the government of the day since the latter appointed them through hand-picking. Hence, it could not monitor and regulate election procedures as it was stifled with funds and established authority in line with constitutional provisions (Hughes, 2000:40). Likewise, the PIEC was charged with a review of constituency boundaries in order to establish some uniformity in the number of electors or voters in each constituency as population grew and migrated within the country. For the 1996-97 elections, the boundaries were extensively redrawn in such a way as to favour the head of state and his party APRC. The number of seats was increased from 33 to 45 to reflect the growing electorate, but, on this occasion constituency boundaries outside the urban conurbation of Greater Banjul were based on local government chieftaincy districts. These bore no relation to population density, with the result that the urban constituencies in the Banjul hinterland, and Serrekunda in particular, as well as some large rural districts, were grossly under-represented, whereas, the lightly populated Foni districts of the Western Division, from where Jammeh hails, saw their parliamentary representations grow from two to five seats. This significantly returned unopposed all five seats in the parliament to APRC candidates (Hughes, 2000:40). Within the same constitution draft of 1996, the AFPRC ensured that the age requirement to contest was met by the Head of state, Yahya Jammeh. This was done by reducing the age qualification from 40 years to 30 years in order to give way to Jammeh to contest for the presidency that year at age 30, but now 31 years. These stratagems employed by the military under Lt. Jammeh to control and manipulate the democratic transition by 1996 gave unprecedented election victories to him and his party candidates at the polls with more than 52 percent landslide. This was not strange to political watchers and analysts given the way the whole process had been cooked up to ensure success (Hughes, 2000:40). It suffices to say then that the electoral process begun in the second republic under president Jammeh is free, fair, credible and wholly transparent even though such has not, till present, degenerated into political turmoil, (*as experienced in other parts of*



*the sub-Saharan Africa*) in truncating the natural gift of peace the small nation and smiling coast of Africa has process of the second republic is seriously faulty and non-credible. As already noted, the strong factor for this spectacular opportunity is the people's understanding with their leaders whether dictatorial or democratic by being submissive and loyal to their rule in the one part, and in the second part, the people's belief in their political system and their religion.

### **2:3:6 The Post-transition Period (1996-2015)**

In the post-transition period of the second republic Gambia, much as the activities of the government were open to public scrutiny, doubts were still cast on the integrity of the democratic system in regard to accountability, transparency and responsiveness. This was informed by the way the post-AFPRC cabal under Jammeh held on to most powers of the state in a dictatorial style. As Hughes put it... 'The latter's persistent authoritarian style of leadership suggests the continuation of a neo-partrimonial system of government, but less tempered by the liberal inclinations of former president Jawara' and so Edie reiterated... 'Little was there the reason to believe that a democratic political culture can evolve in The Gambia's second republic as the transitional program implemented by Lt. Jammeh had its roots in authoritarian military rule' (Hughes, 2000:35-43, Edie, 2000:187). In theory, government policy and its execution are subject to parliamentary scrutiny and approval and, beyond the Assembly, to the stipulations of the 1996 Constitution. However, holding government to account is made difficult by the enormous majority it enjoys in the House, and by the unquestioning loyalty of APRC deputies in the House to the government. As yet, and in contrast to the latter years of the PPP government, back-bench criticism of official policy does not exist. For reasons of ideological identity with the government, or sheer opportunism, little can be expected by way of serious criticism or scrutiny of government policy from its own back-benchers (Hughes, 2000:41). Such criticisms are rather provided by a fewer opposition members in the parliament who vigorously question government policy under APRC with a record high of this from the Assembly Debate released by the local press than what we had in the first republic under Jawara's PPP. The greater challenge to public accountability presented by the APRC might not be unconnected with this definitely. Despite the compositions of the National Assembly which are always made up of uneducated and inexperienced lawmakers who hardly know the essence of the whole process and how to avail it to address mal-administration and poor governance, the fewer opposition MPs who prove a

little critical have taking full advantage of their parliamentary immunity to use the chamber to expose both breaches of constitutional procedures and financial scandals involving the president and his cronies/cohorts, even so, notably opposition MNAs like Sidia Jatta (leader of PDOIS), Hamat Bah (leader of NRP) and Kemeseng Jammeh (UDP Assembly leader and the party leader Lawyer Ousianou Darboe did not contest the parliamentary elections). This has provided the public with some measure of transparency that the electorate require which the junta leaders promised to uphold in the polity but has not been maintained. With the majority APRC has always enjoyed and the tyro composition of the Assembly, the ruling party has always monopolized decisions and deliberations in the chamber contrary to constitutional requirements. Again, the immunity clause has been truncated by the enormous power of the president and the influence he exerts over the chamber's deliberations and outcomes as some of the members including the speaker of the House and who by constitutional provision is second in the state or hierarchy of authority are his direct appointees, their loyalty is undisputed and when altered they could be summarily dismissed by Mr president's order. Personal ruler ship, rather than parliamentary rule, remains the defining characteristic of government in The Gambia. Though, elected separately, the president enjoys considerable constitutional authority as well as a separate power base as National Chairman and party leader of the APRC. These enormous influence which are backed up by constitutional provisions give him the powers to hire and fire at will, even any member of parliament, whether elected or appointed (Hughes, 2000:42).The president has the legal and constitutional authority to appoint the government and beyond that, all key officials in the public sector would appear to require presidential approval either for travel or any other official engagement(s). As the commander-in-chief, the control of the army is in his hand and he keeps close watch of the Gambia National Army (GNA) for presidential directives. Any army officer(s) found culpable of an offence or any form of disloyalty is dealt with according to military laws. Since 1996 when the first post-coup elections were held, Jammeh has been succeeding himself every election as president, alters the constitution to suit political interests and personal aggrandizements, appoints loyalists and closest confidants into government or maintains them as qualified candidates for parliamentary, mayoral and area councilis elections, prominent among them, Yankuba Touray, Edward Singhateh, Bala Jahumpa among others (Hughes, 2000:4). Some notable key ministries are either put under his direct supervision or given to key serving or retired soldiers who are his personal confidants, such ministries like Defence, Interior, Energy, Agriculture and Local Government and Chieftaincy Affairs as are all the key provincial appointments-the five Divisional

Commissioners. Who act as principal agents of the central authority and supervise the activities of chiefs and alkalolu at district and village levels. As the party leader and dictator his approvals are sought for any candidate(s) contesting and should accusations of party misconduct(s) are got the individual could either be expelled or sent to prison. Because of its small size as a nation and for fund paucity, the governmental system has been unitary in nature with '*presidentialism*' which concentrates more powers in the executive and weaken parliament and the justice system. Administrative power has always been concentrated in the relevant ministries in Banjul. All this depicts the characteristic patterns of the second republic's democratic governance and electoral politics (Hughes, 2000:4).

The president and his senior ministers regularly engage in 'meet the people' tour to familiarize with the electorate and the local people, listen to them and meet their needs. However, such has been politicized as a mere propaganda in promoting the APRC popularity than solve the people's problems. Much state resources are usually expended on such tours with hundreds of cars fuelled and sometimes people dying in the process from motor accidents and other strenuous exercises. Through long distances, people trek, dance and merry along the convoys of the president and his APRC party, with the green boys and security personnel leading the train. Besides, the president is accompanied by retinue of armored cars and mobile ant-aircraft guns which as Hughes remarked, has not been conducive in any way to a dialogue of equals but been more reminiscent of the colonial era display of force ('showing of flag') than of democratic engagement with the people (Hughes, 2000:4). Often than not, each time the president is passing, this display has been a norm with over speeding by the entourage, and in some cases, innocent individuals could be crushed down by the convoys on the highways, especially when people are struggling to pick some of the biscuits thrown on the highways and beside the highways, until, this practice was stopped. The incumbent party under Yahya Jammeh had access to army troops and the police who carried out campaigns and other social and political even economic activities for it at the expense of the state and which the opposition party (ies) was denied. This monopolization of government resources and other benevolence provided APRC and its leaders the avalanche reward system that continues to guarantee her periodic election victories, since the newly elected opposition parties lack the similar resources to fight a competitive election battles. In consequence, the opposition parties engage in a more radical and populist approach in their campaigns and political activities in proving to the electorate that they could always effect a change to softening tighter economic conditions and bring about better living conditions for

the people if voted into power. This makes pattern of electoral competition in the second republic to take after the one experienced in the first republic and much harder (Edie, 2000:189, Hughes, 2000:41-43). A characteristic of personal ruler ship in post-colonial Africa is the conflation of public revenue with that of the ruler in the state. In The Gambia, it was no exception as this pattern of leadership was demonstrated and practiced by both the two republics' rulers. On taking over, president Jammeh identified and decried this political and economic corruption under the first republic's leader, promising the Gambian people of reform and great change. Surprisingly, on assumption of office in 1994, he did nothing to correct these ills; rather, his government re-consolidated this policy of personal enrichments and use of state funds as personal wealth which both political activists and economic analysts seriously condemned. Government has been unusually reticent or unwilling in offering more than straight denials of accusations of misuse of foreign loans, most particularly those from the Republic of China (Taiwan) and Libya. For example, a Taiwanese loan of 35million dollars was reported to have been given to the Gambian government for the funding of various development projects was said to have been banked in Switzerland and used as a private fund for the president. Aside, when relations were fully restored with Libya under Moamar Quattaffi in November 1994, an unspecified amount of funds and other aids secured from the latter were converted to president's private uses (Cooke and Hughes, 1997:113). These are negations of promises made to the people on taking over the reins of government in 1994. An oil-for-diplomatic-support arrangement between Jammeh and the late Nigerian leader Sanni Abacha recently came to light as well according to which The Gambia received 20,000 tonnes of Nigerian oil, via a Swiss intermediary, in return for Jammeh's support for a beleaguered Nigeria at the 1995 Commonwealth Heads of State summit in New Zealand. So many monies ostensibly for national development purposes have been inexplicably stashed in several Swiss accounts to which only the president and close confidants have access. In the past year public interest has been aroused by the president's decision to develop, at considerable expense, his home village of Kanilai in the Foni area-described as a miniature 'Yamoussoukro' (a reference to the late Ivorian president Felix Houphouet- Boigny's embellishment of his home town). A new coterie of businessmen-politicians, beneficiaries of Jammeh's development program has arisen and public sector fraud is still rampart, according to the latest Report of the Auditor-General (Weekend Observer, 1999:3-5, Cooke and Hughes, 1997, Hughes, 2000:44). This, so soon after the completion of the work of five commissions of inquiry set up to expose and punish corruption in the public domain during the Jawara administration. Jammeh's frequent public promises to deal firmly with civil

service corruption are not easily squared with aspects of his own financial activities as the supreme servant of the Gambian people and custodian of the state's treasury (Weekend Observer, 1999:3-5, Cooke and Hughes, 1997, Hughes, 2000:44).

### **2:3:7 Civil and Political Rights in the State under the Second Republic**

In the revised 1996 constitution, traditional civil and political rights were clearly and unambiguously entrenched for Gambian citizens to enjoy, contrary to what obtained in the previous 1970 republican constitution. Achievement was made by the AFPRC during the transition when it ousted the former regime from power. Added to this was the establishment of The Public Complaints Commission otherwise known as 'The Ombudsman' and the launching of the 1996 APRC manifesto which made provisions for Human Rights Protection, popular government and embracement of democracy in all ramifications. These were meant to build a 'New Gambia' as the military promised, confessing openly democracy and detesting the oligarchy of the Jawara era. The Jammeh regime further demonstrated this with an appendage to a local Amnesty International document seeking to increase awareness of the UN's Declaration of Human Rights on its 50<sup>th</sup> anniversary. With this development, however, all legislations and decrees that became non-consistent with the new constitution which now represents the new 'General Will 'were supposed to be abolished, such as Decree 86 of August 14, 1996, which retained the ban on three former political parties, including the former president Jawara's PPP and their leaders and prescribing draconian punishment for promoting their activities as well as the Decrees that set up the National Intelligence Agency which has the power to arrest and detain without trial from 90 to 180 days (Decrees Nos. 52 and 65) any individual found culpable of law and public peace disturbance. Disparagingly, none of these decrees was scrapped by the new regime. Rather, they were retained by the administration to curtail the same entrenched civil and political rights as the government continues to justify their retentions on grounds of national interest and security, thereby restricting political activities and full human rights enjoyment in the state. This has reduced the practice of democratic governance in the nation to a restricted one or more or less the entrenchment of authoritarianism. Decrees Nos.52 and 65 permit the NIA officials not only to arrest, detain and interrogate physically those believed to be oppositions and others contravening the press limitations, but to harass and torture them if the need arises for that (Hughes, 2000:45,.....These abuses have pervaded the Gambian polity until today where members of the opposition parties, especially the Ousainou Darboe's UDP and some

critical gentlemen of the press become targets and are indiscriminately arrested, detained illegally and unjustly harassed and humiliated. UDP's spokesman and propaganda secretary Lamin Waa Juwara and youth organizer Shyngle Nyassi were arrested and tortured severally in the state at the NIA's custody, the action that received popular condemnations. Other decrees like Decrees Nos. 70 and 71 were retained to place unusual constraints on the functioning of a vigorous and free press, which ostensibly empower the government to place ban on press activities that are considered inimical to state security and keep in custody the journalist(s) responsible for such unauthorized news or publications (Hughes, 2000:46). The death penalty Decree that was abolished by the Jawara administration in 1993 was reintroduced by the military in the second republic specifically meant to target coup plotters and murder charges. With this, a number of victims have been tried and sentenced accordingly and this has received worldwide and local criticisms especially when in 1993, about nine inmates on death row in the Gambian prisons were executed (source). Flagrant disregard for legal process and constitutional order cum use of force by the government in the second republic has rendered not only the judiciary weakened in the state but also the most important representative body (which is the parliament). The executive arm of the government has arrogated more powers to itself, justifying this undemocratic venture with Promulgated Decrees and constitutional provisions for national security.

On November 3-7, 2014, a United Nations Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman and/ or degrading treatment or punishment, Mr. Juan E. Mendez, visited The Gambia on a special mission to monitor reported cases of human rights abuses like torture, illegal arrests and detentions as well as other inhuman treatments and punishments after due consultations with the government and the clearance got to carry on the investigations. On his visit to the NIA's office in Banjul, Mr Juan's reports confirmed an extreme and regular practice of torture which is carried out by the NIA officials. In his words,... 'The mistreatment inflicted was normally of short duration, consisting mainly of physical trauma caused by punches, slapping and blows with objects such as canes or batons and burns' (Sheriff, 2015:1-3). According to him, testimonies of persons who were held either in NIA Headquarters or in other unofficial places of detention reveals an ongoing practice whereby persons are held incommunicado for many days or weeks (one individual was reportedly held for nine many nine weeks and, in a recent case, three perceived homosexuals were held for over six weeks) under inhumane conditions before being handed over to the police and brought before a judge. He further said accounts of torture are severe and routine for those

charged with “aggravated homosexuality” or for those considered a “high risk to state security” and are routinely held in clandestine detention (Sheriff, 2015:1-3). International law requires that the conditions for the use of force are set out in law. Section 18(4) of the constitution contains a broad standard of “reasonably justifiable” use of force and permits, *inter alia*, its use for the defense of property and to effect lawful arrest. It does not require the existence of an imminent threat of death or serious injury or bodily harm for the use of lethal force nor does it require that it will be used as a last resort to protect life, as prescribed by international law. The UN monitor noted that... “There is a ‘Bulldozer’ Unit which includes several law enforcement units, including a paramilitary unit that reports to the Inspector General of Police (IGP) that is used in quashing civil disturbances/unrests and intimidate civil society. In April year 2000, security forces opened fire on a student protest, which resulted in the deaths of 13 students and one journalist (including six minors) and 28 injured. Since that time there has not been a large public demonstration in the state. The Students Union Body for the country was restructured and re-organized to suit state interest and government policy and they were now named (The Patriotic Students Association of The Gambia). The excessive force used by the authorities resulted in ill-treatment and even amounted to torture, in some cases where the gravity of the injuries was severe (Sheriff, 2015:1-3).

The Special Rapporteur requested, but did not obtain a copy of the NIA’s code of conduct. Under the Drug Control Act, the National Drug Enforcement Agency (NDEA) has broad powers to protect protect state security. The statute is vague as to circumstances and conditions when NDEA can use force. The testimonies received indicated that the NDEA, like the NIA engages in abusive methods. The Special Rapporteur received diverse reports and testimonies about the existence of paramilitary groups associated with the security forces and under the direct orders of the president, just as the NIA and the NDEA take direct orders. A secret unit reportedly called the jungullars, (also known as “Junglers” or “Black Blacks”) is associated with reports of arbitrary arrests, detention, torture, enforced disappearances and extrajudicial killings against persons considered to be opposed to the regime, journalists and ordinary civilians. The methods reportedly used to conduct torture and assassinations is with hammers, machetes, ropes, nails, pliers, needles and syringes injected into the victim’s body (Sheriff, 2015:1-3).

Attached is the detailed report of the UN's Special Rapporteur General's on Human Rights in The Gambia as published by the Voice Newspaper 12 March, 2015 and which was delivered to the United Nations Secretary:

*In cases where there is a real or perceived threat to national security there is corresponding increase by the NIA of acts of torture and ill-treatment during the detention and arrest process. There was also anecdotal evidence of mistreatment by the police and other law enforcement which is more of an isolated sporadic practice. The envoy received many testimonies from people who did not want to be identified out of fear for either their own safety or that of their families that government could pounce on. He conducted thorough interviews and forensic medical examinations by an independent forensic expert. The Special Rapporteur found the testimonies truthful and consistent with other testimonies regarding the practices and methods used and substantiated this with physical evidence presented by a number of cases which were consistent with their testimonies of beatings by fists or blunt instruments and the injuries showed treatment that amounts to torture (or is consistent with allegations of torture) (Sheriff, 2015:1-3). The nature of the torture, the reports maintained, is brutal and includes very severe beatings with hard objects or electrical wires: electrocution (including to the genital part), asphyxiation by placing a plastic bag over the head and filling it with water, cigarette burns, tying up with ropes, burning with hot liquid and an account by one victim of having to dig his own grave believing he would be buried alive. These methods of torture are daily practices by the state security agents and in the prisons as well as other undisclosed detention areas in the state (Sheriff, 2015:1-3)..*

At the invitation of the Government of the Gambia, the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Christof Heyns, conducted a joint official visit to the country with the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (The Voice, 2015). The visit took place from 3 to 7 November 2014. It was originally scheduled for August 2014, but was postponed by the Government at the last



minute for reasons still unknown. The Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions thanks the Government of the Gambia for extending the invitation to visit the country, as well as all officials with whom he met. Additionally, he wishes to thank the United Nations country team and, in particular, the Resident Coordinator, for their logistical support. The Special Rapporteur is also especially grateful to the staff of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) West Africa Regional Office for their invaluable support in preparing for and carrying out the visit.

During the visit, the Special Rapporteur met with the Vice-President of the Gambia, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Minister of Interior, the Minister of Justice, officials of the Office of the Attorney General, the Office of the Solicitor General and the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions, the Director General of the National Intelligence Agency, the Director General of the National Drug Enforcement Agency, the Director General of Prisons, the Inspector General of Police, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and High Court Justices, the Prison Visiting Committee and the Office of the Ombudsman. Additional meetings were held with the United Nations country team, the diplomatic community and the civil society groups. In preparation for the visit, the Special Rapporteur met in Senegal with staff of the OHCHR West Africa Regional Office, and with representatives of the international community and of the Gambian community in exile. The Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions expresses regret that the President of the Gambia was not available for a meeting with the two Special Rapporteurs during their stay in Banjul. As we have it happening in all other country missions, the Special Rapporteurs had requested state permission, in advance, in accordance with the terms of reference for fact-finding missions by Special Rapporteurs, which apply to all country visits in all parts of the world and which, among other things, include guarantees concerning “access to all prisons, detention centres and places of interrogation”, “confidential and unsupervised contact with witnesses and other private persons, including persons deprived of their liberty”, and protection from reprisals. Such authorization was granted by the Government in a letter dated 27 October 2014 and was reiterated in a meeting with the Government at the outset of the visit.

Notwithstanding, when they commenced their visits to prisons, the Government denied the Special Rapporteurs in-site access to the security wing in Mile 2 Prison and insisted on having prison personnel accompany them during the inspection. The Vice-President and other

Government representatives, in a meeting held with the Special Rapporteurs where the latter protested against this exclusion, made it clear that they did not have the power to rule instead, and that the Special Rapporteurs would not be allowed into the security sections of the prisons in the country. This breach of the terms of reference forced the Special Rapporteurs to suspend visits to prisons altogether. The notion of departing from the principle of unrestricted access in one country but not in others would have displayed double standards, created a dangerous precedent for the future and undermined the mandate entrusted to the Special Rapporteurs by the Human Rights Council. At the same time, it was too late to abandon the visit altogether. Although it was concluded, the visit cannot be viewed as full-fledged. The Special Rapporteur notes that, owing to the Government's refusal to allow unrestricted access to detention centres, an inference must be drawn that there is something there to hide.

The present report focuses on the situation as it was during the visit, although some references are made to subsequent developments, including the attempted coup d'état of 30 December 2014 and its reverberations. The report was sent to the Government for comments on 19 March 2015 and was completed on 5 May 2015.

In 1994, a military coup installed Yahya Jammeh as Head of State. Two years after a nominal return to civilian rule took place, after a new constitution was established and presidential and parliamentary elections were held respectively. President Jammeh has been re-elected in all subsequent elections and has since kept a strong grip on public and private affairs in the country. The Special Rapporteur perceived a high degree of personalization of State practice and of decision-making power in the figure of the President.

The Cabinet is appointed by the Head of State and appears to undergo continuous shuffling. Legislative power is vested in the unicameral National Assembly; opposition groups are insufficiently represented in it for its members to exert influence on the Assembly's decisions. This is a hard pill to swallow. The judicial system includes the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeal, the High Court, the Special Criminal Court and several lower courts. Judges are appointed by the President after consultation with the Judicial Service Commission and are granted life tenure. In practice, however, judges have frequently been removed without explanation, and their appointments have been heavily criticized for lack of independence and transparency (International Bar Association Report on The Gambia, 2006).

Economic development remains a challenge in the Gambia, with high poverty and unemployment rates and heavy reliance on foreign aid. The European Union is the country's biggest development assistance partner. However in December 2014, it cut off €13 million of funding, and threatened to block another €150 million in response to the country's poor human rights record. In turn, the Gambia has recently turned to donor countries in the Gulf.

On 30 December 2014, military and ex-military officers in the Gambia attempted to stage a coup d'état, but were repelled by forces loyal to the President. Three alleged plotters were killed during the attacks and one was injured and captured. Up to 30 persons, including family members of insurgents, have been arrested and been held in incommunicado detention, with some being subjected to torture. Only 10 were reportedly released. The President proceeded to replace key members of the Cabinet following these events, including the Minister of Justice and the Minister of Foreign Affairs. At a court martial held on 30 March 2015, three persons were sentenced to death and three to life imprisonment for their alleged involvement in the failed coup.

### **Human Rights Overview**

The country is characterized by disregard for the rule of law, infringements of civil liberties and the existence of a repressive State apparatus. State institutions like the military, the civil service, the police, the Ombudsman, the courts, the Electoral Commission among others are weak and under the influence and control of the executive power, namely the President. Transparency and accountability in public affairs are scarce and there are no independent institutions or processes to channel alternative voices or social demands. The activities of civil society organizations are closely monitored by the executive. The Special Rapporteur encountered many manifestations of fear and frustration in civil society, with reports of rampant State-led violence, persecution of the media and critical voices, and impunity for human rights violations. Human rights concerns also include interference with the independence of the judiciary, denial of due process, prolonged pre-trial and incommunicado detention, poor prison conditions, persecution of lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) persons, and tolerance of the practice of female genital mutilation. It appears that, at best, the State, for strategic reasons, occasionally pays lip service to human rights, but otherwise pursues the narrow interests of power and political survival. Human rights protection is largely an illusion.

The Constitution of the Gambia, approved by referendum, entered into force on 16 January 1997. Chapter IV of the Constitution provides for the protection of fundamental rights and freedoms. The right to life is established therein as a fundamental human right from which no derogation is permitted, even at a time of public emergency that threatens the life of the nation (A/HRC/WG.6/7/GMB/1, p. 3) Despite these constitutional guarantees, compliance is deficient and many fundamental rights are routinely violated.

Moreover, in recent years, the Government has adopted legislation that infringes international human rights standards, such as (a) the Indemnity Act of 2001, which gives the President the power to indemnify law enforcement officials for abuse of force during situations of public emergency, unlawful assembly, public disturbance or rioting; (b) the Information and Communication Act of 2013, which creates several new offences and imposes harsher penalties for online activity deemed critical of the Government; (c) a series of amendments to the Criminal Code, which broaden definitions and impose harsher penalties for various offences, such as sedition, libel, public disorder, or giving false information; and (d) the Criminal Code (Amendment) Acts of 2005 and of 2014, sections 144 and 147, on “carnal knowledge of any person against the order of nature... and any other homosexual act” and on “aggravated homosexuality”, which criminalize sexual activities between consenting adults.

The Gambia’s legal system requires the domestication of international treaties before they can be enforced by national courts. At the international and regional level, the Gambia has ratified several human rights treaties, including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and its First Optional Protocol, and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights. However, the country is yet to ratify a number of international human rights instruments, including the Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which aims at the abolition of the death penalty, the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, the Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, and the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families.

## **2:4 Achievements and Challenges of Democratic and Electoral Politics and Process Under the First and Second Republics' Gambia**

Lofty achievements and myriads of challenges definitely surround the making of the democratic and electoral politics and process in the first and second republics of The Gambia. A comparative survey will be made to logically and empirically present these facts in adding to the existing literature on this issue and in furthering research works generally on the democratization and the electoral process in The Gambia from the independence time.

While some scholars have maintained that The Gambia has experienced a relative political stability and fascinating multiparty politics since independence, especially during the Jawara regime before the military interregnum in 1994, some have argued with available empirical data in the contrary, saying, that the small nation has undergone and is still undergoing serious political setbacks and upheavals that have marred the optimum realization of her viable and stable democratic governance and political order. Perfect, .2008:435 asserts that... "Political developments in The Gambia have often seemed to run counter to that elsewhere in Africa". Perfect here is saying that, not until 1994, The Gambia had remained the longest continuously surviving multiparty democracy and politics which the Jawara administration defended well with the efficacy of the country's constitution but which was later altered by the 1994 military coup that brought president Yahya Jammeh to power and who ostensibly has equally maintained a controversial civil rule since takeover till the present day. Reiterating,... "many sub-Saharan states were moving towards a multiparty political system, The Gambia moved in the opposite direction with the military seizure of power", he quarried. The leader of the coup, Lt. Jammeh transformed himself to a civilian ruler but with high authoritarian and military-styled rulership. This argument suggests that The Gambia would have been adjudged most politically stable and cherishable on the mainland of Africa since her independence on 28<sup>th</sup> February, 1965 and since becoming a full republic on the 24<sup>th</sup> March, 1970, if this process was not interrupted by a coup' d'état on 22nd July 1994, transiting into another questionable democratic governance. In his own view on road to independence and the entrenched democratic order and electoral politics,... "Germane in this road to independence was the process of elections and the party politics in The Gambia". Omotosho, stresses that the foundation upon which the independence and the post-independence electoral process commenced and consolidated for a sovereign national state of The Gambia was the enduring democracy and the fascinating electoral process that the independence government entrenched and consolidated upon from 1970. An achievement

attributed to the Jawara administration of the first republic. The writer describes this foundation of multiparty democracy and electoral process as one known to be harmonious, enduring and free from unnecessary crises that could jeopardize a viable and stable political order (Omotosho, 2014:14). On his own part, (Bodnar, 2012), while commenting on the parliamentary development in the Republic of The Gambia and the role of the president as a niche actor, observes that... “The Gambia suffers from many grievances such as the poor human right situation, mal-administration, political violence and a de facto autocratic political system”, stressing that this obscurity and political stalemate is indubitably responsible for the unachievable political order and viable electoral polity from independence, with a worse experience in the post-coup era. He maintains that the usurped legislative powers with more executive powers of the state, is and continues to be a strong inhibiting factor for the practice of true democracy and electoral system in The Gambia. This infers that, The Gambia polity could have been truly harmonious if true separation of powers has been observed in its political process (Bodnar, 2012) both in the first and second republics. On elections in The Gambia and in giving the political profile of the nation, the African Elections Database categorizes democracy in The Gambia as follows: Between 1965 and 1994 which was the first republic, The Gambia had democracy that was moderate and normal, 1994- 1996, she had a military oligarchy under a junta and headed by Lt. Yahya Jammeh and 1996- present, the country is operating a purely restricted democracy that can be viewed more or less as quasi-military regime under president Jammeh under the guise of democracy and good governance with respect to constitutionalism (source). What this is suggesting is that The Gambia has not experienced a stable and normal democratic governance from 1965 – present, in as much as there has not been consistency all through in adjudging it right as one of the most veritable in the sub-Saharan Africa with multi-party politics in the last five decades. On his own part, (Hughes, 2000:49), laments that... “A ‘democratic audit’ of The Gambia since the return to civilian rule reveals a considerable way to go before most of the requirements for a minimal democratic political order are in place and raises concerns about the capacity and intention of an approach based on the civilianization of the armed forces, rather than their total disengagement from political life”. Stressing further, that the junior army officers who seized power in a zeal of democratic reform are themselves, in some significant ways, the principal obstacle to the attainment of full democracy in the country (Hughes, 2000:49-50). This observation suggests the dominant presence of authoritarian attitudes and governance style reinforced around the personality of President Yahya Jammeh rather than in the ruling party APRC or the National Assembly. This connotes that the democratic system in The Gambia has not been harmonious and credible as

purported by scholars who succumbed to a favorable democratic journey. In consequence, according to Hughes, while one does not detect any major ground swell to restore former president Jawara to power, the failings of his administration are beginning to look less heinous and condemnable, in view of what is under practice in the current regime of the second republic.

For Edie,.. “throughout the post-independence period right from 1965- present, The Gambia had a democratic façade anchored on one-party domination”. This according to this scholar has been maintained and sustained by the incumbent maximizing state resources and other various mechanism and instrumentations to perpetuate rule of oligarchy on the state. The institutional failure of a stable and genuine multiparty democracy that is relatively if not highly competitive to stay and consolidate is perhaps one of the most serious and devastating challenges of the day in The small nation and smiling coast of Africa (Edie, 2000:192-193, Hughes, 2000:45-50). With this The Gambia could be said to be confused in the state of mess and growth of democratic order and stability. All these arguments above present a colossal empirical fact about whether The Gambia has enjoyed throughout from independence a formidable and credible democratic and electoral system to this day or not. This provides us the framework for explaining and analyzing the basic achievements and main challenges that the nation’s political system has recorded.

#### **2:4:1 Achievements and Challenges of the Democratic Governance and the Electoral Politics in the First Republic.**

One of the principal achievements of the democratic process in the first republic under president Jawara was the successful independence the octogenarian and his nationalist colleagues in The Gambia got for their country in 1965 and the successful commencements of an enduring multiparty and electoral politics which, as already accentuated, some scholars had viewed the most viable up till 1994 when the coup ousted it. Sir Dawda Jawara stood out among others, like Edward Francis Small, Omar Faye, I. M. Garba Jahumpa to mention a few, in the fight against the British imperialism and colonialist domination, the struggle that won for The Gambia her independence and nationhood. Jawara also made frantic efforts to return the country to a republic shortly after independence, but this was not successful until 1970, when the presidential form was incorporated to the unitary system of government in the country with a multi party politics.

In the first republic, the government was able to also preserve the traditional voting behaviour

that the British rulers launched in 1960 for the nation's nascent democracy. This traditional voting ideology involved the use of drums and marbles by dropping tokens in the ballot box to indicate a voting has been cast within the multiparty "First- Past- the Post" electoral system. This idea was brought about by the British in order to compensate for the high illiteracy level in the country so as to enable many Gambians to be enfranchised and politically enlightened. The practice has been sustained even up till today in the country.

The first republic leader was also able to achieve for The Gambia its own sovereignty and nationhood by not confederating with her sister country Senegal as Senegambia when the idea was launched by the British colonialist on considering that the nation was too small and not resource endowed to exist as a sovereign national political unit within the enclave. The leader proved to the whole world that The Gambia could maintain her nationhood and exercise her own sovereignty as a nation within the continuum.

Among other achievements of the first republic Gambia was and continues to be the very foundation of peace and unity laid for the country and which has constituted a great asset for the nation today. The Gambia is acclaimed and even commended today for her natural peace environment in the world through the non-ethnic politics that is ostensibly not glaring in the country's democratization process and electoral politics. None of the country's two leaders so far and neither the opposition have utilized ethnicity and religion so glaringly as a political weapon to achieve mischievous political domination and control. As we know, these two issues are always the sources of political conflicts and social disorder in Africa and other Third World nations in the post independence era. The Gambia has not been a victim. The natural peace has continued to attract foreign investments and external aids that constitute a greater percentage for her foreign earnings, especially in the area of tourism and hospitality. Aside, at independence and contrary to what obtained in the other British territories, The Gambia had no national army but a regimentary unit merely for presidential guards. However, following the 1981 coup plot thwarted by the Senegalese army then, to reinstate president Jawara, The latter established the Gambia National Army (GNA), consolidated and sustained it as the country's military and he also established the Police Mobile Force to help internal order and strengthened the nation's peace. These two apparatus which the Jawara administration established helped in the consolidation of the nascent democracy and the electoral politics that the country won at independence in 1965 and which the peace in the country has indubitably facilitated to sustain. The first republic administration promoted unity among its varying groupings by ensuring that



the wolof language is widely spoken across the nation for easy communication, especially in a predominantly illiterate society where a vast majority at independence could neither read nor write or even know their political rights and how to exercise and defend them. However, with the adopted and adapted voting behaviour in the country and the efforts of the government to promote and facilitate local language speaking, the people's political rights were easily communicated to them for understanding. The administration also encouraged rural development, even though not to what was expected, however, with this, the Gambian populace was able to be put together up till 1994 when the revolution took place and the second republic ensued to commence pragmatic development strides in virtually all areas of human needs. The first republic also engaged some economic reforms which had been extensively discussed under patterns of democracy. These reforms revitalized the country and laid the very foundation the second republic came to consolidate on. The reforms bolstered infrastructural growths, agriculture, especially the commercialization of cash crops like groundnuts, cashew and mangoes, being the major export products of the small nation both within the sub-region and overseas. The Jawara administration also made some progress on external relations, especially by strengthening both trade and diplomatic ties among ECOWAS members, the entire sub-Saharan Africa and the West. With the peace in the country, and the attainable political stability, The West, especially, Britain, France and America, were able to shower enormous material and financial assistance to the country to further her development efforts. Aside, major international institutions like The Commonwealth of Nations, The United Nations, The Non-Alignment Group and those of the sub-region and the regional bodies like the ECOWAS and the OAU now AU which the country has their memberships, among varying numbers of non-governmental organizations, were able to focus more attention to The Gambia as a destination and place to develop. The second republic tapped into these advantages in instituting its regime and gaining international recognition and support. President Jawara became a powerful actor to reckon with within the region especially in the ECOWAS sub-region particularly in the areas of conflict resolutions and peace building as well as in institutional building. On the Cassamance issue, the civil war in Nigeria even though the ECOWAS had not been created and as well as the Guinean crises, president Jawara played an elder statesman's roles in all these conflicts to guarantee settlements (source). These moves brought honor and recognition for The Gambia, making her the most stable democracy of the time. President Jawara also participated in the pan-Africanist initiatives lauded by Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, even though, The Gambia was yet to be born by the time this philosophy began, immediately, the country got her independence and became a member of the OAU now AU, Jawara left no stone unturned to play relevant and key roles in

stabilizing the organization and its efforts to achieve her decolonization of Africa and extermination of apartheid from the continent. The second republic built upon this noble achievement. These achievements had sustained the elongation of the first republic for 29 years including the independence period thereby keeping the Jawara rule perpetually re-elected at every election since the people wanted it. This claim could be dispelled based on the fact that the regime was imposing itself and not through viable means because as proved in our previous arguments, voting in The Gambia in the first republic was characterized by many flaws that did not make elections freer and fairer. Such manipulations ranged from one party consolidation and the manipulation of the electorate who didn't understand average voting system very well. Others included the segmentation and marginalization of opposition in weakening them and not making the level playing ground an acceptable one for all. The Jawara regime however preserved the Gambia's 1970 constitution for a stable democracy and open elections with a voting ideology that was instituted to promote voting behaviour in the country. In the first republic, abuse of human rights and press suppression were not rampant as we observed in the second republic, including illegal arrests and incarceration of people by the NIA and the police and neither were there secret intelligence units apart from these two officially established bodies to maintain national security established and attached to the president for acceleration of illegal arrests and tortures, opposition intimidations and massive riggings and the likes were equally not rampant as well. Although, at a point, corruption was rife in the economy and politics by government officials under Jawara, the momentum was however not stampeding as records showed and as later recorded in the second republic, even though, this was the strong point together with bad governance and lack of democracy used against the regime in 1994 to topple her. It is therefore chagrin to discover the correcting regime to be more ruthless in corruption, mismanagement and poor human rights saga.

Despite these achievements, the first republic regime had enormous challenges that crippled the very good efforts made towards nationhood growth. Paramount among these was the low level literacy growth in the country and the inability of the Jawara regime to institute genuine political awareness and educational growths. Enough schools were not built, electoral institutions were not established such as the Independent National Electoral Commission, the list goes on which would have promoted and consolidated this awareness. Instead, the regime capitalized on its people's weakness, manipulated them for political hegemony and the PPP domination, using available means to achieve this. For example, the traditional voting system was not improved on to contain fraudulent voting that the opposition were always crying foul of and not listened to,

just because its practice were favoring the ruling PPP. More so, the non-establishment of higher institutions where programs like political science, development studies and law were taught such as a university marred the poor performance of the democratic system and a vibrant electoral process that allowed massive political participation and an enduring and growing political culture in the state. Worse still, the Jawara regime did little to encourage vibrant and performing competitive party politics which guaranteed a level playing ground and a veritable good governance process that truly embraced all its three determinants of process, content and deliverables. The process involves accountability and transparency, while the content is equality and equity and the deliverables include the dividends of democracy and keeping of campaign promises at elections. The regime perpetuated itself in power without appreciable and or concomitant development efforts that justified a long rule and party domination. This pauperized the country and its people for 29 years, giving room for a military takeover that the people saw as an escape route from one party oligarchy by the PPP. The country experienced serious infrastructural decays, non-establishments of new ones and foreign earnings' reductions and deficits. This increased inflation rate and compounded living standard crises amidst, unemployment that rendered the youths lazy and jobless. Gender equality and women empowerment was at bay with the women reduced to merely domestic uses and home affairs, with the exception of a few of them from well-off homes that their parents could send to schools abroad for higher studies. Importantly, with no credible opposition in the polity, coupled with hampered press freedom, weak civil society vibrancy and as well as poor literacy among the teeming population, The Gambia in the first republic experienced low level democratic growth and questionable and or controversial electoral process. The climax of this poor governance process was advanced by the high corruption level in the government. A tempo that witnessed serious economic crises and political stalemate as the process galvanized all sectors of the nation's political economy including the electoral system. As a result, the country's policy direction lost bearing and noble focus that could propel giant development strides. Funds secured for development purposes either through loans or aids were misappropriated and mismanaged for aggrandized interests. Impunities were on the high scale as senior government officials embezzled state's funds, carted away government properties without being brought to book by the Jawara administration for justice. These propelled the coup that aborted the first republic and instituted the second republic in 1994, which Yahya Jammeh spearheaded. Jawara succeeded in building around himself a personality of 'Worship' by the people than a personality of service to them through an oligarchy that encouraged his party PPP's domination and rulership (source). This wasn't good for the newly worn democracy after oppressive long

years of colonial rule. The same footstep has been the style of the current administration in Banjul under President Yahya Jammeh till date. Just like in the second republic, the parliament was reduced to an instrument of the Executive through the nomination process of some members of the parliament into the Legislative Body, which gave the president the right to hire and fire at will any MPs found disloyal to the government (source). Regional and District governors were appointed instead of being elected directly by the people or through their electoral college. Inadvertently, the Executive arm of the government became both the government and the electoral college of the state. This is undemocratic. With his own level of education, an opportunity that was not common in those days, Jawara had been perceived from the intellectual circle as someone who could have utilized this great privilege to engender and strengthen, even deepen the practice of democracy that would not be subjected to rhetorics and military manipulation. Aside, his regime should have concentrated on massive political education and educational advancements of his people, just as he utilized the language advantage and the voting behavior to galvanize political stability and electoral integrity. He should not also have mixed up his simplicity as a person with decisive administrative and policy process that would have not played his government into the hands of his military ousters. Above all, he should have allowed true multipartism to flourish in engendering opposition participation and free press freedom that would guarantee smooth and viable electoral process and an enduring democracy. The idea of the re-election bid was of course a serious jeopardy to his personality and government as well as the integrity of the entire nation. Jawara had capitalized on the small size of the country, its small population and the poor education level of his people at independence to perpetuate and perpetrate undue rule that brought his government down. He failed to utilize office to strengthen true democracy and consolidate developments that were necessary ingredients for good governance and democratic survival. Nonetheless, his administration succeeded in laying the very foundation upon which democracy and good governance could rest and is being expected to rest both for second republic Gambia and in the future. His people even in his life time continue to eulogize him for this noble goal and lofty achievement recorded in his tenure.

#### **2:4:2 Achievements and Challenges of the Democratic Governance and Electoral Politics in the Second Republic's Gambia**

Achievements and challenges experienced in the second republic under Yahya Jammeh administration towards the democratization of The Gambia's polity and its electoral process are

interlocking if not asymmetrical with those of the first republic. Although, more serious with those experienced in the former was the military era that preceded the proper take-off of the new republic in which this military background continues to determine the nature of democracy instituted by the actors of the second republic who were the same set of rulers that staged the military takeover against the first regime. Also, the changing circumstances informed by trajectory of development process and programs which the Yahya Jammeh administration embarked upon for dividends of democracy and as promised The Gambian people, coupled with events in the international system believed to be having both direct and indirect impacts on the national development efforts and processes in countries world over, including The Gambia, are ostensibly responsible. Some of these events or prominent amongst them are crusade and gale of democratization processes cutting across nations and reforming older regimes and or military governments where they were in power, with Africa most hit. The issue of human rights records is another now widely acclaimed including the issue of gender equality and women empowerment, international terrorism and problem of insurgency, the increasing roles of international regime and the hegemony of the Bretton Woods on the global economic and financial stage. Not left behind is the world economic recession that affected the poor performance of crops and other raw materials for which most African nations are major exporters to the world markets and which prices have plummeted continually, even the oil price also dropped and these affected exporting countries' foreign reserves and their internally generated funds like taxes and local sales. The internal hurdles like ethno-conflict crises and wars, rebel movements, corruption of the political class and their connivances with their military oligarchies and peripheral compradors is also of significant role in this imbroglios and world uncertainties. Civil unrests and protest crises arising from increasing demands for better governance by the civil society and pressure groups within the internal democracies of nations and which concomitantly are transmitting into international crises of refugees and the internally displaced people as rightly being experienced in Burundi, are also among the numerous crises that the world, UN and international actors are coping with today. Because of lack of manures and poor planning, farming, the source of food production has also experienced crop failures in most countries, resulting in food shortages and malnutrition leading to problem of world food crises vis-à-vis international humanitarian services by majorly the NGOs and IGOs in the world as well as some concerned better-off nations. This has increased international pressures on the governments of the UN member nations and those other international and supranational bodies to double efforts of developments, reconstruction, poverty alleviation and human rights issue toward reduction in crimes and unnecessary migrations. In the midst of these hurdles, the second

republic government has recorded some successes as achievements towards the advancement of The Gambia's democratic process and realization of an enviable electoral system.

Plethora of development strides have been accounted for in the last twenty years of the second republic under Yahya Jammeh administration, ranging from infrastructural expansion and modernization, economic reforms, employment generation, attractions of foreign investments, growth of small and medium scale enterprises (SMEs), agricultural production, women empowerment and gender fairness, youth development schemes, electoral reforms and national security protection. The administration has also improved the country's external relations by expanding trade volumes and bilateral and multilateral dealings with friends abroad through constructive economic diplomacy, which have attracted more foreign investments and businesses to The Gambia and make the country to be more open and accessible to the external environment. The country's embassies abroad have increased, to this end, considerably with additional staffers employed to manage them. Asides, the country has taken up additional roles of peace-building and maintenance, especially with her immediate neighbours of Senegal on the latter's troubles with the Cassamance rebels who share borders with The Gambia, the Guinea Bissau's political and electoral crises which the regime had shown keen interest to mediate in between the warring actors among others in the ECOWAS sub-region. The regime has been very vocal and outspoken on African affairs with regard to migrant issues, North-South disparities, ethnic wars and militia movements by suggesting solutions by drawing world attention to their implications and tabling ideas on how they could be globally addressed. As the world's peace giant as fondly referred, she has been articulate on peace issue to major world's unrests, arguing, this will make the world a congenial place for its citizens to live in, if embraced. The regime has been very critical, despite being a donor nation, with the patterns designed by the world powers to dominate the international political and economic stage at the expense of the weaker ones and the least developed countries that are mainly the Third World countries and how these imbalances could be removed for international equities and The New Order. Much has been discussed in the previous sub-chapter on the major achievements of the second republic. Nonetheless, we may still highlight some of them for the purpose of this section.

On infrastructure, the regime has rejuvenated the decaying ones put in place by the colonial government and serviced poorly or inadequately by the first regime particularly on roads, health facilities, schools, government offices and institutions in the greater Banjul additional ones are

constructed to link major towns and cities and to upgrade rural life by improving on commercial activities and businesses for the growing population. Among new schools built for example at the tertiary level was the university of the Gambia in 1999 to provide degree education for the growing youth population and also improve the deteriorating public service which harbours the greater number of the working class in the country. In the area of the media, the administration established the Gambia Radio and Television Services known as GRTS, allowed more private newspapers and radio stations to operate for media coverage, even though, with considerable government censorship. For the first time, the Independent National Electoral Commission (IEC) was established to manage all electoral matters with considerable reforms of the sector for popular elections. Nonetheless, this aspect has continued to attract serious criticisms as the government sincerity is regularly questioned because of its attitude towards opposition and conducts of genuine elections that march international standards. The regime has been accused of not always conducting free, fair and credible elections every five years which other parties always boycott because of massive manipulations to succeed self. This has been the situation of the political order since 1996. The Ombudsman was also strengthened with more workforce and powers, and new edifice of international standard for the National Assembly has just been completed and opened for legislative business of the state since mid-2014. The International Airport was uplifted and another one is being negotiated for against 2017 with the state of Qatar as the facilitator and perhaps financier. Town planning system has been improved upon especially in the cities and the greater Banjul so as to facilitate urban development and growth in the tourism industry (the major export product of the country and attractions to the rest of the world). The government launched “Operation Grow What You Eat. What You Grow” in line with its philosophy of ‘Vision 2020’ and the MDGs to boost agriculture and provide food security for all its citizens, while reducing over-dependency on the outside world. With this effort, government is striving to be exporting farming crops like rice which are now grown at commercial level to earn and increase foreign reserves for the country. Cashew and Mangoes are also been planned to grow at commercial level for exports and local processing for consumptions. Bread, sugar, meat and fish are made available for the people at government reduced prices; farmers are supplied working/farming equipments to increase production and make easier its process. Youths were mobilized and empowered through policy direction and job generation, skill acquisition and vocation. Housewives were encouraged to work and stop engaging in idleness, some of which have encouraged house and office gossiping in particular. More women have been encouraged into politics and public life as a way of bridging gender inequalities among sexes in the country. Indeed, this is a crucial political weapon used by the

second republic actors to propagate popularity and legitimacy nationally and internationally. The regime has increased its role in the sub-region through constructive contributions to and compliances with the ECOWAS protocols by virtue of its presence in the body's parliament, and its other agencies. As a result, most of its closest regional allies like Nigeria in particular have increased their presence in Banjul through collaborative efforts, supports and identity. With the help of Nigeria and through these increased ties the latter has tremendously contributed to The Gambia's socio-economic growth processes and developments, military expansions and advancements through training supports and expertise, technical assistance for civil and military personnel and diplomatic support. All these have added a great value to The Gambia in her quest for greater nationhood. In the music and entertainment industry, the administration has garnered more support and collaborative efforts from Nigeria to tap into her expertise and wealth in this sector in developing her own, where her youths could be more engaged for constructive contributions to national development strive. This is evident in the series of invitations the government of Yahya Jammeh has extended to the Nollywood Actors and music stars during national occasions and festivities like the just concluded Golden Jubilee for the 50<sup>th</sup> year independence anniversary and the president's personal love for Nigerian artists. This is a manifestation of the brotherhood existing between Abuja and Banjul and which has yielded good fruits of achievements for both nations, The Gambia in particular (Omotosho, 2013, Perfect, 2008, Obeta, 2011 and Saine, 2008 and 2009).

Paradoxically, all these achievements have not come without their challenges and constraints, which have scored low for the country in terms of good governance and democratic advancement, which this study concerns itself with more, for analysis. The Yahya Jammeh administration has been scored very low in the area of human rights records, adherence to the rule of law, constitutionalism and press freedom. This poor performance has marred the government very good efforts in improving citizens' quality of life, electoral advancement and political participation. This in turn has diminished redoubled efforts towards genuine realization of a viable modern democracy and popular rule. The administration has been widely condemned for its illegal arrests, tortures and banning of the opposition figures from participating equitably in the political process. The opposition is not given equal opportunity on the political space to exercise their political and civil rights for the very reason of maintaining and consolidating one party rule of the APRC (Saine, 2009, Fleming, 2011, Omotosho, 2013 and Edie, 2011). This has made the political space a very stuffy one not enjoyed by all or the majority. It has also negated the principle of popular participation as entrenched in the nation's constitution. It has marred the



constructive political participation and human rights enjoyments by Gambians, home and abroad, as they detest the practice and condemn its utter disgust in the national interests. Following this indiscriminate practice and inhuman treatment when arrested for opinion making and other commentaries or press publishing, many that feared they could be either arrested and tortured by the NIA officials, kidnapped and never found, sacked from work and imprisoned or framed up and prosecuted for strange and other offences, have fled the country to become refugees in other countries. Not that alone, government has laid hands on the relatives of some of them as a transfer of aggression by incarcerating them. This makes the political system an uninteresting one for many to the extent many citizens rarely listen to the state-owned television and radio as these institutions have been turned to mere individual's popularity and sing praises, detested and abhorred by many indigenes as unproductive and waste of national resources and values. Hence, the glory and honor that the regime should be enjoying or ought to enjoy has been eroded by avarice, disgruntlements and aggrandizements, which have constituted a nuisance or mess for the country's political elegance and electoral integrity. This is the major weakness of the Yahya Jammeh administration since twenty years ago and this is further worsened by his prolonged rule and non-readiness to relinquish power democratically. This confirms the claim that a lot are what the first and second republics share in common and a lot they share in difference in terms of patterns to rule and pursuant of democracy and advancement of popular rule and electoral politics. The president in the second republic also galvanizes the political stage by nominating some members of the parliament including the speaker of the House and his/her deputy against constitutional justifications for that purpose. These people also removed at will the moment they appear to the president as disloyal to his order. Asides, even the elected members could equally be dismissed once something comes up against them or something comes in between them and the president either on party level or state matters. The president has the final say as the APRC's leader on party matters and members who show disloyalty are dismissed at will on grounds determinable by him against any erring one. Loyalists are placed and planted everywhere both at party level and in the public life while they are made to monitor one another and report any suspicious deals to Mr. President, through laid down procedures. Because the community is so small and too tightly close and the people are too familiar with each other if not related directly or otherwise, this gossiping, already cultivated as a habit with the population became more of political culture in the state within and without. Given poverty level and redundancy believed to be high, of course, many citizens engage in this act so as to earn leaving or get favour from the Head of state in form of cash gifts, materials, employment, good postings and protection. Many are not doing it as a mark of love for his

person but for material gains. This has caused the growth of party politics, competitive electoral jostling, an enduring democracy and popular will serious setbacks that have diminished international image for The small but beautiful Gambia and smiling coast of Africa. Given the talking tough of the president, Yahya Jammeh and his lambasts of the super powers for their cruel and what is believed by him as anti- African and third world hate, the country has lost many international supports and financial grants from friendly European powers and America. Some like France and Britain and even the European Union have withdrawn their embassies from the country by providing excuses for exit and securing other enviable enclaves for operations (Abdoulaye, 2009). The country was withdrawn from The Commonwealth of Nations as a member on ideological stance and definitely lost all benefits accruing from that body on development supports and humanitarian grounds. It severed relations with many other countries like Iran in 2010 and the Republic of China on Taiwan for what was described as strategic national interests, such actions that made The Gambia to lose greater material supports and financial aids from these former allies to her. Although, while that of Iran could be justified on grounds of national undermining for illegal arms shipments, which of course was still open to negotiation through development diplomacy, the Taiwan's case was unnecessary as there available better ways utilizing diplomacy to handle such sensitive diplomatic tussle for national interests, given the enormous contributions of this nation to The Gambia's pursuits of global opportunities and national ethos and values. Most Gambians receiving trainings from Taiwan or enjoying scholarships and or other opportunities like business, travelling, health treatment etc. lost them and became helpless at home. Many state projects meant for meaningful developments like rural electrification, roads construction, schools building and agricultural aids were all lost with this development. Even if the state could continue with some of these projects, definitely not all and definitely such resources could have been concentrated on new fertile project areas for national upliftments (Bodnar, 2012).

Due to this prevailing circumstances, The Gambia has lost much more economic and financial supports from her friends and other development collaborators, resulting in untold hardships for the citizenry and as well as high inflation and depletion of the dalasis against superior dollar and euro currencies. Today, Gambia's dalasis exchanges for as much as D53.00 to one dollar and over D60 to one euro. This is inimical to growth and financial stability. Presently cost of living in The Gambia is not just high and could be afforded by a few well to do, but far beyond the reach of a common man, whose condition was miserable before. Hungry-stricken people parade the streets begging for money from those who could give them especially at night time to avoid

being seen. Again, youths who could not be patient with situation either take to petty stealing or take the back way risk to go to Babylon for survival. The girls take to prostitution, including some housewives, much more when they detested working legitimately already to earn living. Most jobs available, many Gambians do either not have certificates to do them or they do not have the skills for them. On the alternatives, such jobs are given to expatriates who could do them and who are either recruited locally or internationally. The Yahya Jammeh government has done much proudly, sentiment apart, to encourage its citizens to be constructively engaged and legitimately empowered. However, most Gambians have indulged in lazy attitudes and begging as well as living only one man in the family to work while others sit to await food and pocket money. This has allowed indiscipline and lasciviousness to increase, leaving the state perpetually poor and GNP very low. Worse, the state tax policy which has kept taxation very high, tended to have reduced people's income and close-up of businesses. This has also made the GDP to have dropped considerably for the nation. Most foreign investors and businessmen and women have closed shops for inability to continue in business. It is worth noting to know that The Gambia's economy is a tax one as a greater percentage of high national income is from this source. An enduring economic policy and business survival is required by the state to sustain in this condition to avoid state economic failures and political stalemate in future (Bodnar, 2012), which could be incited by extreme sufferings and untold hardships when people rebel completely against them. The privilege the government is enjoying is how the people are very submissive to their authorities and rulers, but, this has limitations.

On elections and the IEC, The Gambia leader in the second republic has right to appoint and fire the commission's officials including its Chairman. The commission is the supervision institution of presidential and parliamentary elections and is expected to enjoy its independence while its officials, especially the chairman should enjoy some office and job immunity from the Executive which appointed him. This Bodnar (2012) observed was not good for the political system as Mr. president supervises his own election, rendering the whole exercise a sham and absolutely awkward (Bodnar, 2012:7, Omotosho, 2013:9). In the second republic, The president, because of his strong position and the personality built around him and how he is feared, is the most important and resourceful niche actor. He requires loyalty from the APRC MPs and determines the government policy. By his plans, he does not bear any critic and his policies are never objected or openly criticized by the deputies, lest such an MP(s) risks jail (Bodnar, 2012:8-9, Omotosho, 2013:9, Darboe, 2008:73-82 and Bellagamba, 2002:25-48). Since the independence in 1965 the political process in The Gambia was dominated by authoritarian elites.

As the era of Jammeh and Jawara are in several points very different but as well grounded in the historical development and antecedents of the country with obvious and clear manifestations and common grounds of the authority of the two presidents. Based on this hypothesis are the most important cultural patterns the ambition for leadership, power and the arrangement of an authoritarian regime, with the National Assembly dominated by the ruling party and the president, culminating into politics of patronage with the use of carrots and sticks by the hegemony (Mr. President) (Bodnar, 2012:10, Hughes, 2008:44, Fleming, 2006 and Omotosho, 2013:9-12) to reward and punish as he wishes. This level of loyalty many have attributed to religion which all MPs have sworn to and which determines their culture and obedience to the ruler. This has continued to play a significant part in the political and electoral systems of the country and which have not really helped the society to grow from subsistence to innovation (Bodnar, 2012:10). This acceded to the claim that the two regimes have a lot in common regarding patterns much as they have in difference. On the final note, in both the first and second republics, the democratization process and electoral politics in The Gambia have been that of a two- edged sword that one cannot behold its beauty or get it appreciated as the bad side has spoilt the good side and nothing worth beholden any longer (Omotosho, 2013). In other words, this study opines that the good works of the two regimes variously and with interlocking patterns, none could be said to have successfully led the country to a safe landing of international repute towards democratization and electoral advancement. Their good works have been flawed by their bad patterns and strategies towards the nation's democratic excellence and electoral integrity. Can we now say, that The Gambia has failed as a democracy in the world with election at the center of the whole process. This study should be able to confirm that during analysis of data got from the field surveys and interviews in chapter four.

In the social spheres, the government in the second republic made some remarkable gains in ameliorating laziness and redundancy common among the Gambian youths. For example, government encouraged the youths by empowering them with skills and inspirational thoughts for self-reliance and self-sufficiency. Many illiterate youths who could have gone idle took to driving and apprenticeship jobs, carpenters, mechanics, technicians and a host of others. Skills Acquisition Centers and creative opportunities were established for training and development. Many more schools including the University of the Gambia were established. Many more hospitals were built length and breadth of the country especially in encouraging rural dwellings, Farmers were empowered and women were encouraged into commerce, trade and politics to bridge gender gaps.

The girls were given preferences in education through the program “Education for the Girl Child” and they are massively recruited into the public service. There have been massive infrastructural developments across the nation compared to what we had under the Jawara’s PPP cutting across the transport, sewage, housing, energy sectors, including rural electrification, portable water, internet services, telecommunications and industry. All these sectors have witnessed massive improvement from 1994. The Gambia Radio and Television Service was established and so many other government establishments were visited to alleviate sufferings and bring comfort to the populace. However in the recent time, there has been a sharp drop in the economy through some certain forces that have diminished the dalasis and worsened standard of living in the country. Some political dimensions are ostensibly perceived to be responsible especially the government external policies toward donor countries which became suddenly soiled and which created gaps in the funds expected from this angle of assistance. Also, the government policy at home which became hostile to foreign investors and business partners and which made many businesses to fold up and many returning home. Excessive taxation is among these measures that unleashed hardships on the businesses that folded up as well as increasing and uncontrollable exchange rate are said to be responsible definitely.

The Operation Clean The Nation locally called “Celcetta” was introduced to ensure hygiene nationwide and to instill in the citizens the habit of neatness and hygiene. This is held once or twice in a month throughout the nation between the hours of 9am and 1pm on Saturdays. Presently, with the rate the dalasis is shrinking against dollar and the way foreign investors are increasingly finding difficulties to operate businesses coupled with stylistic sanctions from the external environments, The Gambia’s economy is in serious state of decline or collapse unless something is done urgently to savage this situation. Remedies to this are extensively discussed under recommendations in this chapter and chapter five respectively.

It is perhaps important to note that the economic blueprints set out by the second republic government have suffered some constraints that have not allowed true realizations of the policy trusts. This is not unconnected with government non-prioritization and budget deficits, resulting from reckless spending, mismanagement and inadequate planning for executions. Nevertheless, the socio-economic reforms of the government from 1994 to present and the transformational inspirations embarked upon in sensitizing Gambians towards self-sufficiency and reliance and the invigoration push of international diplomacy to increase friendship level in the external environments have indubitably contributed to the development strides of the Yahya Jammeh

administration. This policy trust is also included among those strong factors that the administration adopted as patterns for the promotion and elongation of democratic rule and electoral politics in the state under the second republic. The common saying has been..."If we have limited democracy, isn't that better than non-development"? But some we say.... "A non-development- oriented government but democratic and free for all is better than a dictatorial one that is repressive" (Omotosho, 2014.).

## **2:5 Low Level Democratic Growth and Massive Illiteracy in The Gambia**

This section explores the epileptic democratic growth and massive illiteracy in The Gambia and the major factors believed to be responsible for the phenomena vis-à-vis the effects on the efforts of the government to change the pattern towards the realization of a sustainable massive literacy and an enduring democratic survival in the small nation Gambia. It actually examines the significance of education to the survival of a viable democratic society and the extent to which this applies to the sub-Saharan Africa including The Gambia. The research examines critically the sincerity of purpose of government efforts and the supportive partnerships that it enjoys from both international bodies and local collaborators towards the realization of a veritable democracy that embraces high literacy.

Commenting on '*Democracy and illiteracy cannot co-exist*', Joshi, A,(2011) posits that... 'Democracy, which postulates enlightenment, is by and large a blessing to any growing political community, while illiteracy, which implies ignorance, is a menace'. He argues that democracy assumes a high degree of political consciousness, a fair degree of education and intelligence, a continued interest in public affairs and a full, abiding realization of the duties and responsibilities of true citizenship, where tolerance, cooperation, understanding of the workings of the political process and a willingness to accept the verdict of the majority are admissible. According to him, if all this is to be attainable, literacy is very indispensable. Where illiteracy level is high or becomes prevalent, the success of a democratic growth and survival is in futility, Joshi, A, (2011). Without literacy, government by discussion, compromise, persuasion and consensus, amidst dissent may become a difficult process. Exchange of views and debating would likely be inhibited and political communication flows could be distorted or manipulated for avarice. Without an acceptable level of education or illiteracy in supporting democracy growth, where a sizable majority is educated above merely just to read and write, accommodating a group with different shades of opinion, different approaches to life and different perceptions would no doubt be difficult. Democracy assumes that the people are fully

aware of the value of dissent and differences of opinion where non-violence becomes an adaptable and an adopted political culture as is the case in most advanced democracies of Britain, France, Germany, Canada, Australia and America the list goes on. One person's claim to an opinion is and should not be seen as a barrier to another person's own, irrespective of status. In an extreme illiterate society, this political consciousness and awareness may be obstructed by ignorance and conservative habits. Freedom, tolerance and respect are expected to be observed to prevent possible arbitrary rule (the very antithesis of democracy), which can be encouraged and developed by a few avaricious and politically desperate individuals. And as Voltaire, in his famous letter to Rousseau is reported to have said and as quoted by Joshi... "I do not agree with a word that you say, but, I will defend to the death your right to say it". This is the beauty of literacy in democracy and its survival. Querying further, Joshi says that there are inequalities of all sorts in every country. Whichever country, socialist or capitalist, claims that everyone in it is equal-physically, economically, socially and politically-is merely putting forth a false claim. The lack of education, which is illiteracy, creates more inequalities than any other factor and as this occurs, governance process is made more intractable for the institution of the state to achieve, under a democracy. The people must become literate and knowledgeable to possess a sense of discrimination between right and wrong so as not to lose every pretension to democracy. Democracy therefore flourishes only in a society where there is equality in law and where there are no discriminations of any kind on grounds of sex, religion, caste and economic status. The practice of the rule of law and respect for human rights and freedoms must be entrenched in the constitution and protected by it. This will give to everyone the legitimate rights and claims to politics on equal level playing ground with a competitive party system where opposition is vibrant and constructive and of course serves as an alternative government at the centre ( Joshi, A, 2011).

On this context, it suggests that democracy goes with education, not only political education, but education in all ramifications to engender a robust political and economically viable as well as socio-cultural and physically stable environment. In this environment, people would choose rightly those to govern them, those chosen would govern according to the rule of the law, national interest would prevail over personal ambitions in the words of President Buhari in his messages to his colleagues at the on-going 25<sup>th</sup> African Union's Summit in Johannesburg, South Africa (Satellite Cable News Network, AIT, Aljazeera etc). The three arms of the government would be able to appreciate the rationale for mutual cooperation for the operation of the government, parliamentary debating and procedures would be constructively and maturely

engaged by well learned legislators, the Executive arm would be conscious of the implications of misrule and abuse of power and the Judiciary would engender a justice system that respects the rule of law. Indeed, the three components of Good Governance which are process, content and deliverables would become realities and not mirage. The process- being transparency and accountability in government, the content- equity and equality and deliverables as dividends of democracy. With this, the role of the civil society groups and those of their civil rights activists would be recognized and valued for the promotion of an enduring democratic society. In a truly democratic election, one citizen equals one vote. In addition, academics and politicians point out that transparency is an important characteristic of a free and fair election, which suggests that for an election to be democratic, every citizen has to have an equal say in electing an individual to a political office and in order for this to be possible, education is key. It is the pillar for sustainable political literacy where the electorate perfectly understands individual- election candidate's programmes and manifestoes, in order for them to choose rightly. This, according to some political watchers is lacking in most sub-Saharan African nations, which ostensibly makes one to doubt the credibility and integrity of most of the elections conducted in these countries to be regarded as truly democratic. In other words, in an illiterate democratic society, genuine elections might not be visible. They are likely to be subjected to manipulations and discrepancies which as a result of the electorate's poor awareness, the latter might not be able to discover tricks and pranks of the election operators and actors within the polity (Bucyana, O, 2011).

For instance, in late July 2014, President Obama invited four African heads of state to Washington DC whom he described as leaders "*elected through free and fair elections*" 'The Whitehouse Blog, 2011' They were the leaders of Benin, Cote d'Ivoire, Guinea (Conakry) and Niger. However when one looks at the levels of education in these four countries, one wonders whether elections in these specific countries can be characterized as democratic.

According to World Bank data, the literacy rate of adults (percentage of people aged 15 and above) in Benin, as of 2009, was only 42% ( World Bank, Benin Data) and in Cote d'Ivoire the literacy rate was 55% ( World Bank, Cote d'Ivoire Data). As for Guinea and Niger, only 39% [World Bank, Guinea Data) and 29%[World Bank, Niger Data (in 2005) respectively could read and write.

When it comes to elections, the African Elections Database reports that in Benin, 84.8% (African Elections Database, 2011) of the population participated in the presidential



elections. In Cote d'Ivoire, depending on whether one believes the Electoral Commission or the Constitutional Council, the turnout for the 2011 elections, which the BBC described as "historic", was either 81.1% or 71.3%. In Guinea (Conakry), the African Elections Database reports a turnout of 67.9% and in Niger a turnout of 49%.

Keeping the levels of education constant, statistically speaking, there is a probability that more than half of the individuals who voted in Benin, Guinea and Niger could neither read nor write. How can such elections be deemed democratic? The elections may have been free if there was no fraud, but were they fair? A low level of education is one of the issues African governments are grappling with today and which they are obliged to address. Addressing it will certainly make electoral processes more free and fair. Importantly, investing in education is investing in human capital and this is just one step, it is the right path towards alleviating the levels of poverty many African countries are faced with today. All that these portend is that education which breeds literacy and enlightenment is inalienable from democracy and since democracy itself is bringing about awareness of the people to their rights to rule and be ruled by constitution, it suffices to say, education is the pillar that holds and sustains democracy erection in a given polity.

In The Gambia, democratic growth and survival has been threatened by massive illiteracy level, thereby, resulting in low level of democratic advancement as recorded in most other sub-Saharan African nations including Nigeria the giant of Africa and its level of human capital development. Below is a set of statistical figures of literacy levels in The Gambia show-casing how low literacy level has affected level of political participation and enlightenment in the country.

## Literacy rate - adult total (% of people ages 15 and above) in Gambia

Literacy rate; adult total (% of people ages 15 and above) in Gambia was last measured at 51.11 in 2011, according to the World Bank. Adult literacy rate is the percentage of people ages 15 and above who can, with understanding, read and write a short, simple statement on their everyday life. This page has the latest values, historical data, forecasts, charts, statistics, an economic calendar and news for Literacy rate - adult total (% of people ages 15 and above) in Gambia.

### World Bank Indicators - Gambia - Outcomes

	1990	2000	2010
Literacy rate; youth female (% of females ages 15-24) in Gambia		41.4	[+]
Ratio of young literate females to males (% ages 15-24) in Gambia		64.3	[+]
Literacy rate; youth male (% of males ages 15-24) in Gambia		64.3	[+]
Literacy rate; youth total (% of people ages 15-24) in Gambia		52.6	[+]
Literacy rate; adult female (% of females ages 15 and above) in Gambia		25.1	[+]
Literacy rate; adult male (% of males ages 15 and above) in Gambia		49.0	[+]
Literacy rate; adult total (% of people ages 15 and above) in Gambia		36.8	[+]
Primary completion rate; female (% of relevant age group) in Gambia		59.2	71.6[+]
Primary completion rate; male (% of relevant age group) in Gambia		73.9	69.5[+]
Primary completion rate; total (% of relevant age group) in Gambia		66.6	70.5[+]
Primary education; duration (years) in Gambia	6.0	6.0	6.0 [ + ]
Secondary education; duration (years) in Gambia	7.0	6.0	6.0 [ + ]

**Source:** <http://www.tradingeconomics.com/gambia/literacy-rate-adult-total-percent-of-people-ages-15-and-above-wb-data.html>

The above infers that, not only The Gambia suffers from this low level democratic growth and massive illiteracy, bigger countries in The Third World, like Nigeria, with much resources to pursue and achieve their MDGs, 2015 targets on education and poverty levels

also fell short of adequacies to achieve this blueprint due to poor planning, misplacement of priorities and bad implementations. The countries' political leaderships simply just lack the political will and vision to create enviable policy frameworks and instruments to pursue and achieve. Where the latter are created, poor implementations by their operators and captains of industry are responsible, creating gaps in development programs and targets towards the vision. In The Gambia, this failure has been responsible for increasing poverty level as unemployment is on the high, especially among the youths and skills acquisitions reduced as many youths in particular choose to go through the back-way to Europe for greener pastures that bring quicker money. This last option by some youths has ended up many dying in the Mediterranean Sea or Lampedusa near Italian coast. To curtail this surge, the government of Yahya Jammeh puts in place many programs to encourage the youths to stay, school and work, such as scholarship programs, commercial driving for only the Gambian youths and men, vocational trainings for the youths through the National Youth Service Scheme, party politics youth engagements, Education For The Girl-Child, Operation Grow What You Eat and Eat What You Grow, Universal Primary and Secondary Education and Scholarships for tertiary education. Still, low illiteracy level remains and continues to dwindle the growth of democracy and political awareness. In fairness to the Jammeh administration, much has been done to close the widening gap of illiteracy in the country through both teenage and adulthood education programs introduced. However, the attitude of the people themselves and the habits cultivated for idleness and other lackadaisical behaviors, the consciousness and sense of hardwork and non-dependency are completely low if not absent in them. This is another big hurdle to government efforts to eradicate poverty and illiteracy. Below is the government report on Education for the youths towards meeting the 2015 MDGs Goal 2, as stipulated by UNESCO for developing countries worldwide and assigned to by countries in the Dakar conference of year 2000:

Despite some laudable achievements the government has made, the lack of political will and strict adherence to limited freedom and observance of democratic principles and ideals by the government as well as the desire by the leader to stay longer in office, illiteracy level is still high and democratic growth and survival is still threatened. Despite this drawback, the second republic could still be appraised for better performance on efforts towards growth of literacy and democratic survival through her various/numerous development programs in the state.

## **2:6 Recommendations for Democracy Survival in the Gambia**

Given the direction the world is moving towards and the trend or momentum with which democracy as the best form of government anywhere in the world is now progressing, it has not only become a necessity but a thing of must for every nation- state within the continuum to embrace the ideology in the overall interest of the globe. This ostensibly will guarantee good governance and the latter will no doubt assure the entire people of the world a secured and crises-free world environment. The reason is that globalization process has made the world system a small unit where anything happening within it definitely affects everything. It is no longer a fallacy that one of the most-generating problem crises in the international system today is bad governance vis-à-vis democracy crusade which have aggravated tensions of war that are capable of resulting in another world war, and, any outbreak of another war in the world around this time might likely result in the total wipe-out of the human race that resides in it. It is at this backdrop, this research views the survival of democracy in The Gambia beyond a necessity, which the Gambian government must see as such and give a high and uncompromising priority to. Indeed, the government must be prepared to work with necessary stakeholders within and without to ensuring democracy survival and national growth, through national development plans and strategies that bequeath enduring legacies worth embracing by younger/unborn generations. To achieve this noble objective, certain measures are vital for considerations, adoptions and realization and we shall be examining them logically as we proceed.

First and foremost, The Gambia's entire political system and electoral politics must have to undergo general political surgery by overhauling and sanitization. This implies that the political authorities and other stakeholders in the state must be willing to allow this change to effect and be sustained. Liberal democracy that will be all-involving, all-inclusive and all-embracing must be institutionalized, where fear and apprehension for individuals to express their views on any matter constructively, and/or engage in political activities within the confines of constitutionalism without intimidation of arrests or killings by the state must be allowed. The constitution of the state must be supreme and people-based, free from all forms of alterations and manipulations under the only powerful ruling party (the APRC) led by President Yahya Jammeh. For example, recently, a prominent opposition figure and persistent presidential aspirant and hopeful, Alhaji Hamat Bah, cried out on constitutional changes that are being made to the fees paid by election candidates through a sponsored bill by the government in power. If this bill is successfully sponsored and becomes law, it means the fees levied by the state

electoral commission (IEC), to contesting political aspirants from the presidential to councilor would be doubled by hundred percent or more. This would become very unaffordable by most candidates who do not have access to state funding or party-government influence except the party in power and their sponsored candidates. According to Bah, by this plan, the IEC which is more or less a government tutelage would successfully truncate Gambia's democracy through constitutional abuses and conspiracy( The Standard,2015). In his words,... *'This is an issue that must be seriously debated in the country because it has to do with the demise or otherwise of democracy in this country. We want the people to put pressure on their elected representatives at the National Assembly so that they would not pass the bill into law'* (The Standard, 2015). The Independent National Electoral Commission had presented some proposed amendments on the Election Acts to the National Assembly as an alteration to the electoral laws regarding election fees as contained in the 1997 constitution. This became worrisome or disturbing to the opposition as it is a move to edge its members out of contest and re-consolidation of one party oligarchy under the ruling APRC in the 2016 presidential and 2017 parliamentary elections respectively.

(Edie, 2000:92-198), had suggested in regard to constitutionality that the party in power which is also the government of the day should and must always respect the provisions of the constitution without reckless alterations that contravene constitutionalism. Furthermore, in his argument on the prospects for democratic future in The Gambia, he says ... *'The institutional failure of a stable and genuine multiparty system to take root presents one of the most serious challenges to democratic politics in The Gambia. This is attributable to some political and economic factors or predicaments such as 'winner takes all principle', opposition suppression, a narrow power distribution base, an inappropriate or flawed electoral representation system, absence of strong civil society associations, poor economic policy implementations, a development strategy that favours domestic elite and external interests as well as politicization/civilianization of the military among other variants'*. He therefore suggests the adoption, practice and sustainability of a viable, credible and an enduring and tolerant democracy in a peaceful political and tension-relaxing environment that allows multiparty competitive politics as well as a level playing ground for all as contained truly in the constitution (Edie, 2000:92-198). Edie further advocated for constitutional adherence to term limits for Mr. President, preferably two term limits of four/five years each, while the incumbent shuns the idea of staying longer in power as this becomes very undemocratic no matter how good the administration may/ could be. This according to him would help the country to avoid any further future military and or revolutionary

coups that can cause harm to the peace enjoyed in the country and the sub-region. It will also guarantee responsive, responsible and accountable government that would be people-based. Opposition would have a base and governance process will be liberalized and made politically harmonious and congenial (Edie, 2000:92-198). Edie suggested vigorous electoral reforms with a proportional representation in place of the 'first-past-the-post' winner-takes-all system. According to him, the latter, typical of the Westminster Model is a majoritarian method of plurality in single-member districts which somewhat encourages concentration of power in the hands of the victorious majority to the virtual exclusion of the losing group (Edie, 2000:92-198). Proportional representation and coalition with small parties could according to Edie provide the opposition with a means of defeating the incumbent and breaking the one-party hegemony. It would also eliminate the problems of districting and partisan manipulation and the voice of a credible and virile opposition which could correct the ills and recklessness of the party in power would be heard (Edie, 2000:92-198). The constitutional requirement for state-financing of all political parties for election engagements is also lauded by Edie whereby all parties are accessed grants in preparations for elections and party candidates' sponsorships. As a result, only the ruling party; candidates will not be advantaged to state resources and financing at the expense of the tax payers and the general public. The people of The Gambia should have a better way of fulfilling their desire for a change in government other than through military intervention and they should be allowed to benefit proportionately from the multi-million dollar development funds which the international donors have showered on the country for more than thirty years, says Edie (Edie, 2000:92-198).

For democratic survival to be realistic in The Gambia under the Second Republic there must be more emphasis on institutional strengthening than personality strengthening. This connotes that the kind of invincibility built around the personality of the president of the republic over the state must be checked if not abolished. This is jeopardy to state constitutional supremacy and state control which the president single-handedly or wholly exercises and usurpes. Importantly, true separation of powers of government and checks and balances principle must be entrenched as the country operates a presidential system of government. The three arms of government must operate within their constitutional powers of independence, but watching over each other to ascertain balanced governance. In The Gambia as of today this is completely absent, the president is the niche actor in state governance and decision-making process. The idea of him appointing some number of members into the parliament as deputies and or nominating the House Assembly speaker (ostensibly believed to be the number two citizen according to the

constitution) should be reversed through electoral reforms. The president appoints about five or more members of the parliament directly into the National Assembly including the speaker of the House and his/her deputy. Invariably, he controls the parliament not only by initiating bills but passing them into law and implementing them appropriately. Procedures in the parliament are just a façade (Bodnar, 2012). He also interferes with the judicial process and justice system thereby truncating the independence of the judiciary. He appoints deputies into the ECOWAS parliament and all appointments in the state emanate from him and all sacks do so as well. These practices negate sharply the principles of democracy and good governance within a viable electoral politics. Citizen engagement in democracy building through effective political participation and level playing ground for politics as well as effective internally revenue generation system that will actually make people to feel that impact of remittances and how the authorities of the state utilize and dispense the funds for judicious governance financing will attract robust public accountability and confidence. The citizens will be able to, from time to time, call their leaders to question with a justification to hold them actually responsible for their actions, whether such actions are legitimate or not constitutional.

Government should by virtue of concern initiate citizenship training and mass education which will inadvertently encourage civic and rights education throughout the country. It is important to note that low level of education in The Gambia has affected democratic growth and survival and this has denied many citizens from being politically sensitized and oriented. Aside, it has kept many unaware and hence fall victim of law-breaking only to end up in jail. Low level education has also contributed to poor political participation and orientation in the state. If the state could increase budgetary allocations to education, it will be an advantage for many to go to school, acquire skills and knowledge and contribute to national growth process and development. It will also enhance capacity growth and political horizons which allow many to show huge interest in the policies that affect them and how these policies are generated. In the light of the above, the government should enhance its participation in public-private sector driven economy for generating revenues to improving the socio- economic and political climate and horizons. As enunciated by (Hughes, 2000:49), ... ‘Authoritarian attitudes still survive in the new elected government; reinforced by the personality of president Jammeh himself. Given the personalization of much political life around the head of state, rather than in the ruling party or National Assembly and given Jammeh’s at best ambivalent and ambiguous attitude towards full civil liberties, one has to question how far he can be counted on to modify his present stance’. This sufficiently connotes that, in as much as this high-handedness of the oligarchy is in place

and rulership of the state like a personal household continues by president Jammeh, it may be hard to achieve true democracy in the small state. However, if constitutional supremacy entails and separation of powers becomes operational, this is achievable. The state has no option than to allow this. Hughes opines further on the need for a thorough democratic audit to pave ways for credible elections in the state that will make the incumbency to allow and accept defeat should that becomes realistic within the electoral system (Hughes, 2000:49 and Obadare, 1997:237).

According to (The Voice, 2015) on special rapporteur reporting for the UN, the following are made as observable recommendations on human rights abuses and the issue of torture in the country and how they can be addressed to pave ways for genuine democracy and good governance in The Gambia:

*“Despite the challenges encountered during the visit, the Special Rapporteur hopes to remain engaged and to work in consultation with the Government and all relevant stakeholders to support the implementation of the recommendations contained in the present report. They are presented in a spirit of cooperation to assist the Government to find solutions to some of the challenges identified herein, that uphold the rule of law and promote accountability for human rights violations.*

*The Special Rapporteur believes that there could be a willingness in some sectors of government to exhibit an approach that is more conducive to the realization of human rights. There is, however, a general fear that inhibits such actions. The main cause of this fear resides in the approach followed at the highest levels of government, and that is where there is the greatest need for change.*

Based on experiences with elections in The Gambia, the security forces and media can contribute to maintaining peace during an election process. While security service members should be engaged with elections stakeholders, they must be careful to remain neutral. The members of the security services should develop a coordinated security strategy under the unified command of the Inspector General of Gambia’s police force. All of the uniformed services, including the police, military, customs, and immigration, should be trained to work together throughout the electoral process. Security personnel can liaise with other electoral



stakeholders to watch for early warning signs of violence and take steps to address potential flash points.

The media has been implicated in fomenting conflict around elections in most countries of Africa. While the media is not responsible for maintaining physical order, media outlets have a responsibility to report professionally and avoid spreading rumors that could spark violence during and after elections. During elections, radio and television coverage of incoming results should encourage citizens to wait for information at home, avoiding potential threats to security from large groups of people converging on the streets spying and prying for election results. However, some radio stations owned by politicians broadcast partisan messages that were a threat to peace. Gambia's National Media Commission, constitutionally should be mandated to protect press freedom and insulate state -owned media from government control, helped to ensure greater access to the media for all parties, but did not have adequate authority to sanction media outlets for irresponsible conduct. A regulatory framework to monitor media broadcasts, promote media pluralism, and encourage responsible journalism would help to reduce the likelihood of election-related conflict and violence.

Non-partisan domestic and international election monitors play an essential role in providing impartial assessments of electoral process and in deterring electoral fraud. Against this background, they should as a matter of promoting peace and stability in a system remain neutral and impartial in their observations and comments against elections and democratization process. This will help mitigate if not totally eradicate post election conflicts and violence and incessant court actions against perceived election and democratization flaws. Most significantly, the use of statistically-based election monitoring techniques throughout the electoral process can give domestic observers the clearest picture of an election in its entirety and a basis upon which to evaluate it. Non-partisan domestic observers can provide an impartial assessment of the electoral process and observe a larger swath of the country than international observers, helping citizens to assess the legitimacy of an election and know whether their votes are counted. (Available at <http://www.ku.ac.ke/actil/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/AFRICAN-ELECTION-BEST-PRACTICES-GHANA>)

According to Larserud , (2007) there are three areas which could be incorporated in guidelines against electoral violence include:

**1. training programmes:** polling station staff training has to be more interactive (role play activities, scenario-building) in order to increase staff capacity to handle election day complaints effectively before they escalate to violence

**2. dialogue among electoral stakeholders** (political parties, EMBs, human rights organizations, security forces etc.) to create an agreement on the rules of the game, but also the build-up the commitment and relationships (exchange of information, regular meetings, contingency planning). Dialogue efforts are essential not only centrally but also on lower levels, ensuring that district/village level conflicts are resolved and that all actors respect the codes of conduct

**3. efficient and credible complaints processes:** unresolved complaints are one of the main triggers for electoral violence (especially as they relate for instance to party registration), so the mechanisms to deal with them have to be efficient

He also dwells on the importance of efficient electoral dispute mechanism bodies, mentioning some cases such as in South Africa, where special permanent Electoral Tribunals/Courts have been established to review decisions of the Independent Electoral Commission. Electoral matters are heard as they appear, so the aim of the court is to address the need for a speedy electoral justice.

## **2:7 Conclusion**

This chapter has examined several relevant literatures on The Gambia's First and Second Republics' electoral and democratization process, right from the independence to present with a comparative survey analysis. The chapter has made an overview of the process with a view to ascertaining how the country has thrived so far and what has been the main challenges and confrontations the two regimes have experienced or undergone to ensure The Gambia's democratic survival and growth within the sub-region of West Africa. It reviewed how the two regimes have individually coped with their respective situations in their tenures to avoiding governance failures. To this end, the patterns and techniques that the two regimes adopted in coping with the vagaries of the politics involved in electoral and democratic process and governance in the country are analogically synthesized for intellectual and perspective discourse and comprehension. Through comparative analogy and perspective of the process, for example, the research explained how ideas and strategies employed by both

regimes in their respective tenures are asymmetrical in some way or on some issues and how similarities of ideas, strategies and tactics in handling sensitive state matters cohered. In the first republic under Sir Dawda Jawara, patterns of electoral politics and democratic system took the dimension of ruling party domination with a theoretical approach to what the constitution recognised as a multiparty politics, ostensibly believed to be competitive in nature and was really not. The same process was what the Yahya Jammeh regime from 1994 followed and which became even more severe. Consequently, the two leaders have successfully built around themselves personality niche that have made them dominant actors of their time. Importantly also, was the doctrine of separation of powers of government and the adherence to its checks and balances principle, entrenched in both the 1970 and 1996 constitutions respectively but which are not seriously adhered to towards democratic survival and growth. In the second republic, the military is civilianised and all the rest of the armed forces are also politicized for the promotion of the APRC ruling party hegemony and one person's authority of the Head of State. The first republic's approach to rulership appeared elitist with a neglect of the rural populace and the under-privileged, particularly the women and the youths and this later had a serious political implications for the regime as the second republic's regime took the advantage of this to galvanize political interest and popularity. The chapter engaged multifarious perspectives to analyze how the regimes have been confronted with spectrum of challenges and obstacles that created rooms for several contestations, agitations and confrontations, which are believed to have had serious underpinning implications for the electoral politics in the country and as well its democratization process till date. For example, in the first republic, provision was not made for an electoral commission to take charge of all electioneering matters regarding conducts, supervision and management as is required under the electoral laws and democracy observance. This marred the effectiveness and the efficiency needed to conduct free and fair elections in the state under the republic. In the second republic, the institution was created but is made a rubber stamp for the successions of the party in power (the APRC) via elections. As a result, credible elections and cohesive political atmosphere that guarantee a place for credible opposition are never achieved or made realistic. So under both regimes, opposition annihilations are rampant, election scuttling is frequently committed, ruling party succession is a political culture and ideal.

The achievements of the two regimes respectively are not ignored in the discourse as they were highlighted for cross-examinations. Dawda Jawara's first republic was known for his

good diplomacy towards peace with neighbours and the rest of the world as well as over-reliance on donors outside for survival. In the light of the above, the regime was constantly called to question on the issue of human rights and popular rule. In the case of the second republic's Yahya Jammeh, much as there are also reliance on external aids for survival, the regime tries to put in place measures to down-size this for a sustainable growth and reduction on pressures for true democratic governance and electoral process in the country, believed to be coming from the outside against what the regime culled as national interest. Much emphasis or attention has gone to agriculture for food security and tourism expansion for foreign earnings, though not without some external supports and collaborations also. The research dilated on the problems posed by poor education in the country as well as high illiteracy level and poverty that pose serious challenges and complications for democratic growth and survival. A great number of people are uneducated, mal-norished and abject for them to resist injustices in government. Furthermore, faith and culture also have their own impacts as the people believe that their leaders must be obeyed under any condition. Consequently, the enormity of bad governance and atrocities of the government became unimaginably high and perhaps uncontrollable, especially in the areas of human rights, torture and reckless spending of state money. Budgetary indiscipline became rife, corruption as an impunity is a common practice, unemployment at its epitome and project abandonments an ideal, ostensibly reducing the state to a poverty haven, despite external assistance and international institutional supports. A number of ideas are raised as suggestions and recommendations based on the reviewed literature which are worthwhile for considerations towards the Gambia's democratization process and the survival of the electoral politics.

## **Chapter Three**

### **Methodology to Research**

#### 3.1 Introduction

#### 3.2 Methods of Data Collection

#### 3.3 Descriptive Data

#### 3.4 Quantitative Data

#### 3.5 Chapter Conclusion

### **Introduction**

The literature review in chapter two has x-rayed the patterns of the Electoral and Democratic system of the First and Second Republics Gambia considering their various applications and institutional achievements and challenges the two republics have to grapple with and the low-level democratic growth and massive illiteracy; with possible remedies for addressing the situation. However, a critical and empirical assessment of The Gambia's First and Second Republic electoral and democratization process has not been well established and therefore remains a subject for clarification.

To clarify this issue, applicable questions need to be answered which include the following:

- What are the electoral and democratic process of The Gambia's First and Second Republics?
- What are the achievements and challenges of the First and Second Republics Gambia?
- Would the low level of democracy in The Gambia be attributable to the predominant illiteracy in the country?

- What considerable remedies would be practically suitable for improving The Gambia's electoral and democratic process?

The answers to these questions are only obtainable from a comparative analysis and assessment study. The wide scope and disclosure / supply of informed responses from respondents/stakeholders in assessing the topic of research is a constraint but to the extent that responders did not have to write their names, the respondents participated willingly and very positively. The quality of data would be regarded as genuine and authentic.

These research questions will form the basis of analysis and presentation of data of the research.

The research method adopted tried to address the goals and objectives of the study as well as the pertinent research questions. Also, the various methods adopted in obtaining information and data from the target respondents were elucidated. For effective interpretation of findings, the data and information generated were subjected to statistical and qualitative analysis. In addition, citation analysis was carried out to clearly elaborate on previous works done in the area of research study and in the testing of the hypothesis. Research method is concerned with the process utilized in the collection and analysis of data for the research. Since data is the life wire

of an empirical study such as this, this chapter presents the structural framework, which deals with generation of data. Basically, this section will examine the research methodology, sources of data, population of study, questionnaire administration and the statistical tools used.

### **3:2 Methods of Data Collection**

For this part, Data would be collected from a number of sources, using different methodologies. The data required for this purpose can be classified as qualitative if it comes in word form, while they are regarded as quantitative if they come in the form of statistics/figures. The actual selection of quantitative and qualitative methods and the understanding of their application to the research context are vital to the success of any research in terms of the presentation of the observable fact being researched upon. However, Boaduo, (2005) regards the choice of a methodology or multiplicity of methods for a research

as a major problem, especially to beginning researchers. Some researchers prefer to use either a single method or a multiplicity (multi-method), usually referred to as triangulation.

As a result of the fact that the research questions and objectives of this study imply the need to explain, compare, explore and assess the electoral and democratization process of The Gambia's First and Second Republics, the researcher adopted a mixed and robust methods approach, involving both qualitative and quantitative methods. The study also involves a correlational research work using a quantitative survey method for hypothesis 2, and an administered structured questionnaire to gather data from randomly selected respondents; as it is designed in part to investigate the correlation between The Gambia's First and Second Republic electoral and democratization process.

By way of definition, mixed methods may be considered as a research design entrenched in some philosophical postulations, which provide the structure or direct the methods of collecting and analyzing data; involving mixture of qualitative and quantitative approaches in a single study or multiple studies. It involves collecting and analyzing qualitative and quantitative data. With the criteria established by Creswell et al., (2003) for choosing a mixed methods strategy, the study design is sequential investigative, which means that first, qualitative data were collected and analyzed, followed by collection and analysis of quantitative data, in which both phases are given equal precedence in a research. Qualitative and quantitative data and findings are therefore integrated at the point of data interpretation, which means that data and findings from the qualitative phase were compared and supported with data, findings and conclusions from the quantitative phase. This exploratory sequential strategy is useful not only for exploration, but also for expanding the qualitative findings (Ozor, 2012 in Creswell, 2009).

This study is virtually correlational in outlook as it is also a quantitative method of research in which the researcher has two or more quantitative variables from the same group of subjects, and is trying to determine if there is a relationship (or covariation) between the 2 variables (a similarity between them, not a difference between their means). For instance, how the First and Second Republics Gambia's electoral and democratization process played out within the period under survey.

Data collections were effected through two major sources – secondary and primary sources and were streamlined to meet the information requirements of this study.

#### **a) Primary Data**

Primary data according to Francis (1978) are those data obtained for the solution of the specific problem at hand. This source of data is very useful because the data arising therein are usually target tailored. Since certain kinds of information can be obtained only by direct contact with the persons who possess the desired information, this source of data is indispensable to any original research. Hence, my primary source of data was a field survey using questionnaires as the main instrument. Informal but structured interviews were also conducted to augment and authenticate the information gathered from the questionnaires.

#### **b) Secondary Sources**

Secondary data are those data which are obtained from other people or sources different from first-hand information. They may include structured information produced either for previous investigations or research, census table etc. (Francis 1978). An intensive review of literature in libraries, reports, journals, magazines, books, materials from the internet and elsewhere is my main secondary source of gathering information that enabled me to obtain background information as well as bring out pertinent experiences of other people with regard to the kind of problem under study.

For this study, the secondary data source can be summarized to include:

Study of relevant information contained in textbooks, newspapers, magazines, seminar papers, journals, periodicals, political and panel reports. It is noteworthy to mention here that questionnaires were articulated in such a way that they contained open-ended multiple-choice questions. The questions in the questionnaires required the respondents to circle or tick their choices amongst the options provided or to give their free answer where necessary. Notwithstanding, care was exercised to minimize ambiguity and bias while drafting the questionnaires.



### **3: 2.1 Research Design**

Research design show cases the procedures and strategies involved in the research. It involves a planned and a systematic format of the research framework from which the research arrives at a dependable result through analysis and interpretation of results. In planning for the research study, the researcher was mindful of the need to have a well-articulated research design. Such a research design is desirable for the objective of data collection that will be useful in addressing the research questions as well as test the stated hypotheses. It is therefore, a veritable guide for data generation, especially primary data. The research strategy adopted in this study is the survey technique. This strategy was chosen because of the nature of the research topic which demands the collection of reasonable amount of data from a meaningful population size in an efficient manner. Because this method is well understood and perceived as authoritative by people in general, but it is most appropriate for this work.

The research study was both exploratory and formal. The study was exploratory because it has the objective of discovering future research tasks. It was equally formal because it further extends the exploratory work by testing the hypotheses designed and also answering the research questions asked. The research study tried to compare and contrast The Gambia's First and Second Republics electoral and democratization process within the given time frame, (1965-2015 ) which made it a descriptive study in one hand. On the other hand, the study was causal in the sense that attempt was made to find out the causal relationships between the two variables (First and Second Republics Gambia). The research environment was the field conditions which were the operating environment of the various subsystems.

Two survey methods including questionnaires and interviews were used because the respondents have diverse backgrounds. Interviews were used to obtain information from politicians, statesmen, nationalists, activists, government institutions, non-governmental organizations, international organizations that provide supports to the Gambian government. Questionnaires were used to obtain information from the appropriate respondents. Interviews were also used to collect information from the main respondents. Interviews were conducted using semi-structured interview schedule and in some cases, specialized interview schedules were used to extract as much information as possible. The goal of a formal research design is to test the hypothesis or answer the research question posed (Cooper and Schindler, 2001).

The research design therefore, expresses both the structure of the research problem and the plan of investigation used to obtain empirical evidence on relations of the problem (Deming, 1960).

### **3:2.2 Sample Population**

Sample population for this research includes but not limited to political/ nationalist leaders, and the administrative/ political regions of the country where the two regimes have as their area of jurisdictions and also affected by their unique electoral and democratic process. Within the time frame, there are apparently six geo-political and administrative regions in the country, namely; Kombo St. Mary Region (KSMR); which is made up of Banjul and the Kombos as they are usually called in the country. North Bank Region (NB), Lower River Region (LRR), Central River Region (CRR), West Coast Region (WCR) and Upper River Region (URR). Therefore, a total number of 100 questionnaires will be distributed among these targeted groups.

### **Sampling and Sampling Procedure**

The sample and sampling procedure will be based on stratified random sampling that covers all nationalists/political leaders, government departments, members of political parties etc as the total number of 100 questionnaires will be distributed based on the five political and administrative regions of The Gambia. Therefore, the questionnaires will be distributed as follows : Kombo St. Mary(covering Banjul and the Kombos) – 30, North Bank Region 20, Lower River Region, 10, Central River Region 10, Upper River Region 10 and West Coast Region 20. A respond rate of 100% is expected from the respondents and will conduct a field trip to all the regions of the country to distribute questionnaires and gather data.

### **Research Instruments**

The research instruments were obtained through the use of structured personal interviews and questionnaires structured in four parts. Part ‘A’ asked for personal information about the respondent such as sex, region, affiliation, age, position in office, etc. Part ‘B’ specifically

presents interview questions on the comparison of The Gambia's First and Second Republics electoral and democratic process in the country, the pattern of the electoral and democratization process, the achievements and challenges of the two republics, low level democracy development in the country. The last sought to know the remedies for improving the standard of democracy in The Gambia.. Section 'C' presents the Likert Scale of response and finally section 'D' is the Dichotomous section of Yes and No responses.

Similarly, the questionnaire would be designed using the Likert pattern of Responses which are classified into strongly agree, agree, strongly disagree; disagree, undecided, Yes, No, Undecided. The score points used were: 1-2 (Strongly disagree), 3 (Neutral or Undecided) and 4-5 (Strongly Agree). Respondents were required to choose from any of the responses. The descriptive statistical technique uses the measure of central tendency for hypothesis 1 and Pearson's Product- Moment Correlational Coefficients of measuring two variables for testing the Null hypotheses 2. Furthermore, the research is semi co- relational in nature, designed to investigate the correlation between the First and Second Republics Gambia.

### **3:3 Descriptive Data**

Descriptive research does not fit neatly into the definition of either quantitative or qualitative research methodologies, but instead it can utilize elements of both, often within the same study. The term descriptive research refers to the type of research question, design, and data analysis that will be applied to this research. Descriptive statistics tell what is, while inferential statistics try to determine cause and effect.

The type of question asked by the researcher will ultimately determine the type of approach necessary to complete an accurate assessment of the topic under investigation. Descriptive studies, primarily concerned with finding out "what is," might be applied to investigate the research questions.

Descriptive research can be either quantitative or qualitative. Under this study, it involves collections of quantitative information that will be tabulated along a continuum in numerical form, such as scores on a test or the number of times a person chooses to use a-certain feature of variable, or it can describe categories of information in a group situation. Descriptive research involves gathering data that describes events and then organizes, tabulates, depicts,

and describes the data collection. It often uses visual aids such as graphs and charts to aid the reader in understanding the data distribution. Because the human mind cannot extract the full import of a large mass of raw data, descriptive statistics are very important in reducing the data to manageable form. When in-depth, narrative descriptions of small numbers of cases are involved, the research uses description as a tool to organize data into patterns that emerge during analysis. Those patterns aid the mind in comprehending a qualitative study and its implications.

Detailed descriptive analysis of the relevant variables involved and examined in this research work has been graphically presented clearly in this section, in addition to measures of central tendency of all the relevant variables.

For this research, quantitative data falls into two areas: the one that describes events and studies aimed at discovering inferences or causal relationships. It aims at finding out "what is," so observational and survey methods are frequently used to collect descriptive data.

In this regard, the descriptive data summaries data such as measures of central tendency including the mean, median, mode, deviance from the mean, variation, percentage, and correlation between variables. Survey research such as this commonly includes that type of measurement, but often goes beyond the descriptive statistics in order to draw inferences.

### **3:4 Quantitative Data**

Quantitative Data involves the systematic empirical investigation of observable phenomena via statistical techniques. The objective of this section is to develop and employ statistical <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Theories> models to explain the phenomenon under investigation. Against this background, the quantitative data that will be generated from this research work will be processed and analyzed to enable the investigator answer the research questions, hypotheses and realize the objectives of the study. The data that would be produced from the sample of 100 subjects will be analyzed by testing the four hypotheses formulated for the study. The statistical methods that will be employed for the analysis will include the Pearson's Product Moment correlation coefficient for Hypotheses 3 of relationships. The Hypothesis 1, 2 & 4 will be tested using the Measure of Central Tendency. The alpha level of 0.05 level of significance will be used as the standard for rejection or retaining hypotheses.

The Dissertation analyzed quantitative data at multilevel, which includes the macro and (shop floor or individual researcher) levels. The purpose of this multi-level analysis was to explain the responses of the respondents (stakeholders) in relation to the topic of research. Under this, they (respondents) explained how and locate where the two regimes – First and Second Republics Gambia related and or differed. In this regard, this work assumes that the electoral and democratic process of the two administrations could influence or impact on the country's democratic dividends and conversely economic development. According to Morris, (2004) examining the within and across level effects and mediating mechanisms can provide valuable information about systemic effects on behaviour. Therefore, in this case the multilevel analysis might be useful in understanding the system wide effect(s) of electoral and democratic process. Nevertheless, the individual investigator remains the basic unit of analysis and the central focus of the dissertation. Having completed quantitative data collection, it becomes necessary to develop statistical measures of association as well as measurement models, which is a process marked by the language of variables (Jean Lee, 1992). The quantitative data analysis and interpretation that followed was basically inferential (deductive) and a matter of proving or disproving the hypotheses. Hypotheses developed around themes and issues considered important to research experiences of Gambia's electoral and democratic process were tested and interpreted through hypotheses testing and statistical analysis.

Finally, quantitative analysis approaches are meaningful only when there is a need for data summary across many repetitions of a participatory process, e.g. focus group discussions leading to seasonal calendars, venn diagrams, etc. Data summarisation in turn implies that some common features do emerge across such repetitions. Thus the value of a quantitative analysis arises when it is possible to identify features that occur frequently across the many participatory discussions aimed at studying a particular research theme. If there are common strands that can be extracted and subsequently coded into a few major categories, then it becomes easier to study the more interesting qualitative aspects that remain.

For example, suppose it is of interest to learn about people's perceptions of what electoral and democratic process means for the electorates. It is likely that the narratives that result from discussions across several communities will show some frequently occurring answers. Such information can be extracted from the narratives and coded. Quantitative approaches provide the opportunity to study this coded information first and then to turn to the remaining

qualitative components in the data. These can then be discussed more easily, unhindered by the quantitative components.

### **Justifications for the Research Methodology**

It is highly essential to describe a research method as specifically as possible (Crotty, 1998). The choice of a qualitative research type for this study is consistent with the research's aim to ascertain a complex phenomenon by considering the context of its settings (Yin, 2009). Reasons for the choice of qualitative research method for this research were based on the research problem as identified in Chapter One, the researcher's epistemological stance and the level of uncertainty surrounding the phenomenon under consideration. Often, "what, how and why" questions are more appropriately examined using a qualitative research approach as highlighted below.

On the one hand, a qualitative research approach is able to accept complexity and subjectivity and enables the researcher to use his/her observations and interpretations of the phenomenon to gain insights and discover meaning about a particular experience, situation, cultural element or historical event (Myers, 2009). On the other hand, the quantitative research mode is suitable for exploring or explaining such complexities and more appropriate for confirming what is already known about a phenomenon (Morse and Mitcham, 2002; Rolfe, 2006). Moreover, quantitative research allows the researcher to familiarise himself/herself with the problem or concept to be studied, and perhaps generate hypotheses to be tested (Golafshani, 2003).

Furthermore, an interpretivist paradigm is suitable for this research as it recognizes the recurring nature of electoral and democratization process of the First and Second Republics and its contributory role in the Gambia's polity. Although, the interpretivist approach raises questions on the generalisability of findings, Saunders et al. (2009) point out that generalisability is not of crucial importance as the aim of the research is to capture the complexities of the situation. Also, this research adopts an inductive rather than a deductive approach since it aims to understand in-depth meanings of the phenomena (Miles and

Huberman, 1994), and theory building takes place after data collection and these are subsequently related to the literature (Saunders et al., 2009).

## **Conclusion**

This research investigates the electoral and democratic process of The Gambia's First and Second Republics. The chapter indicates where data were collected and afterward analyzed. These included Independent Electoral Commission (IEC), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Electorates, Politicians, National Assembly members (called The Deputies), Nationalists, Party Members, Ministry of Internal Affairs, National Archives, and the Educational Research Network for West and Central Africa (ERNWACA, all Administrative Electoral Regions in The Gambia etc, the key stakeholders in research of this nature, were further study points.

This chapter specifically outlines the methodology and research design employed in this research. The organization of a healthy research methodology was the primary focus of this chapter. Particularly, this chapter addresses the methods of data collection, description data and quantitative data of this chapter. The research combined both quantitative and qualitative research methods with a greater dominance on the qualitative method. There was an in-depth explanation of the research method and methodology used for the purpose of this research and a justification for the choice of the qualitative and quantitative approaches. Also, the chapter has identified the various data sources that were used in the research. The choice of the research strategy was based on the nature of the data. A survey was used in the first phase of the research while in the second phase, interviews, and documents were used to complement the results of the survey. This chapter also discussed the approaches adopted in the research as well as the criteria employed in the research. Also, ethical concerns with regard to data collection were emphasised as well as the method of data analysis, highlighting the various steps that were involved.

## **Chapter Four**

### **ANALYSIS OF DATA AND TEST OF HYPOTHESES**

#### **4.1 Introduction**

#### **4.2 Quantitative Data Analysis**

#### **4.3 Test of Hypotheses**

#### **4.4 Chapter Conclusion**

##### **4:1 Introduction**

This chapter analysis, the quantitative and qualitative data derived from the study. The analysis took into reflection responses from the questionnaires distributed and interviews administered and retrieved from government institutions/Ministries/organization and across the Administrative regions of The Gambia. The questionnaire and semi structured interviews were intended to capture more information as deemed fit on issues concerning the Assessment of the Electoral and Democratic process of The Gambia's First and Second Republics. Also, the respondents' readiness and apathy to respond to the questionnaires were captured. The common issues of this research were summarized in order to establish nexus or otherwise of the Electoral and Democratic process of The Gambia's two Republics. These formed the background from where the responses were elicited from the various respondents on questions and interviews relating to the topic under investigation. Various questions were raised in relation to Electoral and Democratic process of the Gambia's First and Second Republics, the achievements and challenges of the First and Second Republics Gambia, the low level of democracy in The Gambia and the considerable remedies deemed practically suitable for improving the Gambia's electoral and democratic process.

The assessment of the electoral and democratic process being investigated out was elucidated through the questionnaire and semi- structured interviews randomly selected. The analysis of the data and the testing of the hypotheses postulated for the study through the application of



various statistical tools will also be presented. It describes the frameworks of analyses as well as details of analyses of both qualitative and quantitative data. It further discusses results obtained separately from the qualitative and quantitative phases of this mixed methods research and its execution for thorough analysis.

As a matter of fact, a total of one hundred questionnaires were generated and distributed across the five Regions of the Kombo and Brikama, North Bank, Lower River, Central River and Upper River respectively, out of which 98 were turned in, representing 98% of the response rate, thereby representing 98%. Thus, these were considered as significant responses to analyse the data.

In distributing the Questionnaire, care and caution were taken, putting into consideration the volatile political landscape of The Gambia, most especially, as time draws near for the 2016 general elections. This was done in order to make my respondents feel comfortable and ease to fill the Questionnaire and return same to me on the spot, lest, the very essence of the exercise might be jeopardized, if not scuttled if the document was divulged to the public domain. With strong will and determination to accomplish this task, the Questionnaires were collated without any hitch for eventual analysis. This largely accounted for the apparent delay in coming out with my research data and analysis.

Similarly, Semi-structured Interviews, which involved a selected powerful few that cut across various segments in the society including politicians, statesmen, educationists and leaders of thought as well as religious leaders and civil servants, were organized and results collated. Issues captured on the interview session were the ones also raised in the research questions that generated the two hypotheses for testing and the Questionnaire respectively. This was also successfully accomplished as the interviewees were assured that their responses will only be used strictly for the purpose of this research and that their names will not be divulged. This made them to feel at ease in responding to my questions.

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It is the combination of the findings of the completed Questionnaires and Structured Interviews that were now collated and compiled for analysis, using the specified statistical tools and instruments as indicated in Chapter One. Instruments like pie-charts/bar-charts, histogram, tables and drawings were used for graphical representations of opinions sampled, including how questionnaires were circulated and responded to as well as how sampled

individuals and institutions for interviews responded respectively. For example, while the pie-charts showed the percentages of responded opinions either in favor or against, the tables deciphered opinions of respondents also either in favor or against and for histogram, findings were graphically presented and illustrated for enhanced and proper comprehensions of facts, using Pearson's Product- Moment Correlation Coefficient and Measures of Central Tendency. These were put together for the testing of the two postulated hypotheses in line with the five generated research questions in arriving at the stated results below for comparisons of the First and Second Republics Gambia. This is in line with my methodology in Chapter Three, using Comparative Analysis Theory to arrive at the results of the research. In chapter three, it was emphasized that research questionnaires and structured interviews would be generated for the purpose of generating and sampling opinions that would help in validating or otherwise the generated research questions and the two hypotheses, both the null and the alternative respectively, from which the basis for research analysis and data presentation emerged. This divides the findings into two parts, the qualitative and the quantitative respectively.

To still further buttress my findings and analysis of data the application of a more advanced statistical computation was used as stated below (see Fig.4:2.2) basically to justify statistically that the Second Republic was far more better than the First Republic, especially in the area of infrastructure development, vision and sustainable development. The Second Republic was only found wanting in the area of human and people's rights. On the Structured Interviews, the respondents below are highly placed statesmen and politicians of repute whose opinions and thoughts were respected in their society. Their views and opinions therefore formed the basis for my critical examination and analysis qualitatively. Both the qualitative and quantitative data generated for findings were harmonized for elaborate/enlarged conclusion.

The participants' responses were analyzed using the Microsoft Spread Sheet (MSS) which generated the frequency distributions, means, standard deviations, variances, standard errors, correlations, etc of the responses. The main hypotheses of this research were confirmed and were tested at 0.05 level of significance using Pearson's Product –Moment Correlation Coefficient ( $r$ ), for hypothesis 1 and Measures of Central Tendency for hypotheses 2. The statistical tool adopted was opted for because it allows for effective understanding and interpretation of results.

Qualitative data were generated concerning the opinions and views of respondents and stakeholders in The Gambia. The chapter is structured in two parts. Part 1 deals with qualitative analysis while Part 2 provides details of quantitative analysis and discussions of results from both phases. In addition, in order to reduce the bulkiness of the data, the data presented and analyzed are those that are considered significant to the statement of problems, objectives and hypotheses of this study.

Finally, the patterns and procedures followed in the data collections, collations and presentations of facts to findings are and have been in agreement with researcher's chosen methodology in view of the involvements of all the necessary tools claimed to be harnessed for generating these data, especially the primary and secondary data, including the random sampling of the population for the application and execution of the structured interviews and for the distribution and retrievals of the questionnaires. These detailed my research design graphically and descriptively. The results arrived at have also validated what the researcher justified as methodology in chapter three respectively.

## **4.2: QUANTITATIVE DATA ANALYSIS**

The purpose of this research project, "Electoral and Democratization process in The Gambia's two Republics" is to contribute to a comparative understanding of the challenges facing governance and democracy in the country Gambia and proffering solutions that will mitigate such noticeable constraints, while facilitating efforts for national sustainable growth, since the engine room for genuine sustainable development in a country is good governance. This section focuses on the whole gamut of electoral and democratic process in The Gambia with its implication on development and the challenges on the institutionalization of democratic change in relation to existing formal and informal power structures in the two Republics.

Electoral and democratic process is one of the main sources of electing people into public offices in order to facilitate the growth and development of a country. However, it has been marred with electoral crises of the highest magnitude, especially in developing countries of Africa. Elections in The Gambia like in other parts of Africa are a time of despair for contesting candidates, but more so for the general citizenry whose efforts to seek new leadership for their respective countries have been a worthless effort in recent years. It is a

time of anxiety, a time of danger and unpredictability for a number of stakeholders (Vorobyev, 2010:41, Omotosho, 2008:1). It is a time when incumbent political ruling elites take stock of what achievements they will have attained for the citizenry and a time of beckoning and wondering whether they will survive the electoral encounter (Masunungure, 2009:156). For the opposition, it is in most cases a time when they will need to prove during campaign that they can do better than the ruling party. It is also a time for the opposition to endure all that comes with an uneven political playing field such as harassment of opposition political leaders and their militant and their wonders whether he/she will see the next day (Mapuva, 2010:471). That is election time in The Gambia in particular and Africa in general.

Elections, notably in The Gambia have been associated with vote-buying, politically-motivated violence, demonstrations, mud-slinging as different political parties seek to outwit each other (Chikwanha and Masunungure, 2007:6). Most importantly the period of elections has been one of uncertainty characterised by harassment and intimidation of political opponents. In a media article entitled "*Elections in Africa: A terrifying prospect*" Duodu has presented the period of elections on the African continent as bringing with it prospects of intimidation, threats, uncertainty and possible death and other magnitude level of destruction. It is this scenario which has portrayed elections on the African continent as a curse to the electorate and a gimmick played by politicians who seek to legitimize the illegitimate practice of coercing citizens into voting for them on the backdrop of rampant electoral rigging. All this is done for the sake of the international community as well as the donor communities who in most cases wish to certify the electoral results should have international standard of free and fair elections before they can recognize incumbent political leaders involved. Even in established democracies such as the US, elections have been fraught with challenges and uncertainty. It is on this premise that a perception had been coined where it has been presented that there is no political event more dangerous than a general election (Duodu, 2010). Even in what are called the "mature democracies", elections bring out hidden weaknesses in a nation's structure that can be stretched to breaking point, and if wise counsel does not prevail, no one can predict what might happen. The best example of this sort of situation is the US presidential election of November 2000. The result was extremely close - George W Bush, the Republican candidate, beat his Democratic opponent, Al Gore, by only 0.5% of the votes - 48.4 against 47.9%. Such a close vote always brings allegations of hanky-panky. Speculation became rife over what might have been, had it not been for... What follows the "for" is anybody's game. In the US election used as a template here, there were

reports about votes disallowed because of “hanging chads” and “pregnant chads” implying that there were irregularities that were identified on the aftermath of the elections, some of which were ostensibly ‘caused by faulty voting machines’. There were also allegations of fraudulent counting, and many other misdeeds amounting to electoral fraud. So emotionally charged became the atmosphere that even when the matter reached the US Supreme Court, not everyone was prepared to accept the Court’s judgement - predictably given in favour of George W. Bush - as a genuine judgment based on legal argument, rather than as a partisan judgement rendered by the court in line with the known political leanings of Supreme Court members. The US is one of the few democracies in which judges are openly branded as “conservative” or “liberal”, and where these judges almost invariably satisfy the cynics by voting in precisely the fashion that it has been predicted they will vote! Fortunately for the US (and this is why it is called a “mature democracy”) at the point where the very existence of the Supreme Court became threatened because of the tension created by what many considered to be the usurpation of the American people’s democratically-delivered verdict by the court - or more exactly, the conservative members of the court who voted in favour of a Bush victory - the person who stood most to gain from an opposite decision by the Court, Al Gore, called off further challenges of the alleged electoral verdict. What could have happened if Gore had gone on with more legal and political challenges? In an “immature democracy”, Kenya, on the other hand, a “minor” civil war did occur, when, in December 2007, election results were declared in a manner that the populace clearly thought was manipulated to favour the tribe of the incumbent president, [the Kikuyu] Mwai Kibaki, who was seeking re-election. Several thousands of people were killed in inter-ethnic fighting that arose out of the dissatisfaction with the election’s results as declared (Lowy et al., 1985, Omotosho, 2014:1-5). Thousands more were chased out of their homes, and for a while, it looked as if Kenya would be permanently divided along ethnic lines. It is therefore not surprising that the way the elections were conducted was very sensitive such that the result led to squabbles. Certain areas became de facto no-go areas to certain ethnic groups. The bitterness caused by the few months following the election, will remain a psychological scar on the entire populace for at least a generation, as ethnic oral history is recounted *ad nauseam* by those who lost relatives, or were themselves injured, during the post-election maelstrom. The Kenyan situation was repeated in Zimbabwe in March and June 2008, and nearly replayed in Ghana in December 2008 (USAID, 2010, Omotosho, 2014). Zimbabwe emerged from the near-civil-war of the election’s aftermath with an uneasy coalition that looks as if it may not take the country into the next election (USAID, 2010, Omotosho, 2014). The Nigerian situation is and cannot be

left unmentioned with the rigors of killings and maiming that attended the violence associated with the April/May, 2011 presidential election which brought Goodluck Jonathan to power after completing Umaru Yar 'Adua/Jonathan only one term. In the northern part of the country, many National Youth Corp members numbering over 500 were killed in several incidents, besides, others who were also killed mainly Christians (Omotosho, 2014). Also in Ghana, what saved the situation, after an extremely close run-off between two candidates, Professor John Evans Mills and Nana Addo Danquah Akufo-Addo was that the outgoing president, John Kufuor, had the prescience to conclude from what he was hearing on the ground that any prolongation of the tension created by the electoral result pull-and-stretch, might toss the nation/baby out with the presidential seat/bath altogether (Hammar, 2008:6). What would the anxious crowds all over Ghana who were cursing the Electoral Commission for delaying the results have done, if it had known then, what had happened in South Africa's election of 1994, when a computer hacker managed to alter the results of the election and add millions of votes to the numbers cast for three parties of the hacker's choice? The near-disaster that would have blown up in South Africa had the hacking not been detected and corrected has just been revealed in a report published in the Johannesburg Sunday Times of October 24, 2010. The report tells the world for the first time that the much-hailed general election in South Africa in May 1994 - in which the African majority formed beautiful, peaceful queues to joyfully cast their votes for the very first time ever - was nearly ruined when a racist computer hacker was able to change the results of three of the minority parties that contested the election against the African National Congress (ANC).

Suffice me to say here that elections in The Gambia have been characterised by irregularities, intimidation, rigging and sharp practices that out-wit opposition parties. State machineries and institutions; especially the media are used at the detriment of the opposition parties- a situation prevalent in all democratic countries in Africa. In Africa, if any opposition party wins the incumbent in any presidential election know it that the margin of the win was so massive that the ruling party and its Independent Electoral Commission found it extremely difficult to manipulate the election results in favour of the ruling party.

It has been deliberated at various levels why some countries are able to organize 'free and fair elections' while others are not. On the same note, one needs to ask what constitutes a 'free and fair' election. Is a 'free and fair election' simply the absence of obvious and overt rigging or a reflection of the maturity of the political institutions; or a process which is judged by the

citizens to be fair, honest, and reflects the will of the people? (Bracking, 2005:7). The importance of elections lies in their traditional importance and to some extent in the way they promote or truncate democracy (Bratton and Masunungure, 2008: 45). As a tool of democracy, elections should be the only basis for choosing a government or representatives of the people (Bratton, 2008:54). It appears that discussions about having free and fair elections always assume certain dimensional discussions that resonate as 'global norms' (National Development Institute, 2000).

But within these global norms, certain facts begin to emerge which are believed to be African specifics (Chitiyo, 2009:125). The widely held assumption that conducting a 'free and fair elections' is tantamount to having a democratic system of government is sometime overstated and indeed, recent events have shown that this may not always be the case (Melber, 2002). This is because if an election is free it may not be fair and if it is free it may not be fair. Secondly, such discussions always tend to ignore economic and social factors like economic mismanagement, levels of poverty; unemployment, ethnicity and why elections tend to widen, not bridge the ethnic divide in some African countries (e.g. Kenya in 2007; Ghana in 2008, Nigeria in 2011 and 2015) respectively. However, the importance of conducting free and fair elections can never be overstated as it is the hallmark of democracy.

Elections are the basis of 'representative democracy' and one of the many, but acceptable means of choosing and not electing leaders in a democratic society (Tendi and Alexander, 2009). In past and recent African history, elections have become the mechanism for the transition from colonial rule to independence. In the military dictatorships of West Africa, elections became the basis for transition from military to civilian rule. Even when regimes have come to power through armed struggle (as was the case in The Gambia, Rwanda, Angola, Mozambique and Uganda to mention a few, while that of Nigeria, several attempts were made during and under Babangida and Abacha regimes but were not successful), elections are often used for legitimizing the role of the victorious Coup d'état leaders or the guerrilla army. It has always been perceived that an election with observers who give their seal of approval is always a 'successful one' (Chitiyo, 2009:126). However true this might be, may not be the representation of the situation on the ground. Sometimes, the interest of the home people or the citizens runs contrary to that of the International Observers. For instance, The Gambian election of 2011; whose election result was not the expectation of International Observers, however, organizing free and fair elections requires more than a mass of election observers, whose presence, though reassuring, could also be used to mask undemocratic and

unfair results - as in the case of West African transitions from military dictator-ships to civilian regimes.

Popular democracy must create the basis for frequent democratic ways of changing the political leadership of a country; the promotion of a democratic culture, based on tolerance and respect for diverse views and opinions. The popular will of the people, expressed through popular democracy must be the foundation of any political system built on the rule of law and respect for human rights. This requires the active and responsible role of civil society and other mass movements. Elections form a core component of such a democratic society, recognizing that elections on their own do not lead to fundamental change, but are part of a process that will lead to the strengthening of national institutions and democratic processes (Dzenga et al., 2000:12). Elections are therefore important democratic processes.

This section of the dissertation extensively draws from Zaya Yeebo's deliberations on the need for strengthening electoral institutions and processes and building a viable system that is governance-surviving on the African continent. The African continent's impediment to the democratization process has been the disconnect and mistrust that exist between citizens and political leaders. Due to the unprecedented high levels of mistrust and as political leaders continue to cling to power, and threats to dislodge them have not been taken lightly. This has in most cases resulted in politicians applying every trick in the book to remain in power, even if it means killing perceived and real opponents, as well as conducting fraudulent elections. The end result has been the existence of a culture of fraudulent electoral politics and impunity that have tarnished the image of the continent, brandishing it as a 'Dark Continent', even in the age of globalization. Who is to blame for this other than Africans themselves that are expected to have a re-think/change of act by putting in place a genuine surviving system, through institutional building and responsible government in their respective countries, even at the continental level at the African Union, where things can work smoothly, effectively and efficiently as they work in advanced democracies. With a focus on the role of 'free and fair elections' in promoting democracy, Zaya Yeebo takes a look at how electoral politics are shaping up across Africa. Zaya further provides a critical analysis of electoral proceedings in countries like Gambia, Nigeria, Zimbabwe, Ethiopia and South Africa, as a microcosm of what happens in many African states prior to and on the aftermath of elections to choose political leaders as well as their deteriorating governance styles. In Kenya, the flawed



elections conducted in 2007 left a trail of disaster which manifested itself through ethnic clashes, leading to the death of about 3000 people ( Omotosho, 2014:1-5).

In Zimbabwe, the 2008 elections were a watershed and an eye-opener of what transpires when political leaders sense defeat (Masunungure, 2009:154). Politically-motivated violence that characterised these elections led to about 500 confirmed deaths and numerous displacements. The institutionalization of violence and the politicization of the administration led to delayed release of election results, with George Chiweshe - former head of the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission simply sitting on results once it emerged that President Mugabe was losing the vote in 2008) (Mapuva, 2010; Makumbe, 2009). The important consideration for the state, the media, civil society and political parties is to work within an African framework, and for international supporters and interlopers to recognize the local reality, and not impose conditions based on geopolitical and economic interest" (Yeebo, 2009). In modern democratic systems of representative governance, elections are periodic contests which determine the next set of rulers in a nation state. In many ways, the notion of a free and fair election is subject to numerous interpretations and like most political concepts is always contentious. In essence, elections should be held in an atmosphere which is 'free from the clouds of traditional claims to political legitimacy based on perceived roles played in the independence struggle' and by extension free from colonial underpinnings or used as a cover for the protection of colonial and neo-colonial interest. As succinctly put,

*“Nigeria could be a disappointing state among its folks on the continent, as it accredits the leadership of the continent to itself with nothing substance to show for it, with the increasing level of electoral frauds being committed, every election and with the increasing level of corruption that are perpetrated in government by its politicians and other leaders across the nation. This appeared shameful and disturbing up till 2015, when there came a change of government that brought the opposition party to power who has begun the fight against corruption and the re-organization and restructuring of the battered economy, the presumed largest economy in the black world. As the richest continent in minerals and resources in the world, should there be present, an organized system and well-structured institutions and not the planting and institutionalizations of individuals and cabals, vehemently, excuses would not have arisen for the predicaments of today in electoral and democratic governance in Africa, The Gambia inclusive” (Omotosho,2015).*

Since elections have been adopted on the continent, it became a common practice, but with different dimensions and consequences. With colonization, came liberation struggles in most African states after which political independence was attained. This usually led to the first colonial elections in which, blinded by euphoria of the post-colonial era, citizens voted with their feet more than with their minds. Lewis (1994:299) has argued that "...more than three dozen African countries long characterized by authoritarian rule have undergone political liberalization or transfer of power through competitive elections". This blind allegiance soon came to pass as liberation heroes of the continent committed most of their time in corrupt practices, resulting in loss of trust from the electorate. And at election time, they found themselves faltering and failing to secure additional tenure from the electorate. This has led to flawed electoral practices, commonly known as electoral rigging, a practice which has taken the continent by storm in recent times. The aftermath have seen other factors such as ethnicity re-surfacing as defeated political leaders fail to contend with the idea of reverting to being ordinary citizens. For political survival, in the face of imminent defeat, most political leaders have resorted to inciting violence, like what happened in Kenya in the aftermath of elections in 2007 in which over 1000 lives were lost in the politically-motivated violence that ensued. A replica of the story occurred in Zimbabwe almost at the same time when the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU PF), which has ruled the country for over three decades stirred defeat in the face. To avoid further bloodshed, a notorious arrangement was mooted- government of national unity (GNU) which pitted winners alongside losers within the same political formation, ironically in the Zimbabwean case, with the losers wielding more political power than the winners. In Madagascar, the then president Ravalomanana trounced Didier Ratsiraka resulting in a power struggle between the two. In Ivory Coast, a similar fate awaited Larrent Gbagbo who disputed his electoral defeat at the hands of Allasana Outtara whose electoral victory was confirmed by the international community as well as the African Union and the United Nations. In this latter case, the result was disastrous for Gbagbo, after a concerted effort by various military forces, when he was eventually arrested. Now Gbagbo has been convicted by the International Criminal Court and the wife is still being tried by the same court in The Hague.

Elections have also been averted in most African countries as incumbent leaders have skirted or avoided them as a way of remaining in power. This has fanned winds of change which, as events in North Africa showed, are unstoppable. Tired of political leaders clinging to power for far too long with no signs of elections in sight, citizens of various countries, notably those

in the African Arab world, like Libya, Tunisia and Egypt particularly, took it upon themselves and demanded political change, popularly called the Arab Spring. The fraudulent elections that were held in Egypt, the fraudulent elections that were held in the North African country did not go down well, resulting in mass protests against Mubarak's three decades in power eventually succeeded in ousting him from power. A similar scenario had played out in Tunisia where Bin Ali was booted for having been in power for a long time without caring to ascertain his acceptability from the people of Tunisia through an election. Similar protests have also surfaced in countries like Libya, Bahrain, Yemen, Syria and indications are that there is simmering discontent in many other countries against their respective leaders who either tamper with the constitution to remain in power or avoid elections altogether or continues to rig elections in order to remain in power. All these events are an indication that people are craving for changes and whether the incumbent political leaders suggest an election, but the bottom line is that their people are fed up with them and want them to go/live power. Unfortunately, many of these political leaders have cases of gross human rights violations and crimes against humanity staring them in the face.

Africa is fraught with multi-ethnicity, a factor that has impacted on the conduct of free and fair elections on the continent. Most of the civil wars on the African continent are ethnic in nature, a factor which is carried to election days when one ethnic group wants to lord it over other ethnic groups. Additionally, the political economy of African states, particularly, their colonial origins can provide a window to understanding why Africa is prone and vulnerable to elections malpractice and disputes (Brandt and Turner, 2003:26). There is sometimes a conscious attempt to deny the impact of colonialism and now neo-colonialism in certain events in Africa (Brandt and Turner, 2003:26). Elections cannot be one of them. Electoral politics in post-colonial African states is very much linked to the character of the post-colonial state as the basis for the primitive accumulation of capital and for amassing economic power and wealth (Chikwanha and Masunungure, 2007:5). In other words, the character of the post-colonial African state encouraged a winner takes all mentality to competitive electoral politics and by extension, the violation of the rules of democratic engagement, particularly political succession. The ethni-cisation of politics in Africa has also contributed largely to the above and of course in no small measure (Omotosho, 2014).

In the anti-colonial struggle, ethnicity became an important factor as the colonial elite from different ethnic groups jostled for power and influence through anti-colonial independence

movements (Birch, 2007). As colonial edifices collapsed, some politicians and activists found comfort as tribal warlords, with no discernable ideas about nation- building, except to protect the land, economic resources and power they either grabbed or inherited from the departing colonial power (Human Rights Watch, 2011). Reflecting on this view “...ethnic followers vote along ethnic lines, believing that their *sons and daughters* can best act as gate- keepers to protect their ethnic interests, if they are voted into power” (Bratton, 2008). This has been a major and consequential source of conflict and crises in most African states (Omotosho, 2014).

Ethnicity has been a key driver in elections with political leaders whipping up ethnic emotions among the electorates thus being the precursor to violence. This situation is however not endemic to Gambia but one would add here that the Mandinka ethnic group of The Gambia has always believed that they are the majority ethnic in the country and as such should have the birth right to rule the country continually. This strong belief has made them to deride the government of Yahya Jammeh who is from the minority group. Consequently, President Jammeh, who is always bitter with this hate and given the ordeal that his tribe had passed through under the previous administration of Jawara for being neglected and marginalized prior to inception of his own regime has always been very critical of this by lambasting the Mandinka openly for being tribalistic in their agitations and claims, despite his government efforts to balance tribal equation in government in the overall national interest. Indeed, it is an African problem. Ethnic conflicts have played themselves in various forms in countries such as Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ghana, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Uganda and Sudan. What most conflicts in Africa illustrate is the character of neo-colonial state as one dominated by the largest ethnic groups, allowing these groups to use resources and sometimes state power to disadvantage their opponents opposition political parties (Class Discussions in Political Philosophy and Theory Class, May, 2016).

Democracy is said to be expensive business, and no-where is this reflected more than at election time. Elections are expensive; both at the level of maintaining democratic electoral management institutions and supporting political parties. In situations of severe poverty and deprivation as witnessed in The Gambia and other parts of Africa, individuals also become susceptible to manipulation and fall prey to financial inducements from politicians. Undoubtedly, poverty makes the electorate susceptible to monetary influences and inducements and therefore remains a severe impediment to organizing free and fair elections

in Africa. This is also related to the high cost of electioneering on the continent and elsewhere. Both the cost of maintaining the electoral administration and high cost of electioneering are impediments to free and fair elections. Related to this factor is illiteracy, which poses its own problems. For instance, how are the electoral regulations or the use of ballot papers explained to illiterate voters?

In short, the limitations, imperfections of electoral administration must be realistically set against the problem of underdevelopment and the economic crisis of the state. In general, however, geopolitical considerations can also influence the perceptions of an election as being free and fair. For instance, the 2008 elections in Ghana were organised within the shadows of monumental flaws in Nigeria, Zimbabwe and Kenya, and political upheavals in Guinea and Mauritania. However, the Zimbabwean case became most outstanding, given the length of time it took to release the election results, the violence that ensued prior to and on the aftermath of the election, and most importantly, a thinly-veiled coup that saw the defeated refusal to relinquish power, opting to arm twist the victors-the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) into a government of national unity (GNU). What has even been disappointing in the latter case is the continued perpetration of politically-motivated violence against the civilian population for having shown sympathy with the MDC and showing disregard and 'disrespect' for ZANU PF, a liberation movement that liberated the country from colonialism in 1980. The need for an African success story means that similar flaws in any African country should be curtailed. Consequently, what Africa needs is a system where regional and international communities are mandated to supervise national elections whether the country's leaders approve such an arrangement or not, with the UN having the authority to enforce such provisions. It has always been common practice that international observers and monitors are called upon by countries holding elections to help legitimizing the electoral process and the subsequent winners, provided the ruling elites approve of such involvement of these international organisations. It does not therefore suffice that the onus rests with countries holding elections to choose to invite international observers or not. It should therefore be made mandatory by the international community that international and non-aligned organisations come to observe elections, if there is to have a semblance of being free and fair.

For a nation or government to organize free and fair elections, certain institutional mechanisms should be in place (Duodu, 2010). Political architecture and institutional support

ensures that citizens are free to elect and be elected under rules and regulations that are clear to all contesting parties, that political parties are not only aware of these rules, but willing to abide by them in the spirit of democratic elections and fair play (Hammar, 2009:52). Some of the institutional and political mechanisms involve the establishment of independent (and non-partisan) electoral institutions that seek to preside over free and fair electoral processes. The role of Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) or Electoral Commissions is crucial to the outcome of an election as these electoral bodies derive their powers and mandate from the national constitution (Makumbe, 2009:156). This will include administering and implementing laws regarding the registration of voters; overseeing the actual conduct of elections, supervising the ballot and the count; promoting transparency at all levels and being accountable to the public and parliament where one exists (Makumbe, 2009; Mapuva, 2010). The INEC should also actively advocate the open participation by all political parties and the public; and provide voter information and civic education to raise awareness of electoral laws and governance issues to help the populace make an informed choice. However, in The Gambia and in other parts of Africa the ruling party manipulates and controls the Independent Electoral Commission; having appointed the body. In Africa it is almost an aberration for an opposition party to win the ruling party.

But most important of all, its role is to ensure that elections are conducted in conformity with the laws of the country. In Africa, overwhelming evidence points to the fact that elections run by independent electoral bodies are more successful, and the results respected. In countries where election results have been respected the state has ceded greater responsibility to the electoral administration such as the Electoral Commission in Ghana. In the same way, in the absence of administrative clarity and the political will on the part of the Electoral Commission (EC) to enforce the rules, election results will always be viewed with suspicion by the populace. In such an atmosphere, groups who feel swindled and abandoned by the electoral process will resort to non-democratic forms of protests as always the case in The Gambia and indeed recently as activities are on-going for preparations towards the next general elections in December, 2016, which is this year (The Standard Newspaper, 2016).

The role of civic education in promoting a free and fair election cannot be downplayed. Democracy requires informed participation of the electorate, but before this can happen, and to lessen conflict and confusion about the democratic processes, citizens must remain informed and engaged. The electorate in any given situation needs knowledge, information

and understanding of the competing political forces to make informed decisions about policy choices and avenues to voice their concerns. Civic education is the process by which the public is made aware of social and political rights and responsibilities, as well as the principles and practices of action. Civic education is used to create awareness of the various issues posed by politicians and candidates during an election, but more than that, it empowers voters and community actors with the tools, information, mobilization skills and understanding of the political dynamics necessary to influence change during the electoral process? In some countries, this role is reserved for government-approved institutions with the mandate to provide impartial civic education and awareness to the general public (e.g. Ghana), in others, this role is reserved for the Electoral Commission (e.g. Kenya). The Gambia in its democratic trajectory can follow suit.

Civil society organizations also provide civic education to large segments of the population using various creative methodologies. Civic education enables various interest groups - both state and non-state actors - to engage in a non-partisan education of voters using various methodologies, ranging from seminars and discussions to plays, poetry and drama. Civic education creates awareness of the electoral process, allowing political parties and competing candidates to set out their policies, thereby helping the electorate to make an informed choice? Elections remain the key avenues for changes of the guard. But this requires an institutional framework within the context of the country in question. Sometimes, 'global norms' are not enough and can overlook local realities. The important consideration for the state, the media, civil society and political parties is to work within an African framework, and for international supporters and interlopers to recognize the local reality, and not imposing conditions based on geopolitical and economic interest (Pamabuzuka News, 2010).

In addition to the institutional mechanisms for managing elections, civil society organizations - here defined to include non-governmental and faith organisations, trade unions - play a very significant role in promoting free and fair elections. For example, in the period leading to an election, they provide civic education, creating awareness of the democratic and electoral processes and some-times in reassuring a restive public. In The Gambia, election year has always been a period for protests by opposition parties who clamor for electoral reforms through peaceful protest and demonstrations. Ideally, clamoring for electoral reforms has due process which should be followed. In The Gambia, civil society has

led the advocacy for electoral reform, arguing for more effective mechanisms to ensure free and fair elections.

During an election, civil society continues to play this role as elections observers and/or monitors, ensuring that rules laid down by the electoral body are followed, and that the election meets local and international standards of objectivity and fairness. In most countries, civil society organisations are active in pre-election periods, when they undertake civic education, promote awareness of the electoral process and promote public debates between candidates - government and opposition.

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Civic education creates awareness of the electoral process, allowing political parties and competing candidates to set out their policies in, thereby helping the electorate to make an informed choice. Elections remain the key avenues for changes of the guard. But this requires an institutional framework within the context of the country in question. Sometimes, 'global norms' are not enough and can overlook local realities. The important consideration for the state, the media, civil society and political parties is to work within an African framework, and for international supporters and interlopers to recognize the local reality, and not impose conditions based on geo-political and economic interest.

Election observers are a key element and catalyst to the fostering of a legitimate electoral process. And can election observers divorce themselves from dominant political parties or conduct themselves in a non-partisan way? Additionally, to what extent are election observers key to a 'free and fair election'? To respond to these and other questions, one needs to explore the environment in which the elections are located or held. Building opposition politics on the African continent has proven immensely difficult largely because of the



oppressive nature of most post-colonial states and the extremely difficult structural conditions under which opposition forces have to mobilize and reproduce their support (Guess, 2009:14). In countries that have undergone an extensive liberation struggle, such as Zimbabwe in Southern Africa, the development of opposition politics presents specific challenges (Matlosa, 2005:54). In particular, the strong legacy of legitimacy enjoyed by former liberation movements and their capacity for revived nationalist mobilization have presented opposition forces with immense obstacles in developing alternative pragmatic positions (Makumbe, 2009:145). Moreover, the often-repressive nature of post-colonial states, compounding the longer repressive histories of colonial politics, has presented democratic forces with few precursors of alternative democratic forms (Mapuva, 2010:467). These obstacles must be set within the context of a global political environment that presents strong structural limits on the positioning of post neo-liberal alternatives. It is therefore not surprising that civic and opposition forces on the continent generally and in Southern Africa in particular have struggled to locate themselves firmly within the historical legacies and contemporary demands of their particular national contexts.

In most cases, it is acknowledged that the sole purpose of election observation is firstly, to help reduce irregularities, and also offer impartial advice to election officials where necessary. Some election observers have stayed within these professional boundaries. As the Kenya Domestic Observation Forum (KEDOF) report noted: 'Election observers are not supposed to interfere in the electoral process and have no authority to change, improve or correct any shortcomings, or to request changes during the election process'. Thus, 'observer missions are, strictly speaking, mandated to collect and verify information concerning the election process, to analyse the observations and then, after the elections, to publish their findings'. Similarly, in various African countries, such electoral bodies have been visible but their efforts have been compromised by politicians who have sought to politicize and in some cases, militarize such bodies through staffing them with military personnel in civilian clothes.

Allowing observers to monitor an election has become part of the accessory of any election. An election where these observers are barred is considered fraudulent from the beginning. The activities of these supposedly 'neutral' election monitors have become an important part, first as a way of validating an election, and secondly, as a legitimizing exercise. In Africa, no election is thought to be free and fair without a horde of foreign election observers. There are two types of election monitors: international and domestic. International election observers or

monitors usually comprise international organisations, regional organisations (e.g. Africa Union), and international organisations (e.g. the Commonwealth or the European Union) groups outside the host nation. The role of international election observers or monitors was given a boost by the United Nations when in October 2005, the UN international democracy organisations signed on to the Declaration of Principles for International Election Observation.

This declaration encourages countries to allow for both international and domestic election observation. In most African elections, the presence of international observers reassures the weak opposition and politicians that the process will be free and fair. A review of The Gambia elections of 2011, noted: 'The large and visible presence of foreign media, and diverse groups of international observers including the EU, the Carter Centre, the Africa Union, the Pan African Parliament the Commonwealth and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) contributed to increased public confidence in the process as well'. The role of foreign observers has been usually complemented by domestic elections observers. Domestic observers also play a similar role. In the 2008 general elections in Ghana, and the 2007 elections in Kenya, local election observers contributed immensely to managing peaceful elections.

But more than that, those observers can help to reduce or deter fraudulent election practices. Domestic election observers usually involve non-governmental organisations. Domestic election observers have a longer history of election observation in Africa than international observers. In South Africa, Nigeria, Kenya, Ghana and Senegal, domestic observers have been essential to successful elections. Experience in Africa and Asia has demonstrated that domestic election monitors have certain advantages over their international counterparts. In both Kenya and Ghana, and to some extent in Zimbabwe, domestic organisations are rooted in the society, have a longer history of engagement and have cultural advantages (e.g. language) over their international counterparts, most of whom that tend to be election junkies or tourists. Domestic election observers also have the advantage of lessons learned over a long period of time.

Based on what has been discussed in this session of the project, free and fair elections on the African continent continue to present numerous challenges. But the most victims in the ensuing scenario are the electorate who are not only presented with electoral environments

not conducive to the conduct of free and fair elections, but either end up being targeted as voters bent on regime change. What further insinuates the electorate is the prospect of having to face those political leaders who they will have voted out of office. What of the vindictiveness of being voted out of office by an electorate that seeks to transform the political landscape? As a result, the African political landscape, fraught with irregularities as it is, will continue not only to short-change the electorate, but cheat them out of their political choices. Electoral observers, powerless as they are, have not helped the situation either, except to make recommendations which are in most cases not binding and are ignored by political parties. Unless and until recommendations of election observers are taken seriously, electoral processes on the African continent will continue to be manipulated and trampled upon by powerful but insensitive politicians.

#### **4:2.1 Quantitative Description of Hypothesis with Tables shown below**

##### **Hypothesis 1**

**( $H_0 \neq 1$ ): The First Republic Gambia was not better than the Second Republic.** From the result of the hypothesis, the proposal that the First Republic Gambia was not better than the Second Republic was **ACCEPTED**.

Table 4 Figure 17 shows very high mean agreements (51% and 36%) for strongly agree and agree respectively) with the fact that the Gambia's First Republic was not better than the Second Republic. Whereas on the Table below, not more than 13% which is equal to 2.7 mean response score of the observed responses, either disagreed or strongly disagreed with the fact that the First Republic was better than the Second Republic of the Gambia. This mean agreement is statistically significant to draw inference on hypothesis one.

##### **Hypothesis 2**

**( $H_0 \neq 1$ ): High illiterate level was not responsible for low democratic growth in The Gambia.**


From the obvious result, the hypothesis that High illiterate level was not responsible for low democratic growth in The Gambia was **REJECTED**.

Table 4 Figure 18 also shows high mean agreement (44.9 and 35.7) for strongly agree and agree respectively; thereby rejecting the High illiterate level was not responsible for low democratic growth in The Gambia. Suffice it to say here that high illiterate level was responsible for the low democracy in the country. These two hypotheses have been

represented

graphically

below:



#### Stupendous Development Strides in the Second Republic's Statistics

N	Valid	98
	Missing	2
Mean		19.6
Median		18
Mode		00
Std. Deviation		18.04
Skewness		1.63
Variance		325.3
Range		45
Minimum		5
Maximum		50

**Table 4: 18 the low level of democratic growth in The Gambia is attributed to massive illiteracy in the country**

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid Strongly Agree	44	44.9	44.9	44.9
Agree	35	35.7	35.7	80.6
Strongly Disagree	4	4.1	4.1	84.7
Disagree	8	8.2	8.2	92.9
Undecided	7	7.1	7.1	100.0
Total	98	100.0	100.0	




Figure 18: Bar Graph of Massive Illiteracy a Cause for Low Democratic Growth in the Gambia

#### Massive Illiteracy a Cause for Low Democratic Growth in the Gambia

##### Statistics


N	Valid	98
	Missing	2
Mean		19.6
Median		8
Mode		00
Std. Deviation		18.5
Skewness		0.71
Variance		342.3

Range	37
Minimum	7
Maximum	44

## Frequency Tables

**Table 4: 1 Regions of Respondents**

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Kombo and Brikama	26	26.5	26.5	26.5
North Bank Region	25	25.5	25.5	52.0
Lower River Region	27	27.6	27.6	79.6
Central River Region	12	12.2	12.2	91.8
Upper River Region	8	8.2	8.2	100.0
Total	98	100.0	100.0	



## Statistics

N	Valid	98
	Missing	02

Mean	19.6
Median	25
Mode	00
Std. Deviation	8.91
Skewness	-0.69
Variance	79.3
Sum	100
Range	18.00
Minimum	8.00
Maximum	26.00

**Table 4: 2 Occupations of Respondents**

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Civil Servant	46	46.9	46.9	46.9
Student	14	14.3	14.3	61.2
Police	9	9.2	9.2	70.4
Teacher	13	13.3	13.3	83.7
Human Resources Manager	2	2.0	2.0	85.7
Trader	11	11.2	11.2	96.9
Self Employed	3	3.1	3.1	100.0
Total	98	100.0	100.0	




Figure 2: Bar graph of Occupations of Respondents

#### Occupations of Respondents

##### Statistics

N	Valid Missing	98 2
Mean		14
Median		11
Mode		00
Std. Deviation		14.9
Skewness		2.10
Variance		220.7
Range		42
Minimum		2
Maximum		46

**Table 4: 3 Elections are instruments of democracy building to the extent that they give the electorate legitimate authority to choose their leaders**

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
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Valid	Strongly Agree	72	73.5	73.5	73.5
	Agree	17	17.3	17.3	90.8
	Strongly Disagree	3	3.1	3.1	93.9
	Disagree	2	2.0	2.0	95.9
	Undecided	4	4.1	4.1	100.0
	Total	98	100.0	100.0	




Figure 3: Pie Graph of Elections as Instruments of Democracy-Building and Legitimacy

#### Elections as Instruments of Democracy-Building and Legitimacy

##### Statistics

N	Valid	98
	Missing	2
Mean		19.6
Median		4
Mode		00
Std. Deviation		29.92
Skewness		2.02

Variance	895.3
Range	70
Minimum	2
Maximum	72

**Table 4: 4 Elections in the Gambia's First and Second Republics have been characterized with agitation, acrimony, contestation, bitterness and terror among others**

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid Strongly Agree	20	20.4	20.4	20.4

Agree	47	48.0	48.0	68.4
Strongly Disagree	2	2.0	2.0	70.4
Disagree	9	9.2	9.2	79.6
Undecided	20	20.4	20.4	100.0
Total	98	100.0	100.0	




Figure 4: Bar Graph of Elections as a Product of Controversy and Violence in the Gambia

#### Elections as a Product of Controversy and Violence in the Gambia


##### Statistics

N	Valid	98
	Missing	2
Mean		19.6
Median		20
Mode		20
Std. Deviation		17.13

Skewness	1.16
Variance	293.3
Range	45
Minimum	2
Maximum	47

**Table 4: 5 Gambia's Elections are usually marred with a lot of flaws that they lay no credibility for their fairness and transparency**

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Strongly Agree	58	59.2	59.2	59.2
Agree	32	32.7	32.7	91.8
Strongly Disagree	4	4.1	4.1	95.9
Disagree	1	1.0	1.0	96.9
Undecided	3	3.1	3.1	100.0
Total	98	100.0	100.0	



**Figure 5: Pie Graph of Non-transparent and Non-credible Elections in the Gambia' s Fragile Democracy**

Non-transparent and Non-credible Elections in the Gambia' s Fragile Democracy  
Statistics

N	Valid	98
	Missing	2
Mean		19.6
Median		4
Mode		00
Std. Deviation		24.97
Skewness		1.17
Variance		623.3
Range		57
Minimum		1
Maximum		58

**Table 4: 6 There are widespread removal of constitutional rights and protection from political opponents in The Gambia's electoral and democratic system**

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Strongly Agree	57	58.2	58.2	58.2
Agree	32	32.7	32.7	90.8
Strongly Disagree	4	4.1	4.1	94.9
Disagree	2	2.0	2.0	96.9
Undecided	3	3.1	3.1	100.0
Total	98	100.0	100.0	




Figure 6: Bar Graph of Constitutional and Human Rights Abuses in the Gambia's Electoral and Democratization Process

#### Constitutional and Human Rights Abuses in the Gambia's Electoral and Democratization Process

##### Statistics

N	Valid	98
	Missing	2
Mean		19.6
Median		4
Mode		00
Std. Deviation		24.9
Skewness		1.16
Variance		595.3
Range		55
Minimum		2
Maximum		57

**Table 4: 7 There exists the termination of open party politics and the confirmation of political participation, usually within the framework of a single party**

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid Strongly Agree	33	33.7	33.7	33.7
Agree	38	38.8	38.8	72.4
Strongly Disagree	12	12.2	12.2	84.7
Disagree	4	4.1	4.1	88.8
Undecided	11	11.2	11.2	100.0
Total	98	100.0	100.0	




Figure 7: Pie Graph of Non-existent Level Playing Ground for Party Politics in the Gambia's

Non-existent Level Playing Ground for Party Politics in the Gambia's


Statistics

N	Valid Missing	98 2
Mean		19.6
Median		12
Mode		00
Std. Deviation		14.9
Skewness		0.47

Variance	223.3
Range	34
Minimum	4
Maximum	38

**Table 4: 8 The Gambian Presidents at different republics have respectively devised measures for their individual regimes to perpetuate a prolonged rule over their subjects**

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Strongly Agree	46	46.9	46.9	46.9
Agree	31	31.6	31.6	78.6
Strongly Disagree	5	5.1	5.1	83.7
Disagree	7	7.1	7.1	90.8
Undecided	9	9.2	9.2	100.0
Total	98	100.0	100.0	



**Figure 8: Bar Graph of Regime Perpetuations by the Gambia Two Republics' Presidents, Regime Perpetuations by the Gambia Two Republics' Presidents**

Statistics



N	Valid	98
	Missing	2
Mean		
Median		19.6
Mode		00
Std. Deviation		18.10
Skewness		0.96
Variance		327.8
Range		41
Minimum		5
Maximum		46

**Table 4: 9 The Electoral pattern of "Drum and Marble" in The Gambia is a better method of casting votes, given the level of illiteracy**

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Strongly Agree	44	44.9	44.9	44.9
Agree	36	36.7	36.7	81.6
Strongly Disagree	8	8.2	8.2	89.8
Disagree	3	3.1	3.1	92.9
Undecided	7	7.1	7.1	100.0
Total	98	100.0	100.0	




Figure 9: Pie Graph of Gambia Electoral System Drum & Mable's Methodology Voting

#### Gambia Electoral System Drum & Mable's Methodology Voting

##### Statistics

N	Valid	98
	Missing	2
Mean		19.6
Median		8
Mode		00
Std. Deviation		18.9
Skewness		0.66
Variance		358.3
Range		3
Minimum		41
Maximum		44

**Table 4: 10 Opposition Parties in The Gambia are merely allowed to function for constitutional requirements for multiparty elections to hold**

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid Strongly Agree	43	43.9	43.9	43.9
Agree	39	39.8	39.8	83.7
Strongly Disagree	8	8.2	8.2	91.8
Disagree	4	4.1	4.1	95.9
Undecided	4	4.1	4.1	100.0
Total	98	100.0	100.0	




Figure 10: Bar Graph of Manipulated Multiparty Politics and Rubber Stamp Opposition in the Gambia

#### Manipulated Multiparty Politics and Rubber Stamp Opposition in the Gambia

##### Statistics

N	Valid Missing	98 2
Mean		19.6
Median		8
Mode		4
Std. Deviation		19.7
Skewness		0.60

Variance	386.3
Range	39
Minimum	4
Maximum	43

**Table 4: 11 Corruption in The Gambia is a critical factor in the development of The Gambia's democracy**

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Strongly Agree	49	50.0	50.0	50.0
Agree	32	32.7	32.7	82.7
Strongly Disagree	6	6.1	6.1	88.8
Disagree	5	5.1	5.1	93.9
Undecided	6	6.1	6.1	100.0
Total	98	100.0	100.0	




Figure 11: Pie Graph of Democracy Corruption in the Gambia

Democracy Corruption in the Gambia

Statistics

N	Valid	98
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Missing	2
Mean	19.6
Median	6
Mode	6
Std. Deviation	20.00
Skewness	0.99
Variance	400.4
Range	44
Minimum	5
Maximum	49

**Table 4: 12 THE GAMBIA SUFFERS FROM MANY GRIEVANCES SUCH AS THE POOR HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION, MAL-ADMINISTRATION AND A DE FACTO AUTOCRATIC POLITICAL SYSTEM**

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid Strongly Agree	31	31.6	31.6	31.6
Agree	40	40.8	40.8	72.4
Strongly Disagree	5	5.1	5.1	77.6
Disagree	6	6.1	6.1	83.7
Undecided	16	16.3	16.3	100.0
Total	98	100.0	100.0	




Figure 12: Bar Graph of Gambia's Poor Records of Democratic and Electoral Statistics

N	Valid	98
	Missing	2
Mean		19.6
Median		16
Mode		00
Std. Deviation		15.5
Skewness		0.48
Variance		239.3
Range		35
Minimum		5
Maximum		40

**Table 4: 13 The Gambia has not experienced stable and normal democratic governance from 1965 to present**

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid Strongly Agree	41	41.8	41.8	41.8
Valid Agree	33	33.7	33.7	75.5

Strongly Disagree	10	10.2	10.2	85.7
Disagree	9	9.2	9.2	94.9
Undecided	5	5.1	5.1	100.0
Total	98	100.0	100.0	




Figure 13: Pie Graph of Democratic and Electoral Instability


#### Democratic and Electoral Instability

##### Statistics

N	Valid	98
	Missing	2
Mean		19.6
Median		10
Mode		00
Std. Deviation		16.2
Skewness		0.68
Variance		263.8
Range		36
Minimum		5
Maximum		41

**Table 4: 14 One main achievement of the democratic process in the First Republic was the successful granting of independence from the British in 1965**

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid Strongly Agree	47	48.0	48.0	48.0
Agree	27	27.6	27.6	75.5
Strongly Disagree	10	10.2	10.2	85.7
Disagree	11	11.2	11.2	96.9
Undecided	3	3.1	3.1	100.0
Total	98	100.0	100.0	



**Figure 14: Bar Graph of Electoral and Democratic Success in the First Republic**

Electoral and Democratic Success in the First Republic

Statistics


N	Valid	98
	Missing	2
Mean		19.6
Median		11
Mode		00
Std. Deviation		17.7



Skewness	1.13
Variance	311.8
Range	44
Minimum	3
Maximum	47

**Table 4: 15 the entrenchment of multiparty system in The first Republic helped to boost the democratic image of The Gambia**

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid Strongly Agree	43	43.9	43.9	43.9
Agree	32	32.7	32.7	76.5
Strongly Disagree	7	7.1	7.1	83.7
Disagree	9	9.2	9.2	92.9
Undecided	7	7.1	7.1	100.0
Total	98	100.0	100.0	



**Figure 15: Pie Graph of Entrenchment of Multiparty Politics in the First Republic of the Gambia**

Entrenchment of Multiparty Politics in the First Republic of the Gambia,  
Statistics

N	Valid	98
	Missing	2
Mean		19.6
Median		9
Mode		7
Std. Deviation		17.7
Skewness		1.13
Variance		282.8
Range		36
Minimum		7
Maximum		43

**Table 4: 16 The greatest achievement of the Second Republic Gambia was the  
recognition of women in the democratic process**

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid Strongly Agree	47	48.0	48.0	48.0
Agree	32	32.7	32.7	80.6
Strongly Disagree	6	6.1	6.1	86.7
Disagree	7	7.1	7.1	93.9
Undecided	6	6.1	6.1	100.0
Total	98	100.0	100.0	




Figure 16: Bar Graph of Recognition of Gender Equality in Politics in the Second Republic's Gambia

Recognition of Gender Equality in Politics in the Second Republic's Gambia,  
Statistics

N	Valid	98
	Missing	2
Mean		19.6
Median		7
Mode		6
Std. Deviation		18.9
Skewness		0.95
Variance		358.3
Range		41
Minimum		6
Maximum		47


**Table 4: 17 The various infrastructural development in Gambia's Second Republic are all dividends of democracy**

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
--	-----------	---------	---------------	--------------------

Valid	Strongly Agree	50	51.0	51.0	51.0
	Agree	18	18.4	18.4	69.4
	Strongly Disagree	7	7.1	7.1	76.5
	Disagree	5	5.1	5.1	81.6
	Undecided	18	18.4	18.4	100.0
	Total	98	100.0	100.0	

**Table 4: 19 Democracy postulates enlightenment and by and large a blessing to any growing political community while illiteracy, which implies ignorance, is a menace.**

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Strongly Agree	50	51.0	51.0
	Agree	35	35.7	86.7
	Strongly Disagree	5	5.1	91.8
	Disagree	1	1.0	92.9
	Undecided	7	7.1	100.0
	Total	98	100.0	100.0



**Figure 19: Pie Graph of Democracy a Sense of Enlightenment vis-à-vis Illiteracy a Menace in Democratic Elections**

Democracy a Sense of Enlightenment vis-à-vis Illiteracy a Menace in Democratic Elections  
Statistics

N	Valid	98
	Missing	2
Mean		19.6
Median		7
Mode		00
Std. Deviation		21.7
Skewness		0.83
Variance		469.3
Range		49
Minimum		1
Maximum		50

**Table 4: 20 The Gambia's Electoral and democratic system (process) need  
overhauling**

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Yes	73	74.5	74.5	74.5
Valid No	25	25.5	25.5	100.0
Total	98	100.0	100.0	




Figure 20: Bar Graph of Gambia's Democratic & Electoral System's Total Overhauling Statistical Quantifications.

**Table 4: 21 There should be more emphasis on institutional strengthening than personality strengthening in The Gambia**

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Yes	68	69.4	69.4	69.4
No	30	30.6	30.6	100.0
Total	98	100.0	100.0	




Figure 21: Bar Graph for Institutional Strengthening over Personality Strengthening in Gambia's Democratic and Electoral System,

**Table 4: 22 The government should respect the constitution and rule of law to advance democracy**

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Yes	70	71.4	71.4	71.4
Valid No	28	28.6	28.6	100.0
Total	98	100.0	100.0	




Figure 22: Bar Graph of Respect for the Rule of Law to Advance Democratic Governance in the Gambia Statistics.

**Table 4: 23 Government should as a matter of concern initiate citizen and civic education training in order to promote democracy in The Gambia**

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Yes	80	81.6	81.6	81.6
Valid No	18	18.4	18.4	100.0
Total	98	100.0	100.0	




Figure 23: Bar Graph of Civic & Citizenship Education a Means of Boosting Governance Awareness and Electoral Integrity and Growth in The Gambia.

#### 4: 2.2 Statistical Representations of Responses to Questionnaires.

TITLE:

	y	x			
	AGREE	DISAGREE	xy	$y^2$	$x^2$



1	89	5	445	7921	25
2	67	11	737	4489	121
3	90	5	450	8100	25
4	89	6	534	7921	36
5	71	16	1136	5041	256
6	77	12	924	5929	144
7	80	11	880	6400	121
8	82	12	984	6724	144
9	81	11	891	6561	121
10	71	11	781	5041	121
11	74	19	1406	5476	361
12	74	21	1554	5476	441
13	75	16	1200	5625	256
14	79	13	1027	6241	169
15	68	12	816	4624	144
16	79	12	948	6241	144
17	85	6	510	7225	36
18	73	25	1825	5329	625
19	68	30	2048	4624	900
20	70	28	1960	4900	784
21	80	18	1440	6400	324
	$\Sigma y = 1622$	$\Sigma x = 300$	$\Sigma xy = 22496$	$\Sigma y^2 = 126288$	$\Sigma x^2 = 5298$

n = the numbers of data

$$\Sigma y = 1622, \text{ where } \Sigma$$

$$\Sigma x = 300$$

$$\Sigma xy = 22496$$

$$\Sigma y^2 = 5298$$

$$\Sigma y^2 = 126288$$

Using the Pearson's Product Moment Correlation Coefficient we have:

$$r = \frac{n(\Sigma xy) - \Sigma x \Sigma y}{\sqrt{\{n(\Sigma x^2) - (\Sigma x)^2\} \{n(\Sigma y^2) - (\Sigma y)^2\}}}$$

$$= \frac{21(22496) - (300)(1622)}{\sqrt{\{21(52980) - (300)^2\} \{21(126228) - (1622)^2\}}}$$

$$= \frac{472416 - 486600}{\sqrt{111258 - (90,000)(2552048 - 2630884)}}$$

$$= \frac{-14184}{\sqrt{(21164)(21258)}}$$

$$= \frac{-14184}{\sqrt{44904312}} = \frac{-14184}{21210.94793}$$

$$r = -0.669$$

$$r = \theta - 0.669$$

The correlation coefficient is between  $-1$  and  $+1$ . When the value of  $r$  is near  $+1$  or  $-1$ , there is a strong linear relationship. When the value of  $r$  is near  $0$ , the linear relationship is weak or non-existent. Since the value of  $r$  is computed from data obtained from samples, there are two possibilities when  $r$  is not equal to zero either the value  $r$  is high enough to conclude that there is a significant linear relationship between the variables, or the value of  $r$  is due to chance. To make this decision, one uses a hypothesis-testing procedure.

$$H_0 : P = O \text{ and } H_1 : P \neq O$$

$$\text{Sig } \alpha = 0.05$$


n is the number of data and d.f is the degree of freedom. The critical value is obtained by using d.f to search from the statistical table from the table

$$n - 2 = 21 - 2 = 19 \text{ gives } + 2.093$$

Computing the test value

$$\begin{aligned} t &= r \sqrt{\frac{n-2}{1-r^2}} \\ &= -0.669 \sqrt{\frac{21-2}{1-(-0.669)^2}} \\ &= -0.669 \sqrt{34.3929375} \\ t &= -3.923 \end{aligned}$$

The test rejects the null hypothesis since the test value falls in the critical region.



There is a significant relationship between the variables of those who agreed and disagreed.

In studying the relationship between the two variables, which are those who agreed called variable y and those who disagreed call variable x. The data collected for these two variables form a construct of scatter plot.

The purpose of this scatter plot is used to indicate the nature of the relationship between the variables. The line of best fit drawn is called the regression line.

The purpose of the regression line is to enable the researcher to see the trend and make predictions on the basis of the data.

The formula for the regression line  $y^1 = a + bx$

Where a is the intercept and b is the slope of the line.

This line always drawn to pass through the centroid  $\left[ \bar{x}, \bar{y} \right]$  where  $\bar{x}$  is the mean of all values of x and  $\bar{y}$  is the mean of all values of y.

$$\bar{x} = \frac{\sum x}{n} = \frac{300}{21} = 14.3$$

$$\bar{y} = \frac{\sum y}{n} = \frac{1622}{21} = 77.2$$

$$\left[ \bar{x}, \bar{y} \right] = (14.3, 77.2)$$

The intercept a is given by

$$a = \frac{(\sum y)(\sum x^2) - (\sum x)(\sum xy)}{n(\sum x^2) - (\sum x)^2}$$

$$\begin{aligned} &= \frac{(1622)(5298) - (300)(22496)}{21(5298) - (300)^2} \\ &= \frac{8593356 - 6748800}{111258 - 90000} = \frac{1844556}{21258} \end{aligned}$$

$$a = 86.7699 \sim 86.77$$

$$a = 86.77$$

$$b = \frac{n \sum (xy) - (\sum x)(\sum y)}{n(\sum x^2) - (\sum x)^2}$$

$$b = \frac{21(22496) - (300)(1622)}{21(5298) - (300)^2}$$

$$\frac{b = 14184}{21258} = - 0.667$$

$$b = 0.667$$

$$y^1 = 86.77 + ( - 0.667)x$$

$$y^1 = - 0.667x + 86.77$$

The nature of the regression line shows that those who agreed are far more than those who disagreed. This shows that while variable y increases variable x decreases.

In conclusion, the report of these statistical findings is that the Second Republic witnesses more or has witnessed more development as compared to First Republic.

#### **4:2.3 QUALITATIVE DATA ANALYSIS REPORT ON SEMI- STRUCTURED INTERVIEWS**

The second phase of this research presents findings of the qualitative study amongst the five participants chosen for the survey which were identified as civil servants, leaders of thought, politicians, renowned nationalists etc. No doubt, the experience of the selected participants with respect to their astute knowledge of the electoral and democratic trajectory of The Gambia is quite comprehensive and profound. The main tools used for data collection in this second phase were semi structured personal interviews. The semi-structured personal interviews were used in combination with the questionnaire to aid improved interpretation of results. The interviews provided an avenue for the interviewer to ask for further clarifications on certain pertinent and thematic issues and helped immeasurably in gathering extra information that were not formerly captured in the research.

##### **Question 1.**

##### **What are the electoral and democratization processes in the Gambia's First and Second Republics?**

The responses got from the various interviewees/respondents on the above questions are summarized thus:

While some responded that the processes have been smooth in view of the peace enjoyed in the political system, even though, some contestations and agitations still greet the affairs, some have opined that the processes are flawed completely by the political avarice of the leaders of the republics who have used their various tenures to perpetrate and perpetuate long rule in power, coupled with severe electoral malpractices like rigging by the ruling power/party in order to retain and maintain the political power.

Another cross-section of interviewees also maintained that a hollow portion of the ruling party members in power have shared the view that the instituted multiparty politics has been a charade as the state pervades in extreme non-partisan contrary to the provision of the constitution. Some observed or questioned the exercise of a body-politic that is yet to be matured as it triggers political violence and electoral fraud provoked by the attitudes and greed of the uneducated elements or personal individuals who are in charge of administration of the state.

Further responses got, especially from the intellectual and civil society circles informed how electoral and democratization processes in the Gambia were characteristic of ethno and class politics, especially in the first republic. However, with a slight variation in the second republic that appeared populist but somewhat dictatorial in pattern.

The system was also ostensibly characterized by a modest approach to develop in the first republic contrary to what was seen in other West African nations at their independence whose leaders embarked on huge capital projects that gulped enormous finance, while in the second republic, the democratization was and has always been sweetened with developmental strides that have promoted peace and better life, though, high-handed.

Some other opinions said the democratization process have been with soft-spot approach until 1994 when the gear changed hand to military style of politics on the principle “Do as we want not as it should be”. For electoral process, it was embellished in the adoption of an adapted traditional-based voting system which introduced the elective principle of/for the use of marbles and drums which continued in the second republic but with different phases. For example in the first republic, election campaigns were invigorated and concentrated more in the protectorate and the Mandinka settlement where the first republic commanded unopposed influence, while in the second republic, findings confirmed, election campaigns were taken to the rural people, especially, women and children. It was characterized by party co-optations by the first president in order to re-consolidate hegemony and weaken all oppositions and so

also in the second republic. Some responses were in crises of financial global support especially in the first regime which were more relied upon with the first regime becoming extensively relying on these political giants. Democratization and electoral processes have also been assuaged as one that pervaded around personality rule and popularity of one man in politics from independence to date.

### **Interview Question 2.**

What are the Patterns of the Electoral and Democratization Process in The Gambia's First and Second Republics?

Responses cut across and confirmed that patterns have tailored along prolonged hegemony and personality rule in the two regimes. The process has also been patterned along opposition cooptation and elimination as well as repressive rule through the latter more severe in the last 1994 coup democratization and electoral process. It has also been patterned along ethnic chauvinism and 'groupist' rule even though this has not been allowed to affect the enormous natural peace the nation enjoys and is still enjoying.

Patterned also along multi-partism but this appears only in theory as an oligarchy is in power to perpetuate succession and repressive rule through election rigging and manipulation, co-optations of opposition. The designed voting system was equally designed to help the uneducated carry out their electoral responsibility of choosing their leaders, pending the outcome of election results.

The two Republic electoral and democratic systems were characterised by patterns- dominant party rule as opposition parties were carefully and deliberately schemed out and in some cases eliminated in party politics through imposition high party registration fees.

Regionalism is more prevalent both in the First and Second Republics. In the Second Republic for example, development is tied to vote for the ruling party. Any region that fails to do this suffers definitely non- development or is automatically denied development. This, some of the respondents described as undemocratic and repressive as democracy entails equal opportunities.

### **Interview Question 3:**

#### **What achievements and challenges are attributable to both first and second republics' Gambia?**

Information gathered from the interviews conducted on achievements are as follows:

Jawara successfully led the nation to independence firstly in 1965 and to full republic in 1970. He also allowed competitive multi-party politics with modest development strides (This is part of responses collected). During his regime, The Gambia's democracy was a model of reference in the sub-Saharan Africa so much that the country enjoyed enormous international support and goodwill as well as gigantic material and financial aids from donor countries. The country also enjoyed a lot of internal peace and political calmness as there were no issues of disappearance of people, illegal arrest on political reasons, tortures and press censorship. The Jawara led government also promoted the speaking of Wolof as a unifying language for national identity. This united the people as one and promoted love amongst them as a nation. Efforts of national growth were therefore enhanced as it was people-based.

Jawara succeeded in achieving nationhood for The Gambia as he refused confederation with Senegal as Senegambia on fear of marginalization because of the small size and population of the country compared to what Senegal has. The administration succeeded in building a National Army and the Police for the small country. It was gathered that, the regime maintained a soft-spot to ruler ship and did not turn to a dictator. People said, though, he stayed too long, but, his regime was calm and peaceful and therefore, achieving.

For the second republic, it was gathered that the Jammeh administration embarked on gigantic development strides from take-over till date, some of which have catapulted Gambia to the international scene as a force to be reckoned with in politics and economy, especially in Agriculture and Tourism and most particularly the voice to be heard in the area of peace-building and development. Indeed, it is reckoned with as the peace giant of the world, placing the small nation on the strategic world map for a national role on the global space or in arena of world politics. Yahya Jammeh's policy of "without development, there cannot be peace" which made him as President of the Republic to establish Jammeh Foundation for Peace, an establishment that embarks on various projects that add value to people's lives is believed to be instrumental in national development efforts in building The Gambia. Also, his policy of



“let’s grow what we eat and eat what we grow” is another, a policy that has helped to bridge what used to be the extremely noticeable gap between the rich and the poor before the inception of the second republic. No doubt, as the claim inferred, the policy as one of Jammeh’s Vision Document’s principles, has endeavored to guarantee food security and reduce hunger and starvation, especially, among the rural populace. Amongst others, like the visions 2016, 2020 and 2025 which have opened doors of opportunities for most Gambians to work and contribute to nationhood, especially the women and the young people, stupendous opportunities have equally been made available/secured for the Gambians abroad for various career and business interests, especially in scholarship grants for schooling abroad by various foreign governments and institutions and this has been enhanced by the Jammeh administration’s diplomatic shuttles and increased foreign missions for national interest. This development has increased level of manpower in the country for the boosting of its Gross national and Domestic Products.

Democratization process has also in the regime, as respondents claimed, broadened the economy and modernized it from agrarian to commercial-based through mechanization policy and supply of modern farming equipments to rural farmers, including financial grants to help them procure crop breeds for farming. It has increased tremendously, educational opportunities for the Gambians, home and abroad, especially in the area of political education, entrepreneurship and skilled acquisitions. The regime modernized and advanced the electoral system with the formal establishment of an Independent National Electoral Commission (IEC) and the expansion of voting rights which has increased greater participation of the citizenry in their own affairs and by extension, in the country’s electoral and democratic process.

On the issue of challenges and failures the interviewed have these to say: while Jawara failed to follow dire constitution process on tenure and succession, Jammeh did. However, the administration later abandoned this tenure stipulation by removing the clause from the constitution to allow unstipulated tenure process to suffice. Low literacy level was a main challenge as people were not politically educated enough about their political values and ideals. This was more severe in the first republic than in the second republic. In the first republic, little was achieved in terms of education growth by encouraging people-powered government at all levels except with some degrees in the protectorate areas like Banjul, Serrekunda and Brikama. In the second republic, education is given priority but with some cautionary measures against political unrests.

Democratic process and the electoral system were faulted on personality politics rather than institutional politics both in the first and second republics. Policies are not factored towards building a surviving and long-lasting system as is the case in western and advanced democracies, but are fashioned towards enhancing one-man popularity and worship. This impedes seriously democratic growth and development in the country.

Another challenge, the interviewees asserted was in the multiparty politics that was only coax and not real in both regimes but with different degrees of manifestations and practices. In the 2<sup>nd</sup> republic, the democratic process and the electoral system is marred by massive crack downs on the political activists, opponents and civil protesters by the state through its institutional agencies like the Police, National Intelligence Agency (NIA) and other intelligence units. This alone has painted in black the Gambia's governance system as undemocratic and highly dictatorial. Corruption also constitutes a major challenge to the political process in both republics as efforts of national growth that would have yielded positive results are not manifesting. This corruption manifested in both phases and at all levels of governance in the First and Second Republics.

In the second republic, press freedom and enjoyment of freedom of speech are also curtailed to a reasonable lower level. In the second republic, the Executive arm has hijacked most of the constitutional powers of the legislative, thereby, reducing the latter to a mere rubber stamp of the Executive actions and policies. For instance, the President appoints the Speaker and Deputy Speaker of the House and five other nominated members of the House, including the majority leader. The House has been de-empowered to summon Mr. President for questioning on his/her actions and policy frameworks. This is the consequence. So, there is the policy of 'if I hire you and you do not comply with my rules, I fire you'. Jammeh's style of administration strictly works with the principle of hire and fire at any time of the day. This, some of the interviewees actually conceded and alluded to. The Assembly also lacks the credibility to declare as unconstitutional any acts of the Executive that contravene the constitutional process etc. Suffice it to say, that, in the Gambia's political presidential republic, separation of powers as a doctrine and its checks and balances principle as propounded by the great Baron Montesquieu for experiment in the arms of government and as workable in most modern democracies is a charade. This again has flawed the democratic and electoral efforts of the Second Republic's Gambia.

#### **Interview Question 4**

##### **Can the Low Level of Democracy in The Gambia be Attributable to the Predominant Illiteracy in the Country?**

From the interviews conducted, it was gathered that the high illiteracy level has not only reduced the long awaited political consciousness to rubble, but, has deprived the state the most beneficiary, the means by eliminating barriers to its economic emancipation and political liberation; i.e. genuine independence has been deprived Gambia. To this end, people are deprived their rights to political participation in the political process through conservatism and ignorance, believed to be rampant in the political process. Low level literacy necessitates the adoption of an adapted electoral principle of the use of marbles and drums which over-ambitious politicians easily manipulate to suit class interest and elitist political oligarchy. Some political watchers maintain that, illiteracy had been aggravated by the uncared attitude and negligence of the first republic ruler, Dawda Jawara, who had thought it was not necessary to devote much resources to this sector just for fear of being ousted by ambitious political opponents in a rubber-stamp multi-party politics and elections. This has caused low level of political consciousness and agility to change through decisive and competitive mobilization and political horizon. The Gambia's case is not different from what was and is still being experienced in other parts of Africa, especially, in the ECOWAS sub-region including, even the big giant, Nigeria. Just that, the Gambia's situation is in extreme.

Jammeh's regime is believed to have given a greater attention to education towards the reduction of illiteracy level and poverty alleviation. This has been reflected by the percentage increase in the literacy ratio and political awareness, that which as at 2014 is put at 48% reduced from its 58% in the previous year, even though, its autocratic style of leadership is still in question and a stumbling block to progress expected (Omotosho, 2016).

The Gambia was among the few African nations that got independence and was blessed with a president that was well-read, articulate and proficient. Paradoxically, unlike Ghana, Tanzania, South Africa, Nigeria etc., its own leader in person of Sir, Dawda K. Jawara refused to make use of his own potentials unto greatness, with a greater and critical attention from scholars and experts, especially in the areas of education, agriculture and commerce. Nothing was wrong at this time for Gambia not to have been put on the effectively industrialization wheel as well as rigorous educational emancipation program for a greater nationhood and nothing disturbed the administration of Dawda Jawara to harness available

home and abroad potentials to implement genuine sustainable economic programs that would empower the working populace to be on their toes for/to work as experienced in Singapore, but, something was wrong as the administration failed woefully to do all these for chauvinistic and personal political ambition for perpetuity. This, according to the interviewees' submissions, created opportunities for coupists to take advantage of the political stage at the people's detriment.

### **Interview Question 5**

**What considerable remedies would be practically suitable for improving The Gambia's electoral and democratic process?**

When the above question was posed to the respondents, the following were their responses:

- ✓ That true multi-party politics should be encouraged or entrenched in The Gambia's Constitution in both republics by the state. Though, the 1970 constitution is gone for operation, we now have the 1996 constitution, Hence, a nationally invoked constitutional review should hold to look into this, through parliamentary efforts and plebiscites.
- ✓ Parliamentary independence from the Executive should be maintained. In other words, doctrine of separation of powers and checks and balances principles be allowed in the government process to prevent Executive tyranny and abuse.
- ✓ There should be emphasis on institutional strengthening and empowerment as against personalizing government/leadership.
- ✓ The Electoral Commission should enjoy true independence to conduct free, fair and credible elections in the country.
- ✓ A level playing ground for politics and relative equal political and other opportunities should be encouraged and be provided for in the constitution.
- ✓ Corruption in the democracy and sharp electoral practices should be discouraged.
- ✓ Tribal politics and class domination should be dissuaded.

- ✓ Justice System (Court system) should be overhauled to avoid miscarriage of justice and made apparent.
- ✓ Political participation should be enhanced and political culture to be re-oriented through genuine political education and development of a viable political culture and political system.
- ✓ Rule of law, constitutionalism must be respected in the art of governance, especially in respect to law taking its course and full Fundamental Human Rights entrenched and enjoyed by all in the state. This means that, genuine Good Governance, that is hinged on the three component pillars of ‘the Process (transparency and accountability), Content (justice and equity) and Deliverables (dividends of democracy) must be engendered in the polity.
- ✓ Poverty of the mind to be addressed for change of attitude and behavior
- ✓ Patriotism must be encouraged and enhanced for a true nationhood and democratic practice.

#### **4:3 TESTS OF HYPOTHESES**

This session of Chapter Four appraises the Electoral and Democratic process of The Gambia’s First and Second Republics by testing the two hypotheses postulated during the initial stage of this dissertation. The approach here was to throw these hypotheses in form of questions to the respondents and their different views were identified and subjected to statistical evaluation. In order to avoid bias/prejudice this study overall used the Null hypotheses ( $H_0 \neq$ ) to determine the respondents views. In testing the hypotheses, the following were discovered:

##### **Hypothesis 1**

Null ( $H_0$ ): The First Republic Gambia was not better than the Second Republic.

Alternative (H1): Null (H0): The First Republic Gambia was better than the Second Republic

After hypothesis 1 was tested, the null hypothesis (H0) was ACCEPTED and the alternative hypothesis was REJECTED as shown below: With the results generated from the data, this null hypothesis is accepted. Table 4 Figure 17 shows very high mean agreements (50.0% and 18.4% for strongly disagree and disagree respectively) with the fact that the Gambia's First Republic was not better than the Second Republic. Whereas, looking at the results presented in Table 4, not more than 13% which is equal to mean response scores of the observed responses, either strongly agreed or agreed with the fact that the First Republic Gambia was better than the Second Republic. The graphical figures that follow every table clearly further emphasize the fact of the responses that validates the acceptance of this null hypothesis.

**Conclusion-** The null hypothesis (H0) is accepted and the alternative hypothesis is rejected based on the facts and figures made available.

Undoubtedly, the Gambia's Second Republic is adjudged far better than the First Republic. Since coming into being in 1996 with the ushering in of the Second Republic, a plethora of development and economic growth has taken place in The Gambia under President Jammeh. These developments cut across all sectors of the economy. The coming of Second Republic Gambia has been widely acclaimed as the greatest thing that has happened to the country.

On the health sector, the Second Republic has done appreciably well. More hospitals and health centres have been built across the length and breadth of the country. Examples are the APRC hospital Farafenni, Bwiam hospital, Serrekunda hospital Kanifing and other numerous health centres. The two main referral hospitals – Edward Francis Small Teaching Hospital and Bansang hospital have been expended and improved upon to meet the needs of the people. This has been done by providing state-of-the-art medical equipments, significant among them: CT scanner, Endoscopic machine, Hemodialysis machine, Oxygen concentrator, and Laparoscopic machine. This equipment has improved diagnosis and they have also saved many Gambians the cost of going abroad for treatment or diagnosis. Today, Gambians enjoy better Medicare than what was enjoyed under the First Republic.

The Agriculture sector has continued to receive more attention in the country as against the First Republic. The Second Republic Gambia sees agriculture as the heart beat of its government and therefore strongly encouraged mechanized farming. With the back-to-the-

land and operation-feed – yourself call by the Gambian leader himself, tremendous awareness rising has been registered about the significance of self-reliance and self-sustenance.

While achievements are no doubt being registered in terms of the projects being initiated by government, the personal intervention of President Jammeh has impacted greatly on the sector, with regards to participation of the people. And also, over the years, government has provided hundreds of tractors to farmers, with a number of incentives. A number of new crop varieties aimed at improving the productive base of the farming community in The Gambia have also impacted greatly on the sector. But the most brilliant among the entire anti-hunger crusade was the sanctioning of the Vision 2016 initiative, which aims at putting hunger and food insecurity at bay and making Gambia a food self-sufficient nation by 2016. The Gambia's export ratio is about to be boosted with the on-going efforts to be exporting rice for export earning generation.

The APRC government of the Second Republic was quick to realize the potentials of women and the key role they could play in national development. Women, therefore, enjoy equal opportunities since the advent of the Second Republic. The Gambia can boast of key positions manned by women. Example, the vice presidency, the Office of the Secretary General was before manned by a female, Office of the Speaker of the National Assembly has also been manned by women speakers for many years, coupled with many other ministerial positions, directors, permanent secretaries, village heads, national assembly members, and of late the appointment of the first female governor of the West Coast region. Currently, through this effort, The Gambia's Vice President, Aja Dr. Mrs Isatou Njie Saidy is now the most longest serving woman Vice President in the Black world and also Hon. Mrs Haddy Nyang Jagne (JP) was the first female president-ECOWAS Female Parliamentarians Association (ECOFEP) and above all, the current Chief Prosecutor in the International Criminal Court (ICC) in the Hague, Netherlands is a Gambian woman- Mrs. Fatou Bensouda, an international jurist of repute. These, among others, have not only helped in addressing what used to be the apparent gender gap in public appointments and functions, but has given opportunities to women to tap their potentials and contribute to nation-building as well as the pride these women now have, that, they are recognized and made relevant domestically and public-wise by their government. The youths of the land have not been left. The government of the Second Republic has encouraged the youths to embrace hard work and education which are keys to national development. The empowerment of women and youths is felt

across the board as women at all levels, including grassroots and participation in national affairs. It could be recalled the First Republic under Dawda Jawara used women and youths to achieve his political ambition and aspirations without empowering them as done in the Second Republic. This is the big difference.

Before the advent of the Second Republic, Gambia's utility institution was only able to provide electricity to most of its customers for only 12hrs or sometimes none at all, for days, due to low generating capacity. Even worse was the fact that electricity supply was within a limited area, usually where the well-offs resided. Today, energy is supplied throughout the country. This is made possible because of the increase in the number of generators, resulting in the construction of a new power plant in Brikama, under the watchful eyes of the Second Republic under President Jammeh. That has resulted in the expansion of coverage to major coastal settlements such as Brufut, Sukuta, Sanyang, Tanji, Tujereng and Jambanjelly, and as well as the West Coast electrification project amongst others. This is a means to reduce poverty and suffering level and close gaps in a little way between the well-offs and the downtrodden. This electricity provision boosting has also in some ways increased economic activities and enterprises as smaller scale businesses are able to generate power for their enterprises, thereby, contributing to sustainable national development (Omotosho, 2016).

The rural electrification project has enabled 46 towns and villages in rural Gambia to benefit from electricity supply, with new power stations installed in Barra-Essau, Kerewan, Farafenni, Kaur, Bansang and Basse. Today, most rural villages, which were deserted due to the menace of rural-urban drift, are turning into financial centres due to the intensity of economic activities. This is as a result of accessibility to electricity supply. Similarly, the provision of pipe –borne water has greatly improved under the Second Republic. Most towns and villages of the Gambia have safe drinking water. Indeed, the cheapest in the Gambia is portable drinking water. This has reduced water-burn diseases in the small nation (Omotosho, 2016).

**In terms of Telecommunication, the Second Republic had fared well.** The country's booming telecommunication sector has also added impetus to the growing financial sector. This is also attributable to the sound ICT policies of government. The telecommunication sector has seen the birth of four GSM service providers in the country – Gamcel, Africell, Comium and Qcell. This has been hailed as the beginning of the revolutionization of not only the GSM industry, but also the business and other sectors the technology is relevant to.



From the beginning of the Second Republic, it had become a focus for government that existing roads are not only rehabilitated, but that new roads are also constructed to facilitate the much needed communication for continued development. A number of projects have been embarked upon by government in this regard. They include the 168km Kombo Coastal road; the rehabilitation and upgrading of the 20km Barra-Amdallai road, 13km Mandinaba-Seleti road, 193km Soma-Basse road, 23km Basse-Wellingara road, as well as the trans-Gambia Highway. Already the West Field-Mandinaba road has been fixed. The newly constructed Brikama-Dimbaya-Darsilami roads, has also been completed and commissioned as part of activities marking the 20th anniversary celebrations of the great July 22nd Revolution. These are just some of the major achievements registered by the APRC government of the Second Republic.

Under the Peace-Keeping Mission, the government has fared well. The Gambia Armed Forces has been participating in a range of peacekeeping operations; from the woodland of Burma, the mountainous regions of Nepal, the forest region of Congo, Burundi to Angola, the sand storms of Darfur, Chad; the rainy region of Liberia, Ivory Coast, Guinea Bissau, and Sierra Leone and to the mercurial region of Eritrea and Ethiopia. This has in one way or the other improved the lives of the personnel of The Gambia armed and security services, financially, morally and psychologically. It has given them a career pride.

Gambian troops have been sent to East Timor and Kosovo; they formed part of the UN peace-keeping forces. The Gambia also participated in a 12-month peacekeeping mission in the Sudanese region of Darfur, the first to serve for that duration since that country began the United Nations African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) in the year 2004.

Since The Gambia became independent in 1965 and joined the United Nations in that same year, it only became a member of the Security Council for the first time in 1999 under President Jammeh's regime. The Security Council being the organ of the United Nations charged with the responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and world security, Gambian membership to this august body is an eloquent expression of the recognition of The Gambia's exemplary record of peace, democracy and stability under the leadership of President Jammeh.

Unarguably, the new order of the 21st Century development trajectory has been massive investments in public infrastructure, running into millions and billions of Dollars. The era has

seen visionary governments around the world assigning huge chunks of their budgets to public infrastructure, premised on the fact that no sustainable development can take place without this in-dispensable necessity. But even at the level of regional groupings, enhanced infrastructure is a key item on the agenda. Such is the case at both the levels of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the African Union – each has unit for infrastructural development and The Gambia under the Second Republic has an ambitious government under the watch of His Excellency Sheikh Prof. Alh. Dr. Yahya AJJ. Jammeh, Babili Mansa.

In this race to rapid modernization through enhanced infrastructure, his 20-year-old government is not trailing behind. Since the birth of a new Gambia in 1994, one of the hallmarks of the Revolution has been capital investment in public infrastructure across the board. It is best anchored on the glaring fact that infrastructural development is an indispensable investment need that any serious and responsible government would prioritize as far as meeting the targets is concerned.

In the area of education, the Second Republic has done noticeably better than the First Republic. In this regard, more schools, be it primary and or secondary schools have been built. As a consequence, more pupils/students enrollment has been recorded. There is also an increased awareness of the need for western education. The establishment of the University of The Gambia in 1999 is one of the greatest land mark achievements of President Jammeh. Today, the Gambia University turns out local intelligential who are contributing meaningfully to the growth and development of both the private and public sectors of the economy as against the period of First Republic where Gambians had to go to Nigeria, Ghana, Sierra-Leone , Europe etc to acquire University education with high costs.

Economic development in The Gambia has grown rapidly since July 1996 with great achievements in the key social sectors of education, health, public infrastructure, the productive sectors as well as the services sector. According to the 2013 Human Development Report, The Gambia's Human Development Index (HDI) value increased from 0.279 in 1994 to 0.439 in 2011; representing an increase of 57 percent or average annual increase of about 1.4 percent. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) has been growing at a rate of 5-6 percent over the last four years of which agriculture currently contributes between 25 - 30 percent. This share of GDP is rapidly expanding largely driven by significant investments in the sector since 1994. The Gambia is on track to achieve the MDGs relating to education, health, water

and sanitation, gender parity, reduction of maternal and infant mortality rates and overall poverty reduction. Using the US\$1.00 per day per person poverty index, the incidence of poverty has been reduced considerably from 68 percent in 1998 to 36.7 percent in 2010 and in 2014 to 48.6 percent respectively.

It is no secret that since 1994, The Gambia, through The Gambia Armed Forces has been participating in a range of peacekeeping operations; from the woodland of Burma, the mountainous regions of Nepal, the forest region of Congo, Burundi to Angola, the sand storms of Darfur, Chad; the rainy region of Liberia, Ivory Coast, Guinea Bissau, and Sierra Leone and to the mercurial region of Eritrea and Ethiopia. This has in one way or the other improved the lives of the personnel of The Gambia armed and security services, financially, and morally as they benefit from UN system Peace Keeping benefits.

Gambian troops have been sent to East Timor and Kosovo; they formed part of the UN peace-keeping forces. In all these conflict areas, Gambians have in the image of their youthful, committed and peace-loving President, performed with distinction and honour. Gambia also participated in a 12-month peacekeeping mission in the Sudanese region of Darfur, the first to serve for that duration since that country began the United Nations African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) in the year 2004. Since The Gambia became independent in 1965 and joined the United Nations in that same year, it only became a member of the Security Council for the first time in 1999 under President Jammeh's regime. The Security Council being the organ of the United Nations charged with the responsibility of maintaining international peace, Gambian membership to this august body is an eloquent expression of the recognition of The Gambia's exemplary record of peace, democracy and stability under the leadership of President Jammeh.

Cognizance of the importance he attached to peace, security and stability, the Gambian leader did not only advocate this, but has physically demonstrated it by playing a greater role in settling disputes between political opponents in countries such as Guinea Bissau when he gathered all of its stakeholders and political opponents in Banjul to an open dialogue as means to re-uniting politicians in that former Portuguese colony. That political forum was described by many as historic; that has provided the Gambian leader the opportunity to interact with major political party leaders of The Gambia such as Lawyer Ousainou Darboe, Hamat Bah and Lamin Waa Juwara, the party leaders of the UDP, NRP and NDAM respectively. The presence of the Gambian opposition leaders in that forum clearly

demonstrates President Jammeh's commitment to unity and the promotion of peace and stability in the sub-region and Gambia in particular.

President Jammeh, in October 1998, succeeded in bringing to the negotiating table President Joa Bernardo Vieira and General Ansumane Mane for their first face-to-face meeting in Banjul since the two were locked in a fratricidal struggle for power in Guinea Bissau. From the Banjul meeting, President Jammeh flew with the two men to attend the 21st ECOWAS Summit in Abuja where the two men signed the Abuja Accord, which called for the establishment of a government of National Unity, the withdrawal of foreign troops and the deployment of ECOMOG, the military intervention unit for ECOWAS.

The mediation efforts of President Jammeh in the quest for a peaceful settlement of the conflict between the Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance (MFDC) and the Government of Senegal brought new hope for peace to be enjoyed again by the population of the Southern Region of Senegal after nearly two decades of war and the loss of more than 1200 lives. Again Banjul was the platform in June 1999, for peace negotiations, which President Jammeh facilitated and which was welcomed and hailed by the two parties in conflict. Much progress was made and for the first time there was general optimism that peace and stability would return to Casamance. Against this backdrop the then Senegalese President Abdou Diouf and MFDC leaders agreed that The Gambia should continue to host subsequent meetings and negotiations until the conclusion of a lasting peace. The new Senegalese Head of State, President Abdoulaye Wade at that time has equally recognized the need for Gambian mediation in the conflict. On his part, President Jammeh has expressed his willingness to join forces with others committed to the search for the rapid and lasting solution to the internecine conflict in Casamance.

President Jammeh was concerned and more worried about the conflict involving Sierra Leone, Liberia and The Republic of Guinea, which is destroying the very foundation on which the Mano River Union was built with great expectations for their people, for sub regional integration and for African Unity. At the very early stage of the crisis The Gambian President played a very important role in bringing about direct talks in Abuja between the warring factions of Liberia. Spending 16 hours in non-stop dialogue with the Liberian warlords, the Gambian leader personally undertook the herculean task of convincing the Liberian warlords of the need to have direct dialogue. This marathon mediation effort led to the Liberian warlords embracing each other as brothers for the very first time since the

Liberian civil war broke out. Battle hardened Liberian Generals broke down in tears on that day. He has demonstrated pan-africanist postures and leadership by these gestures.

In 1999, the US Embassy compound was under siege by the Taylor regime and it was thanks to the mediation of President Jammeh that President Taylor allowed the Americans to evacuate Roosevelt Johnson and his militants from the US Embassy compound to Sierra Leone. Early in the Sierra Leone conflict President Jammeh was the first leader to offer to mediate between the Sierra Leone Government and the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) led by Foday Sankoh. In the same vein the Gambian leader has played host to the respective leaders of the countries of the Mano River Union (Sierra Leone, Liberia and Republic of Guinea) on a number of occasions, and has visited all three countries. In pursuit of his historic mission for peace for all especially in neighbouring countries and the ECOWAS sub-region President Jammeh, made a two- day visit to Sierra-Leone to give hope to and as a mark of solidarity with the Government and people of Sierra Leone who yearn so much for peace and stability. President Jammeh, who was visibly moved by the sight of the Sierra Leonean amputees, assured the people of Sierra Leone that he would forever be on a mission to ensure that such atrocities never occurred again in this world. In April 2001, President Charles Taylor paid a one-day visit to The Gambia at the end of which President Jammeh succeeded in eliciting from President Taylor a commitment to resolve the erstwhile problem between him and President Kabbah of Sierra Leone and President Conte of Guinea regarding the expulsion of the Ambassadors of Sierra Leone and Liberia in a fraternal manner.

The President's efforts to restore regional peace has also been characterized by a humanitarian dimension as attested by the various refugee camps in The Gambia which have become safe havens for refugees fleeing violence and the ravages of war especially from Sierra Leone and Casamance and at one time Guinea Bissau. As part of its effort to improve conditions in camps, especially at the Kerr Alhassan Camp, A programme of food-for-work has been instituted among other positive community schemes.

As a champion of African Unity, following the footsteps of the great pan Africanist, the late Dr. Kwame Nkrumah, President Jammeh deployed every effort to solve the protracted Libyan-Western impasse following the Pan Am bombing. Thus the Gambian Leader who had sponsored during the Annual Meeting of the Organisation of Islamic Countries in 1997 the famous motion denouncing violence as a weapon of solving problems by the Islamic world, initiated the process to see to it that the whole truth about the alleged Pan Am bombing was

brought out in the open to bring relief to the families of the victims as well as Libyan people who had for long suffered under the sanctions imposed because of the bombing allegations.

The concept behind the goals of the Vision 2020 blueprint is to transform The Gambia into a paradise of some sort. Given the achievement realized within this short period of time, compared to what we had achieved as a nation from pre-independence to the end of the First Republic, there is every reason to rejoice the eminence of reaching the end on the onward journey to the Vision 2020. Unarguably, the new order of the 21st Century development trajectory has been massive investments in public infrastructure, running into millions and billions of Dollars. The era has seen visionary governments around the world assigning huge chunks of their budgets to public infrastructure, premised on the fact that no sustainable development can take place without this in-dispensable necessity. But even at the level of regional groupings, enhanced infrastructure is a key item on the agenda. Such is the case at both the levels of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the African Union – each has unit for infrastructural development and The Gambia under the Second Republic has an ambitious government under the watch of His Excellency Sheikh Prof. Alh. Dr. Yahya AJJ. Jammeh, Babili Mansa as he is fondly called or addressed.

In this race to rapid modernization through enhanced infrastructure, his 20-year-old government is not trailing behind. Since the birth of a new Gambia in 1994, one of the hallmarks of the Second Republic has been capital investment in public infrastructure across the board. It is best anchored on the glaring fact that infrastructural development is an indispensable investment need that any serious and responsible government would prioritize as far as meeting the targets is concerned.

Taking into account all these development achieved within the last twenty years of Gambia's Second Republic under the leadership of His Excellency Sheikh Professor Alhaji Dr Yahya Jammeh, his government has done appreciably well than the First Republic as also corroborated by the various respondents.

## **Hypothesis 2**

Null (Ho): High illiteracy level is not responsible for low democratic growth in The Gambia

Alternative (H1): High illiterate level is responsible for low democratic growth in The Gambia

When the Null hypothesis 2 was tested it was REJECTED whereas the Alternative hypothesis was ACCEPTED. Table 4 Figure 18 shows very high mean agreements (44.9% and 35.7% for strongly disagree and disagree respectively) with the fact that High illiteracy level is responsible for low democratic growth in The Gambia. The graphical figures that follow every table clearly further emphasize the fact of the responses that validates the acceptance of the alternative hypothesis.

**Conclusion-** The null hypothesis (Ho) is therefore rejected and the alternative hypothesis is accepted based on the facts and figures made available to the researcher as elaborated below:

Unarguably that education is a vital factor in the realization of political democracy is not in doubt. President Borja of Ecuador aptly captured this when he observed during a presentation at the world summit on Education for All at Jomtien that “the vote is an expression of opinion, and wise decisions in choosing governments depend on a well educated public.” The Gambia is saddled with varieties of uneducated people that cannot make well informed decisions on whom to vote for during elections. Most countries that have political, economic and social crises today are among those that have crises in their education systems. For The Gambia, the provision of education is grossly inadequate, underfunded, or poorly managed by those in charge. A major challenge that confronts the country in the provision of mass literacy for the citizens is their failure to understand that the provision of basic education is central to the attainment of sustainable social, political and economic development. As Rao (2011) observed, in times of economic adjustment and austerity, services for the poor have to be protected; that education-empowerment of individuals-through the provision of learning is a human right and social responsibility. It is only when Gambian leaders understand this and make concerted efforts to live up to it that their situations will improve democratically as their votes may reflect their opinions and wishes.

Democracy and Education in Africa Freedom is universally admitted as the very being of man. Human beings have always attached value to freedom and have sacrificed their lives to protect it. As a concept, democracy may be accepted as “the voice of revolt raised by human spirit against coercion and imposition” Dhiman (2007). It is a political system that is opposed to obituary authority and tyranny that comes with it. It is opposed to the exploitation of the weaker by the stronger. Politically, democracy is simply seen as government of the people by the people for the people (Abraham Lincoln). In a democratic political system the citizens are protected by the constitution. Such a system voluntarily gives sovereignty to the people. In countries where the culture of democracy is well entrenched it is seen more as a way of life than a political system. In such countries citizens act rationally. But in the case of The Gambia, the citizens on account of poor education cannot act rationally. To a large extent democratic way of living is the result of man’s faith in himself, his being free and self reliant, his respect for truth, his wisdom and courage to make rational decisions, his ability to accept or respect the views of others. Another essential attribute of democratic culture is the ability to resort to discussion rather than the use of force or coercion and or sentiments in the resolution of issues. For a man to be rational is for him to have faith in the reasoning and position of other people for the promotion of the general interest of the society. In a predominantly illiterate community like The Gambia, where the people cannot read and write, votes are cast out of sentiments, prejudice and ethnic affiliations. This explains why the Gambian citizenry continues to vote sheepishly for one man for as many years as he can manipulate them. For instance, the two Presidents that have ruled the country had ruled for not less than twenty years; even though it seems obvious that they may not have performed creditably well. But cannot be supplanted or replaced with the opposition party. In summary, democracy as a way of life is built around man’s implicit faith in himself, in being free and self reliant, in respect for truth, having courage of one’s convictions and yet being ready to accept the position of those who differ from him and all these can only be achieved when enlightenment comes through education.

For the democratic culture to flourish in any society such as The Gambia, there are some basic conditions that must be in place. Firstly, there must be an economic system that provides for the basic needs of the people so that they can enjoy the basic needs of life. This is because democracy cannot thrive on the empty stomach of the people (Dahiman, 2007). The truth here is that a hungry people can easily be convinced by those who control the resources of the society to do what may not be in their interest or that of the majority. This



has been the case in most African countries where democracy has been at lowest ebb. In The Gambia, like in the majority of African countries, the imbalance in the distribution of the national wealth has created a large pool of poor citizens who are exposed to the manipulation of the minority or cabal who control the larger proportion of the national wealth. This is a serious constraint to the installation of a true democratic culture. Nigeria, the big brother of Africa, largest democracy and largest economy on the continent, whom much is expected from as a legacy and model for other brother-nations, is equally indicted. This situation tended to have worsened constraining democratization process across the continent of Africa. Things are just coming to normalcy, where in today Nigeria, democracy is thriving with a peaceful and clear democracy transition in the Big Brother Nigeria as recorded in the last elections of 2015, when the opposition party (APC) defeated the ruling party Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) in a keenly and highly competitively contested presidential election, bringing Gen. Mohammadou Buhari, the opposition candidate to power.

The second condition for the smooth installation of the democratic system in any state is the implementation of a functional mass literacy programme. This is because education is the agency through which the people can be made to become conscious of their rights and duties. All the countries of the world that have installed effective education programs have equally been able to evoke effective democratic culture. For The Gambia as a highly pluralistic society the role of education in the enthronement of a sustainable democratic culture is of great importance. That the advanced countries of the world have perfected the democratic system today is largely because they have been able to provide effective mass literacy programme for their citizens. At this point, it is necessary to observe that education can influence democracy positively only when it is able to inspire the potential voter with the urge for social justice, to eradicate the barriers of caste, creed and ethnicity, to deepen their cultural understanding and sympathy and instill love for honest work. This is where education in most African countries including The Gambia has failed. The provision of Universal Basic Education in the country is considered as a  
fundamental responsibility of government.

The government at various levels should recognize that an educated citizenry is an informed one and is vital in the attainment and sustenance of political stability, since it enhances political participation and communication. It is also the only sure means through which a pluralistic country can achieve any meaningful harmony. It is recognized that education is a

major factor in the transmission of democratic values including dialogue, national unity patriotism and self-reliance which are vital for the realization of sustainable development in The Gambia. The corporate existence of The Gambia is currently threatened by ethnic conflicts which are largely politically motivated. For instance, the strong belief by the Mandinka ethnic group that they are the majority ethnic group in The Gambia and its avowed desire to control the country has always spurred political tension and acrimony. This is always the case in most African countries. For example, Babangida (2002) in Omachi (2012) noted, that ethnicity in Nigeria has become a huge human investment that is not only nurtured by the structure and ideology of ethnic nationalities but also becoming increasingly a preferred mode of loyalty as opposed to loyalty to the Nigerian state.

Most crises in The Gambia and most other African countries is as a result of illiterate and unemployed youths that are employed and equipped to fight perceived political enemies. The high levels of illiteracy among the youths as well as the ever escalating incidence of poverty in the country provide ruling Party ready hands to engage for their undemocratic practices. The African Peer Review Mechanism Country Self Assessment Report revealed that Gambia's democratic administration has not met the expectations of the majority of the citizens as poverty has continued to escalate. The report indicated that inflation was on the increase just as the education system was decaying at an embarrassing rate.

The state of infrastructure was deplorable while unemployment was put at an unmanageable level. The report also indicated that corruption had reached all time high. Mass literacy has remained a crucible for democracy and liberty as well as sustainable national development. However, for it to achieve these objectives, its programmes must be oriented towards the total liberation of the individual from every form of domination and oppression which can only be achieved through mass literacy campaign. Such a programme must also be able to socialize the individual so as to be dynamically involved with others to assume responsibility. For any mass literacy programme to be said to be successful it must be one that is able to prepare the individual for transmission to other education levels with ease.

## **RESEARCH QUESTION 1: What are the electoral and democratic process of The Gambia's First and Second Republics?**

The results obtained from the survey shown in **Table 4:4** indicated clearly that the nature of the electoral and democratic process of the Gambia's First and Second Republics as posed by the researcher is characterized by:

- Agitations,
- Acrimony
- Contestation
- Manipulations
- Partialism
- Favoritism and Nepotism
- Bitterness, calumny and terror
- Unpatriotic behavior and sentiment
- Tribalism and others

This conclusion is drawn because 20.4“Strongly Agree” and “Agree”48.0 mean score of responses in a scale of 5.0 range was recorded which represents 69.4 % of the respondents agrees with the researcher question of ‘What are the electoral and democratic process of The Gambia's First and Second Republics’? Noticeably, ‘Strongly Agree’ and ‘Agree’ pie chart is positively skewed compared with the Strongly Disagree and Disagree responses which is very negatively skewed, showing that a negligible number of respondents concur that the electoral and democratic are epitomized as shown above.

Obviously, Politics of the Gambia takes place in a framework of a Presidential Republic, whereby the President of The Gambia is both Head of State and Head of Government, and of a Multi – Party system and Executive Power is exercised by the government. Legislative power is vested in both the government and parliament. However, over time and space the trend has changed. Electoral and democratic process as perceived in The Gambia's First and Second Republics was held by an individual, or as in an absolute leader who held power for

too long, thereby manipulating the electoral system to their advantage. Elections constitute an important element in modern liberal democracy. They serve as a viable means of ensuring the orderly process of leadership succession and change and an instrument of political authority and legitimization.

At a point in time over the past five decades one could have been tempted to say Africa has undergone political renewal, but it appears the democratic project is in crisis in a good number of African states. The evidence points to a gradual but worrying return into autocratic and authoritarian regimes under the cover of democracy.

It is easy to contemplate that yesterday's despots and military tyrants have resurfaced as today's "born-again" democrats to re-establish or perpetuate their rule, while in others, a new breed of budding autocrats are emerging. This shift towards democratic retreat tends to leave elections and the electoral process as the major victims as the electoral processes and structures are often characterized by careless manipulations. As a result of this, there is a tendency to regard elections not as a catalyst, but as a devalued element and a fading shadow of the democratic process in most African countries.

The lack of confidence in the electoral process in most African countries is undermining democracy in Africa. Joseph Schumpeter made the following observation, "Democracy means only that the people have the opportunity of accepting or refusing the men who are to rule them". Simply put, democracy is about conducting credible elections and choosing political leaders.

The most important elements of liberal democracy are: political participation of the citizens; competition among political agents, especially political parties; and the granting of a host of civil and political liberties, which include freedoms of expression, association and the press, sufficient to ensure the integrity of political competition and participation. Without these elements, there can be no confidence in the electoral process and hence, transparency and legitimacy will be questioned. But the big question mark is how many of these elements are often fully respected in African electoral processes?

## **RESEARCH QUESTION 2: What are the achievements and challenges of the First and Second Republics Gambia?**

The results obtained from the survey shown in **Table 4:14** indicated clearly the achievements and challenges of the First and Second Republics Gambia. The following were the observed achievements and challenges:

- Achievements of Political independence
- Infrastructural Development
- Relative democratic governance
- Recognition of Gender Equality
- Recognition of women in the democratic process
- Multi Party system
- Illiteracy and conservatism
- Lack of Political Education/Awareness
- Poor Political Culture

High poverty Level caused by laziness and dormancy

This conclusion is drawn because 48.0.“Strongly Agree” and “Agree”27.6 mean score of responses in a scale of 5.0 range was recorded which represents 75.6% of the respondents agree with the research question of ‘What are the achievements and challenges of The Gambia’s First and Second Republics? Observably, ‘Strongly Agree’ and ‘Agree’ pie chart is positively skewed compared with the Strongly Disagree and Disagree responses which is very negatively skewed, showing that high achievements and challenges of the two Republics.

Democracy in The Gambia just like in so many other African countries has made some remarkable achievements. In The Gambia it has ushered in multiparty system in the country which consequently opened the flood gate of party politics. The Gambia in the first republic was a glowing democratic example in the sub-region and by extension the entire sub-Saharan

Africa as its human records were superb and unmatched. This singular record made The Gambia to be chosen as the headquarters of African Centre for Peoples and Human Rights (ACPHR). The Second Republic Gambia has equally ushered in multiparty politics and brought about infrastructural democracy but its greatest challenge has been its poor human records. Were this not there or minimally observed and executed, the second republic's democracy would have been a world edifice and significantly a model for other democracies to copy world-wide, just because of its very satisfactory developmental records of performance. And as observed by Parasuraman,(2004:13-14), "A dictatorship that delivers basic needs to the citizens is no doubt better than a dictatorship that does not, but it is not good governance". If it is not good governance, then, it is not people-centric and popular. More is still required from the Jammeh administration to improve on its flaws for improved score cards.

Good governance is the ingredient that can unlock Gambia's enormous potential. Democracy and good governance not only create free, just, and more stable societies, they also create the traditions for sustainable, broad-based economic growth and development. Democracy and good governance are about much more than just holding elections. What happens before and after elections is equally, if not more important. That is why capable, reliable, and transparent institutions are keys to success. Strong parliaments, the rule of law, protections for human rights, independent judiciaries, free presses, and vibrant and dynamic civil societies as well as private sectors protect democracy and good governance from those who might weaken or trample upon it. The same Parasunaman,(2004: 13-14), also opines when he says "...regular elections alone do not translate into 'good governance'. Rule of law that is transparent, but unjust-such as Apathied- is certainly not 'good governance'. It is only when the three conditions of 'process', 'content' and 'deliverables' are fulfilled that good governance is said to become and of course equated to 'good governance'...".

#### **RESEARCH QUESTION 4**

**What considerable remedies would be practically suitable for improving the Gambia's electoral and democratic process?**

The results obtained from the survey shown in **Table 4:20** clearly indicate the considerable remedies that would be practically suitable for improving Gambia's electoral and democratic process?

The following remedies were suggested:

- Political enlightenment
- Total Overhauling of the democratic and electoral system
- Respecting the constitution and not floating its
- Applying Rule of Law principles
- Citizenship and Civic Education
- Institutional Training and strengthening
- Massive Literacy Campaign.

This conclusion is drawn because 74.5 for 'YES' response' mean score of responses in a scale of 5.0 range was recorded which also represents 74.5% of the respondents agrees with the researcher question of **"What considerable remedies would be practically suitable for improving the Gambia's electoral and democratic process?"**

Observably, 'YES' response pie chart is positively skewed compared with the 'NO' response which are very negatively skewed, showing the remedies that can be practicable in addressing democratic challenges and problems in The Gambia.

Democracy has come a long way in The Gambia especially in the First Republic under Sir Dawda Kairaba Jawara with the ushering of multi-party system. But despite the seemingly multi party political activities, the ruling Parties (parties in power) had dominated the political landscape outsmarting opposition parties. For the most part, changes came about because both civilian governments had failed to alleviate poverty, unemployment, and oppression and had not provided their citizens with such basic services as health, housing, and education as it ought to be. Administrative inefficiency, political corruption, economic mismanagement, poor political will and poverty of the mind as well as social decay of the

day had further undermined the authority of autocratic leaders and national institutions. These unpalatable conditions led to popular demands for democratic reforms throughout Africa.

For democracy to be reformed in The Gambia there should be extensive mobilization of civil society in order to consolidate its trajectory as it took place in many African countries, particularly Nigeria, Ghana, Kenya, South Africa, Republic of Benin Ivory Coast, Senegal just to name a few where credible elections have been held and power transited smoothly without violence or minimal violence and where civil society groups have been largely involved in the political process and election conducts through credible and constructive criticisms that correct and prevent the malaise of the day. Students, professional and civic associations, trade unions, church leaders, women's groups, human rights organizations, and others should spearheaded the cause of democracy, though, not by violence but through popular revolts that government in power must be sensitive to, to address. There should be greater political freedom and open electoral politics to increase the government's transparency and accountability in line with good governance and democratic ideals. More so, commitment to the principles and rule of democracy, respect for human rights, the full inclusion of women in society, economic, political, as well as religious and press freedoms are germane to democratic growth in The Gambia. If all these are embraced by the current regime, the existing trend will automatically change positive for The Gambia and by extension the sub-region.

#### **4:4 Chapter Conclusions**

This chapter has described the structure of analyses as well as details of analyses of both the qualitative and quantitative data applied in this treatise. It also discussed results obtained separately from the qualitative and quantitative phases of this mixed methods research. Qualitative data were generated concerning the opinions, beliefs and experiences of individuals concerning the electoral and democratic processes of The Gambia's First and Second Republics. The chapter is structured in two parts. Part I deals with quantitative analysis while Part II provides details of qualitative analysis and discussions of results from both phases.

Equally, it has also analyzed both the quantitative and qualitative data emanating from the research and has also appraised responses from Questionnaires distributed in all the Regions of the country and Semi Structured Interviews organized to elicit response from government



institutions/Ministries/Organization and across the Administrative/Educational regions of The Gambia and astute politicians, statesmen, whose opinions and views are generally venerated in the country. The questionnaire and structured interviews were designed to arrest the problems of the research in view as clearly visualized in the research questions and hypothesis. The major concern that triggered this research was to fish out the major trust of the electoral and democratic processes in The Gambia's First and Second Republics with a view to finding out how the two Republics had fared in their democratic agenda and process and offering relevant solutions that can mitigate electoral anomalies as noticeable in the final analysis.

For the analysis of this work, the statistical tools used were the use of the Measure of Central Tendency and Pearson's Product Moment Correlation Coefficient ( $r$ ). It further discusses results obtained separately from the qualitative and quantitative phases of the research. The chapter was structured in two parts. Part I deals with quantitative analysis, while Part II provides details of qualitative and discussions of results from both phases. Data in itself does not convey any significant meaning or information unless it is subjected to critical analysis and interpretations. In this vein, efforts were made to discuss and analyze the results accruing therein with concrete objectivity for generalized opinions.

More so, both quantitative and qualitative results were merged in order to understand the observable facts under investigation by triangulating both the figures from quantitative research and the details of qualitative result. The integration of both the quantitative and the qualitative result is relevant in research as it assisted in attaining expanded and elaborate understanding of the observable fact under investigation and also gives room for association of results. By merging both the quantitative and qualitative results improved confidence will be built in a singular conclusion where findings are substantiated across the diverse approaches but in the event that findings conflict, then greater knowledge and ideas can be gained; as interpretations and conclusions may be customized appropriately.

The research data collection and analyzed Quantitatively here involved the use of simple statistical tools (frequency distributions, means or modes, standards deviation/standard error of a sampling distribution, percentage tables and a 5-point Likert scale) to test predetermined hypotheses developed around themes and issues considered important to research experiences of participants as well as themes deriving from the investment, principal-agent, and stakeholder theories of this research investigation.

## **Chapter Five**

### **Findings, Conclusion and Recommendations**

#### **5.1 Introduction**

The Gambian general populace had over the years held divergent views over which of the Republics was better than the other. While many are of the view; especially the conservative elitists that Gambia's First Republic was better than the Second Republic, others, larger in number, especially women and youths, are of the apt views that the Second Republic Gambia was far better than the First Republic. Since the dawn of The Gambia's Second Republic the government in power has always echoed and re-echoed on National Television and Radio, Gambia Radio and Television Services (GRTS) that the First Republic was a period of marked poor infrastructural development and lukewarm attitude towards a sustainable general development of the country.

Based on these assumptions, as well as the essential quest for national development and comparative analysis of the polity, the idea of this research was hatched. Given this framework, therefore, this research was primarily intended to give an empirical assessment and analysis of the two Gambian Republics under Sir Dawda Kairaba Jawara and Alhaji Yahya AJJ Jammeh, from 1965- 2015. It is also the intention of this study to make appropriate recommendations on the ways forward for putting electoral and democracy processes on the right track in order to achieve more democratic dividends. As a guide in this research, two hypotheses were derived directly from the statement of problems which were formulated and tested as stated as follows:

#### **Hypothesis 1**

Null (Ho): The First Republic Gambia was not better than the Second Republic.

Alternative (HI): Null (Ho): The First Republic Gambia was better than the Second Republic.

#### **Hypothesis 2**

Null (Ho): High illiterate level is not responsible for the low democratic growth in The Gambia

Alternative (H1): High illiterate level is responsible for the low democratic growth in The Gambia.

As The Gambia faces the challenges of economic and political development, it is the objective of this treatise to conduct a comparative analysis of the electoral and democratic processes of The Gambia's First and Second Republics with a view to identify the trajectory of the electoral and democratic processes of the two Gambian governments and proffering appropriate remedies to address noticeable electoral and democratic flaws that hinder the viability of the country's growth. Specifically, the research questions were posed as follows:

- What are the electoral and democratic process of The Gambia's First and Second Republics?
- What are the achievements and challenges of the First and Second Republics Gambia?
- Would the low level of democracy in The Gambia be attributable to the predominant illiteracy in the country?
- What considerable remedies would be practically suitable for improving the Gambia's electoral and democratic process?

To this backdrop, task efforts included the formulation of a research model that was aimed at addressing the statement of research problem. To this effect, the researcher went round the nooks and crannies of the country; covering the five administrative regions of The Gambia, distributing questionnaires to elicit responses and also to interview nationalist leaders, eminent politicians, statesmen and leaders of thought during the semi- structured interview session; which was an important component of the research..

During the course of this research, a total of one hundred questionnaires (100) were prepared and distributed, while 98 of them were returned; which represents 98% of the relevant

population sample actually responded to the research instrument. The data collected was analyzed using a combination of both descriptive and quantitative statistical analysis, Measures of Central Tendency for hypothesis 2 and Pearson's Product-Moment Correlation coefficient (r), for Hypothesis 1 and one- way ANOVA, using the SPSS Version 20.5 software integrated with the Microsoft Spread Sheet (MSS).

Detailed descriptive analyses of the relevant variables involved and examined in this research work were graphically presented clearly in Chapter 4. The alpha level of 0.05 level of significance was used as the standard for rejecting or retaining hypotheses. The one-way ANOVA with two independent samples from the same population was also applied.

As well, this research adopted the multiple research method and the post modernism approach in cracking the iceberg of the study. This mixed methods research consisted of the quantitative phase and a qualitative phase in the overall research study. The justification for combining both the quantitative and qualitative research was for a clearer grasp of the phenomenon under investigation by triangulating both broad numeric trends from quantitative research and the details of qualitative research and to explore participant views for the sole purpose of using these views to develop and test survey instrument with a sample from the study population.

The Qualitative and quantitative data and findings were integrated at the point of data interpretation in this thesis, which means that data and findings from the qualitative phase were compared and supported with data, findings and conclusions from the quantitative phase. This investigative chronological strategy was useful not only for exploration, but also for expanding the overall results of the research.

In order to make a comparative analysis of the electoral and democratic process of the two Gambian Republics, the researcher sourced information from secondary sources such as from books, academic journals, magazines, archives, articles, bulletins etc which were analysed and integrated into the main body of the research. However, the research findings were evident as to which of the Republics were better, in terms of democratic dividends and returns. Based on my data and findings in the process of the study, my conclusions were drawn. This study is therefore predicated on the need to assess the electoral and democratic process of The Gambia's First and Second Republics.

This chapter is structured under three sections namely: **Findings, Conclusions and Recommendations:**

## 5.2 FINDINGS

The findings of this research show that:

1. Elections in The Gambia's First and Second Republics have been characterized with agitations, acrimony, contestations, bitterness calumny and rancor among others.
2. Gambia's elections are usually marred with a lot of flaws that lay no credibility for their fairness and transparency, due to political manipulations and maneuvering.
3. There exists the termination of open party politics, equal level playing ground and the confinement of political participation, usually within the framework of a single party.
4. The Gambian Presidents at different Republics have respectively devised means during their individual regimes to perpetuate a prolonged rule over their subjects.
5. The Electoral pattern of "*Drums and Marbles*" in The Gambia is a better method of casting votes, given the level of illiteracy and this has yielded positive results to attaining peace in the country.
6. Opposition Parties in The Gambia are merely allowed to function for constitutional requirements for multiparty elections to hold periodically and not really for them to have a grip of the political process.
7. The Gambia suffers from many grievances such as the poor human rights situation, mal-administration and a de facto autocratic political system.
8. The entrenchment of multiparty system in the First Republic helped to boost the democratic image of The Gambia under Sir Dawda Jawara.
9. The low level democratic growth in The Gambia is attributable to massive illiteracy in the country.
10. Gambia's electoral and democratic system (process) needs overhauling and total re-organization to boost genuine democratization and good governance.
11. That there should be more emphasis on institutional strengthening than personality strengthening in The Gambia for an existent enabling system that allows and guarantees genuine state-building
12. That the government should respect the provisions of the constitution and rule of law to advance democracy and practice of good governance.

13. In general, the Second Republic Gambia is far better than the First Republic in terms of infrastructural development but lags behind border line pass in terms of human rights records and practice of the rule of law.
14. There is a hope that with continued and persistent checkmating of the political awkwardness inherent in the political process through scholarly works and research, political awareness and consciousness towards institution-building would trigger genuine democratic survival in the near future.

### **5.3 CONCLUSIONS**

The major objective of this research apart from assessing the electoral and democratic process of The Gambia since independence is also to offer practicable solutions that can transform democracy in the polity for national growth and development. Democracy has become the political and economic goods of our time and if they are not packaged very well will have serious/critical implications for a small country like The Gambia with lean resources; as they may not participate as a significant partner in the global arena. This implies that democracy must be modernized, refined and made competitive in aligning with the rules of engagement.

Democracy has various dimensional effects on The Gambia's political trajectory such as the enlightenment and political education of the electorates, interest articulation and aggregation, economic growth and development; democratic dividends vis-à-vis infrastructural development. Until the adequate understanding of all the multi-dimensional nature of electoral and democratic processes in The Gambia is put into proper place and brought into play, genuine electoral and democratic processes will continue to elude and mar the country.

Elections and democratic process in The Gambia are a time of despair for contesting candidates, but more so for the general citizenry whose efforts to seek new leadership for their respective constituencies have been a worthless effort in recent years. It is a time of anxiety for a number of stakeholders. It is also a time when incumbent political ruling elites take stock of what achievements they will have attained for the citizenry and a time of beckoning and wondering whether they will survive the electoral encounter engaged to them by the Opposition Party.

For the Opposition Party, it is in most cases a time when they will need to prove during campaign that they can do better than the ruling party. It is also a time for the opposition to endure all that comes with an uneven political playing field such as harassment of opposition political leaders, party militants and their members as well as the abuse of state machinery to further intimidate, and in some cases, murder supporters of opposition political parties. For the electorate, it is again a time when they have to be fed on a diet of lies, misconceptions and falsehoods akin to folktales, mostly figments of imagination to impress upon the electorate.

The significance of elections as a critical element of democracy cannot be overstated. But the pre-occupation with elections at the expense of other elements in the democratization process often defeats the whole purpose of the democratization project. Like stated elsewhere in this research, for the fact that elections are almost assured of on regular basis does not take away the equally important need to focus on elements that can ensure sustainable democracy. It is axiomatic that, recognizing the interests exhibited by development partners and the international community on elections, most ruling elites have reduced elections in the Gambia and Africa to a mere formality which is held not only as a means to democratic consolidation, but as a reassurance to the international donors and community that the country is democratic when actually it is not. The notions that “better a sham election than no election at all” has taken the center stage in most African countries, with The Gambia as no exception.

The stakes that accompany the electoral process especially the cost of winning or losing elections has led to a new development namely electoral and political conflicts. Increasingly, electoral conflict is fast emerging in Gambia as a new area of conflict and a new manifestation of intra-state conflict. Over the last two decades, The Gambia has witnessed electoral violence with far reaching ramifications, such as the detention of political opponents, imprisonment in some extreme cases, jail. On several occasions the ruling parties in The Gambia and main Opposition parties’ militants have always clashed. In 2011, the opposition parties boycotted elections in The Gambia. The linkage between elections and political violence points to serious problems in terms of democratic assistance and sustainability in Africa in general.

Decades of single party system in a supposedly multi –party system whereby the ruling party perpetuates in power for decades has made the majority of the population to see elections and democratic process in The Gambia as a ‘fulfillment of all righteousness’. This is because the

outcome of an election is always known before the real elections are conducted. Suffice me to say here that individuals' political experiences of elections over time shaped their own democratic attitudes and behavior, and how, in turn, has this shaped the expectations and demands they bring to the electoral process.

As elections are a necessary but not a sufficient condition for a democratization process to be successful, it is crucial that other factors in the political culture of African countries are taken into consideration as well as (also the case in studies on elections in the US, Europe) anywhere else. Specific traits in local political traditions impact on the success and durability of elections: cultural notions of authority and accountability, levels of economic development, the extent of 'neo-patrimonial' networks, civil liberties, gender relations, and religious values regarding the political process and community representation. The role of the judicial system in shaping and regulating the democratic and institutional context of elections is also highly relevant and paramount.

International factors have played an important role in supporting African democracy. Since the end of the Cold War, the global climate has become decidedly more uncomfortable for non-democratic governments, which are increasingly deprived of legitimacy and resources, and trends within Africa have reinforced this. South Africa's own political transition has given the region a dominant power whose ideals and strategic interests both are served by promoting democracy and human rights. The launch of the AU and its adoption of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD)—an initiative that identifies “good governance” as an essential “condition for sustainable development” and “practice of the rule of law” as an ingredient for “political sanity”—embody the thrust of South Africa's regional policy. While the Zimbabwean crisis starkly illustrates how difficult it is to dislodge a skillful and intransigent dictator, however, democratic norms are much more influential in Africa than they were two decades ago.

Meanwhile, emerging evidence seems to confirm that, in African countries where democracy has been established, states have tended to perform better as agents of economic development. These effects seem to hinge on the benefits of imposing institutional checks on leaders' discretionary authority, backed by the ability to remove governments that fail to improve the well-being of their people. By contrast, the region's most catastrophic developmental failures—including Zimbabwe's current plunge—have only spun out of



control when constitutional checks and balances have been absent or dismantled. Democratically elected governments have no monopoly on economic insight, but under democratic regimes “bad economics” eventually becomes “bad politics,” giving government's strong incentives to change course. In light of Africa's diversity, any sweeping generalization about prospects for democracy and development would be misleading.

For democracy in The Gambia, many questions remain unanswered; many others remain subject to dispute. Democratic dividends have not been fully harnessed; as the teeming population is marginalized in terms of returns for political participation and engagement. In the present democratic dispensation in The Gambia there has been growth without development as the country's living standard remained stagnant or rose slightly. The tale of democracy has all been woes from every angle in The Gambia. The country has predominantly remained rural and underdeveloped as the resources meant for its well-being and development is diverted into non-prioritized agenda by the political warlords.

Undoubtedly, democracy has had far reaching effects on The Gambia in so many ways and is still affecting the country. The good thing is that democracy is being experimented in the country, while at worse; it is not played according to the rules of the game. This study has revealed that the present primary roles of electoral and democratic process are highly flawed and manipulated to dismember opposition parties and scheme them out of political contest. The present Gambian government has an ambivalent history of democracy in the eyes of international community. It can also be concluded that the deep-seated corruption in Gambia's Republics (covering the period under investigation) the selfish behavior of some of the political leaders to sit tight in office for over 20 good years even when they had obviously outlived their usefulness in the eyes of their people, are attributable to the selfish desires of leaders who see power as a means of personal aggrandizement. The politicians in The Gambia's have over the years ‘become more desperate and daring in taking and retaining power: more reckless and greed in their use and abuse of power; and more intolerant of opposition. To achieve their inordinate interest, these politicians manipulate the illiterate masses and use state machinery and institutions to make good their political ambition.

Presidential elections in many African countries as also in The Gambia are very competitive. As in many parts of the world, presidents in Africa wield substantial power. The influence that comes with the office makes it very attractive. Herein lies the problem, especially if an incumbent president who is eligible for re-election attempts to utilize all means necessary to

win an additional term. There are no concerns if electoral rules are followed. However, if the rules are broken, serious consequences result at both a national and a regional level. In the interest of international peace and security as well as in the interest of human rights, democracy and the rule of law, measures must be taken to guard against any interference with presidential elections.

The entrenchment of democracy in the country has come with many challenges. Being a predominantly illiterate community, many are not clear of what democracy portends for them. Democracy has become a clock that tells a people their historical time of the day. It is the compass that nations now use to locate themselves on the map of the world. It has become a mirror with which nations are politically viewed and economically rewarded for observing the rules of democracy by comity of nations. A peoples' democratic setting tells them who they are. What they have been, where they have been, where they are now, but most importantly, where they still must go. Democratic government has become the norms and values of our contemporary period. Tell us the nature of your democracy and we shall tell you who you are. Given this present circumstances of democracy, it is germane that the Gambian government follows the pattern of the game in order to remain relevant in the comity of nations.

Improving electoral processes is vital. The source of problems in recent disputed elections in Africa has been weaknesses in the electoral processes. Elections observation, often focused on voting day, is gradually taking a wider perspective. Beyond recording irregularities at polling stations, a growing number of observers are paying attention to other elements, including the media coverage of the campaigns and the voter registration process. The aim is to ensure equal access to public and private media for opposition candidates and incumbents, as well as to increase the credibility of the voters list. This shift is important. An election is not an event, but a process. There is a need therefore to monitor what happens months if not years before elections are conducted.

Despite the central importance of elections in building and solidifying democratic societies, analysts point out; their quality depends on progress in other areas as well. Good elections are directly linked to the independence of the judicial system, a competitive media environment, the ability of civil society to be involved in public life and a political landscape that allows free expression of diverging views. Beyond such issues, a wider use of proportional representation in African elections is very crucial. Such an arrangement can bring more

peaceful transitions by lowering incentives for protest and violence from those most afraid to lose. In such arrangements, unlike in football games, victory will cease to mean that the winner takes all.

Finally, it can be concluded here that the findings of this research work will serve as sources of information regarding the Gambia's democratic science and also can serve as a useful guide in the decision making process, thereby providing a profound background for the development and improvement of electoral and democratic process.

## **5.4 RECOMMENDATIONS**

Just like any other African country, The Gambia has been practicing democracy since the 20<sup>th</sup> century and has continued to do so up to the present dispensation with many flaws marring the electoral and democratic process. Though, democracy has come to stay in The Gambia but its basic principles and rules are not thoroughly observed and operationalized by the stakeholders, especially the political class. However, we cannot wish democracy and its attendant flaws away since it is the order of the day.

Against this background statement and in view of the reviews, surveys conducted, and findings drawn from it, suggestions made by respondents and interview panel, the above conclusions and the need to move The Gambia forward democratically in its development agenda, the following recommendations are put forward in this research :

This study recommends that for The Gambia to overcome her present social, economic, political, health, education woes, etc., there is the urgent need for the people and the leadership of this country to create a conducive environment for democracy to exist and thrive. This would be interwoven in good governance, rule of law, accountability and transparency. This multi- dimensional approach to tackling the problems of democracy would help give the country a new face-lift dotted with smooth political landscape for all and sundry irrespective of creed, ethnicity, social status and political affiliations.

The Electoral and Democratic process of The Gambia needs total overhauling. Democratic principles and practices, according to our findings have not been fully followed. The electoral process has been marked with many noticeable innumerable irregularities that sent negative signals about The Gambia. Elections, a hallmark of democracy and process for political

transitions, have often served as triggers of violence. Its violence slows the consolidation of democratic norms, reduces the prospects for long-term, durable peace and stability, and undermines economic growth. Thus, managing the conflict that accompanies elections is critical to build strong governing institutions and create durable peace. Countries with strong authoritarian legacies or deep ethnic cleavages—common in many African countries—find it difficult to manage political opposition. Yet social, political, and economic tensions can be managed so that electoral processes can help lay the foundation for sustained good governance.

Since The Gambia is a predominantly illiterate community, there is the crying need to embark upon mass literacy campaign and political enlightenment / education. Democratic education infuses the learning process with these fundamental values of our society. Democratic education sees young people not as passive recipients of knowledge, but rather as active co-creators of their own learning. They are not the products of an education system, but rather valued participants in a vibrant learning community. Democratic education begins with the premise that everyone is unique, so each of us learns in a different way. By supporting the individual development of each young person within a caring community, democratic education helps young people learn about themselves, engage with the world around them, and become positive and contributing members of society.

The media are essential to democracy, and a democratic election is impossible without media. A free and fair election is not only about the freedom to vote and the knowledge of how to cast a vote, but also about a participatory process where voters engage in public debate and have adequate information about parties, policies, candidates and the election process itself in order to make informed choices. Furthermore, media act as a crucial watchdog to democratic elections, safeguarding the transparency of the process. Indeed, a democratic election with no media freedom, or stifled media freedom, would be a contradiction in terms and a mockery of democracy and good governance in totality.

In order to fulfill their roles, the media need to maintain a high level of professionalism, accuracy and impartiality in their coverage. Regulatory frameworks can help ensure high standards. Laws and regulations should guarantee fundamental freedoms essential to democracy, including freedom of information and expression, as well as participation. Meanwhile, provisions such as requiring government media, funded out of public money, to

give fair coverage and equitable access to opposition parties, help ensure appropriate media behavior during elections.

Government institutions rather than personalities must be strengthened for democracy to make a head way in The Gambia. Government institutions as evidenced from the review of related literature will also need reorganization and empowerment. Lack of power is a universal and basic characteristic of poverty. Poverty is not solely a lack of income, but rather it is also characterized by a vicious cycle of powerlessness, stigmatization, segregation, discrimination, exclusion and material deprivation, which all mutually reinforce each other. Developing an inter-linkages approach can improve opportunities for more effective national cooperation, inclusive policies, poverty alleviation, improved national synergies, and stronger and more sustainable partnerships with even the private sector. The main driver of empowerment is economic: Governments' main role should be to deliver inclusive, pro-poor growth. In this approach, both the quantity and quality of a country's growth are decisive in empowering poor people, both directly, in terms of liberating them from hunger and want, and indirectly, by providing them with the means to acquire education, voice and agency (Nnaocha, 2015).

Equality and participatory democracy in a nation should be one of the bench marks of democratic dividends. In the last two decades, as democracies have been established in Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe, and Latin America, concerns have been raised regarding the extent to which citizens participate in public decisions. Merely crafting democratic institutions from above is not enough, it is argued. Unless citizens have faith in these institutions and unless they engage in large numbers with diverse processes of self-governance, democracy might end up being no more than an empty shell, devoid of substance, and often providing merely a thin cover for dictators and authoritarian regimes. Higher political participation does not always guarantee that democracy will flourish. But governments can be more effectively held to account, constitutionally guaranteed rights can be enforced, and individuals' and communities' demands can be better represented within the policy process when ordinary citizens participate actively in the politics of their country. As more people are drawn into the business of democratic decision making – and fewer groups get left out – the democratic process gets legitimized across a wider domain.

In The Gambia, Opposition parties should be given a fair play ground. Opposition parties in a democratic setting make democracy quite interesting as they compel the ruling party to sit or face the dire consequences. Political parties are social organizations with a representative function, they embody particular interests, aggregate and communicate them to political and government institutions. Political parties epitomize the fighting spirit; a readiness for political action and confrontation. It is the only avenue to institutionally organize around different views of society. In modern society, political parties in opposition have a crucial function in the state and future of governance in any particular nation.

Democracy stands opposed to the idea of common will by all citizens in a state. Modern mass societies are characterized by a variety of interests, world views and beliefs; as such, no single government or political organization can embody the interests of all society. Governance in the 21<sup>st</sup> century yearns for diverse political parties thriving towards common principles of freedom, justice and solidarity, for different causes and different groupings of society. It is now harder for homogeneity in any system of governance. A modern re-shared principle of term limits for presidents' stems from the premise that societies evolve, interests shift and change is inevitable. It is important to note the synonymous nature of ideological progression and the rule of law.

This study is recommending that The Gambian constitution should be reviewed and electoral reforms carried out. The idea of the president not having term limit is undemocratic and archaic. The question of how to best reflect the will of the people in a country's leadership cuts to the very heart of democracy. And the argument that people should be free to vote for whomever they want – even if that candidate has already been in power for two terms or longer – has some persuasive power. However, all democracies face problems of representation, and emerging democracies in particular tend to face high levels of inequality and authoritarian legacies – and with regards to these challenges, term limits offer a promising solution. Since democracy has become the political fashion of our modern time, the term limit of any would- be President of The Gambia should not be more than two terms if the country would have political redemption.

Authoritarian legacies in Africa have their roots in colonial state apparatuses, which were designed to facilitate resource extraction, and relied on state control over its subjects. The state became a bastion of wealth and a locus of exclusionary power, so access to the state

guaranteed access to resources and security, usually at the expense of excluded groups. Term limits render violence unnecessary by ensuring that newcomers have a real chance at challenging incumbents electorally. Similarly, the idea of the President having non –elected members in the National Assembly renders democracy meaningless.

The Independent Electoral Commission should be given free hands to conduct elections. The administration of elections occupies an important and strategic place in the entronement of democracy. Constitutionally empowered to organize, undertake and supervise all elections and electoral processes, with a mandate to ensure transparency and accountability. Their national assignments call for seriousness of purpose, honesty and integrity. It is plausible to argue that most of these elections failed because of lack of confidence in the body which facilitated the elections. The electoral umpires in all these elections have always been accused of being biased and partisan always in favor of the ruling party. Although most African states recognize voting rights in theory, an examination of what states do in practice paints a different picture. It shows that the process faces several challenges as a result of human interference.

The Gambia adopts both Presidential and Unitary system of government altogether. Suffice me to say that unitary system of government is germane for the country, given its small size. But the Presidential system seemingly noticeable in The Gambia Government (GG) structure is very expensive for a relatively poor country like The Gambia. As small as the Gambia is, its government's structures and Ministries are too many and this means the government would be spending a lot of money on these structures and ministries/departments. Money that would have been channeled into other important sectors of the economy is used to maintain these structures and service its personnel and tools/equipment. As much as possible budget deficits that characterize Gambian government budgeting system since independence should be done away with. *The Gambian government spends a lot of money on the citizens' behalf, on its staff, offices, vehicles, fuels and the like, and NONE of this goes to build more power plants, roads, housing schemes, hospitals and welfare projects.* Each ministry has at least one minister and in some cases deputy minister, like the ministries of Agriculture and Works and Infrastructural Development, with a Permanent Secretary, Deputy Permanent Secretary, and on average 3 directors. The Ministers and Permanent Secretaries have personal assistants, special assistants and special advisers. Each of these expects to drive an official car to work, complete with police orderlies and other file carriers. Then they will need houses, furniture

and running costs of the vehicles and utilities. The costs of all these somehow find their way into the overhead budgets of the ministries at the expense of tax payers' money. These expenses can be pruned to mitigate on sustainable infrastructural development and growth, while generating employment for the teaming- working class for a stable polity and robust economy as is the case in Singapore.

Finally, the Gambian government should establish Centre for Democratic Studies (CDS). This body would be charged essentially with the responsibilities of acquainting the electorates of democratic principles, rule of law, fundamental human rights, civil liberty, electoral and democratic patterns, and electorates' power to choose a government of their own, while reducing political illiteracy and conservatism. Among other things, they (the electorates) should be familiarized with workings and structures of government and what constitutes and defines national interest. Democracy proclaims civil equality for all citizens and tends to concede them political equality. But it is incapable of creating natural equality if not played according to the rule of the game as had in advanced western countries and America.

## **5.5 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY**

This treatise has been largely carried out ostensibly to make a comparative analysis of The Gambia's First and Second Republics from 1965 to 2015. In the process of carrying out this research, the researcher had limited time frame and resources to embark upon this project. Equally, there were poor transport facilities and inaccessibility of some of the rural areas of the five administrative and political regions of the country. As a result, it became obvious that those areas could not be covered. Also some of the respondents/interviewees were critical of this research and as such, could not freely give out information needed. This could be for fear of political victimization by the ruling class. Equally, some highly placed politicians, statesmen and social critics alike could not feel comfortable granting interview to the researcher.

In the near future, potential areas of research could be in the area of looking at "why the ruling power/party stays in government for too long in The Gambian polity".

However, the researcher was able to surmount all these identified limitations and went ahead to complete the work fruitfully. I am submitting here that in the near future Gambians



(respondents) should try to be research friendly; as the outcomes of research works can be useful for stakeholders in building a virile system or to achieve desirous and meaningful objectives. This research, no doubt, has been very productive, fruitful, inspirational and interactive! If you want to succeed do not fear huddles.

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## APPENDIX A - St. Clements University's Letter of Introduction



Reg. No. E14905

Web Site: [www.stclements.edu](http://www.stclements.edu) Email: [admin@stclements.edu](mailto:admin@stclements.edu)

Registered Office: 2<sup>nd</sup> Floor, Yellowman & Sons Building, Off Old Airport Road, Grand Turk  
Turks & Caicos Islands - British West Indies

To Whom it May Concern

Felix Oyejide Omotosho is enrolled into the St Clements University  
Doctor of Philosophy program.

His research dissertation is titled "An Assessment of the Electoral  
and Democratization Process in The Gambia's First and Second  
Republics 1965 to 2015: A Comparative Analysis".

St Clements University would appreciate any assistance you may  
be able to give him in researching the information for this  
dissertation.

If you have any questions please do not hesitate to email me.

Yours faithfully

Dr. David Le Comu  
President

Dated: 1<sup>st</sup> September 2015

## **APPENDIX B - COVER LETTER**

### **A Cover Letter for the Survey**

**PhD Comparative Political Studies (St. Clements University, British West Indies)**

Survey Questionnaire on An Assessment of The Electoral and Democratization Process in The Gambia's First and Second Republics (1965-2015).A Comparative Analysis.

Dear Sir/ Madam

I am a PhD student at St. Clements University, British West Indies, under the supervision of Professor (Dr.) David Le Cornu. I am currently undertaking a research on Comparative Politics that considers **An Assessment of The Electoral and Democratization Process in The Gambia's First and second Republics (1965- 2015).**

This questionnaire is required to generate primary data for analysis on the subject of study. It is important to know your views regarding The Electoral and democratization Process in The Gambia's First and Second Republics, 1965-2015, using a comparative survey analysis and expected to yield valuable information for sustainable development in The Gambia and its Political System and ideology.

I am therefore writing to request for your co-operation as I would be grateful if you could complete the questionnaire and return it to me.

I assure you that the data and information provided will remain strictly confidential and will be used only for the purpose of this research. Please turn overleaf for the main survey questionnaire questions.

Thank you for your time and co-operation.

Yours faithfully,

Oyejide Felix Omotosho

(Research Student)

Email: [ofomotosho@utg.edu.gm/omotoshofelix@yahoo.com](mailto:ofomotosho@utg.edu.gm/omotoshofelix@yahoo.com)

St. Clements University, West Indies

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## APPENDIX C – Questionnaire

### GCS SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE

**Part A: Biographic data of Respondent** (Your response is strictly for this research and will be treated anonymously)

**Please, fill in as appropriate**

Administrative Region: (circle the one applicable to you) 1    2    3    4    5

Institutional Affiliation (Department/Ministry): .....

Occupation: .....

Position Held: .....

#### **Part B**

**Please respond to these questions as you deem appropriate. (Please tick ☐ as applicable.**

Scale	5	=	Strongly Agree
	4	=	Agree
	3	=	Strongly Disagree
	2	=	Disagree
	1	=	Undecided

1. Elections are instruments of democracy building to the extent that they give the electorates legitimate authority to choose their leaders.

- |                       |        |
|-----------------------|--------|
| (a) Strongly Agree    | (    ) |
| (b) Agree             | (    ) |
| (c) Strongly Disagree | (    ) |
| (d) Disagree          | (    ) |
| (e) Undecided         | (    ) |

2. Elections in The Gambia's First and Second Republics have been characterized with agitations, acrimony, contestations, bitterness and rancor among others.

- (a) Strongly Agree ( )
- (b) Agree ( )
- (c) Strongly Disagree ( )
- (d) Disagree ( )
- (e) Undecided ( )

3. Gambia's elections are usually marred with a lot of flaws that lay no credibility for their fairness and transparency.

- (a) Strongly Agree ( )
- (b) Agree ( )
- (c) Strongly Disagree ( )
- (d) Disagree ( )
- (e) Undecided ( )

4. There are widespread removal of constitutional rights and protection from political Opponents in The Gambia electoral and democratic system

- (a) Strongly Agree ( )
- (b) Agree ( )
- (c) Strongly Disagree ( )
- (d) Disagree ( )
- (e) Undecided ( )

5. There exist the termination of open party politics and the confinement of political participation, usually within the framework of a single party.

- (a) Strongly Agree ( )
- (b) Agree ( )
- (c) Strongly Disagree ( )
- (d) Disagree ( )
- (e) Undecided ( )

6. The Gambian Presidents at different Republics have respectively devised means during their individual regimes to perpetuate a prolonged rule over their subjects.

- (a) Strongly Agree ( )
- (b) Agree ( )
- (c) Strongly Disagree ( )
- (d) Disagree ( )
- (e) Undecided ( )

7. The Electoral pattern of “*Drums and Marbles*” in The Gambia is a better method of casting votes, given the level of illiteracy.

- (a) Strongly Agree ( )
- (b) Agree ( )
- (c) Strongly Disagree ( )
- (d) Disagree ( )
- (e) Undecided ( )

8. Opposition Parties in The Gambia are merely allowed to function for constitutional requirements for multiparty elections to hold.

- a) Strongly Agree ( )
- (b) Agree ( )
- (c) Strongly Disagree ( )
- (d) Disagree ( )
- (e) Undecided ( )

9. Corruption in The Gambia is a critical factor in the development of The Gambia’s democracy.

- (a) Strongly Agree ( )
- (b) Agree ( )
- (c) Strongly Disagree ( )
- (d) Disagree ( )



(e) Undecided ( )

10. The Gambia suffers from many grievances such as the poor human right situation, mal-administration and a de facto autocratic political system.

(a) Strongly Agree ( )

(b) Agree ( )

(c) Strongly Disagree ( )

(d) Disagree ( )

(e) Undecided ( )

11. The Gambia has not experienced stable and normal democratic governance from 1965 to Present.

(a) Strongly Agree ( )

(b) Agree ( )

(c) Strongly Disagree ( )

(d) Disagree ( )

(e) Undecided ( )

12. One main achievement of the democratic process in the First Republic was the successful granting of independence from the British in 1965.

(a) Strongly Agree ( )

(b) Agree ( )

(c) Strongly Disagree ( )

(d) Disagree ( )

(e) Undecided ( )

13. The entrenchment of multiparty system in the First Republic helped to boost the democratic image of The Gambia

a) Strongly Agree ( )

- (b) Agree ( )
- (c) Strongly Disagree ( )
- (d) Disagree ( )
- (e) Undecided ( )

14. The greatest achievement of the Second Republic Gambia was the recognition of women  
in the democratic dispensation

- a) Strongly Agree ( )
- (b) Agree ( )
- (c) Strongly Disagree ( )
- (d) Disagree ( )
- (e) Undecided ( )

15. The various infrastructural development of Gambia's Second Republic are all  
dividends of democracy

- a) Strongly Agree ( )
- (b) Agree ( )
- (c) Strongly Disagree ( )
- (d) Disagree ( )
- (e) Undecided ( )

16. The low level democratic growth in The Gambia is attributable to massive illiteracy  
in the country

- a) Strongly Agree ( )
- (b) Agree ( )
- (c) Strongly Disagree ( )

(d) Disagree ( )

(e) Undecided ( )

17. Democracy postulates enlightenment and by and large a blessing to any growing political community while illiteracy, which implies ignorance, is a menace.

a) Strongly Agree ( )

(b) Agree ( )

(c) Strongly Disagree ( )

(d) Disagree ( )

(e) Undecided ( )

### **Part C**

**(Please tick ☐ only Yes or No in this section)**

18. The Gambia's electoral and democratic system (process) needs overhauling

☐ Yes ☐ No

19. There should be more emphasis on institutional strengthening than personality strengthening in The Gambia ☐ Yes ☐ No

20. The government should respect the provisions of the constitution and rule of law to advance democracy ☐ Yes ☐ No

21. Government should as a matter of concern initiate citizenship and civic education training

in order to promote democracy in the country

☐ Yes ☐ No

**Thank you for filling this Questionnaire**

## APPENDIX D - Interview Cover Letter

**PhD Comparative Politics (St. Clements University, British West Indies)**

Semi- Structured interview on **An Assessment of the Electoral and Democratization Process in The Gambia's First and Second Republics (1965-2015).**

To: Prof./Dr/Rev./Mr./Mrs.....

Date .....

Dear Sir/Madam

I am a PhD student at St. Clements University, British West Indies, under the supervision of Professor Yasmin Yusof. I am currently undertaking a research on Economic History that considers **An Assessment of the Electoral and Democratization Process in The Gambia's First and Second Republics (1965-2015).**

I would be very grateful if you could participate in an interview session regarding this research. These questions are required to generate primary data for analysis on the subject of study and it is important to know your views/thoughts regarding **An Assessment of the Electoral and Democratization Process in The Gambia's First and Second Republics (1965-2015).**

Results from this research will be of great assistance to policy makers and stakeholders toward the economic development of The Gambia.

The date, time and venue of the interview could be arranged at your convenience.

Thank you for your time and cooperation

Yours sincerely

**Felix Oyejide Omotosho**

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## **APPENDIX E Interview Questions**

Question 1: What are the electoral and democratization processes in The Gambia's First and Second Republics?

Question 2: What are the Patterns of the Electoral and Democratization Process in The Gambia's First and Second Republics?

Question 3: What achievements and challenges are attributable to both first and second republic Gambia?

Question 4: Would the Low Level of Democracy in The Gambia be Attributable to the Predominant Illiteracy in the Country?

Question 5: What are the possible remedies for the Electoral and Democratic flaws noticeable in The Gambia?

## **APPENDIX F      List of Interviewees, Place of interview and Dates Interviewed**

1.      Abdu-Karim Kamara – University of The Gambia, Brikama Campus; 6/01/2016.
2.      Dr. Fred Ozor, Ebonyi State University, Abakaliki; Interview by Skype on 21/11/2015.
3.      Dr. Ismailia Ceesay, Lecturer, University of The Gambia, Brikama Campus; 21/02/2016.
4.      Prof. Bubaccar Senghore, Ministry of Higher Education, Science and Technology, Banjul; 06/06/2015.
5.      Class of Democracy and Electoral Politics (Pol. 105), 1<sup>st</sup> Semester, 2014/2015, Department of Political Science, University of The Gambia, Brikama Campus.
6.      Dr. Cajetan Ifeanyi Nnaocha, Head, History Department, University of the Gambia, Brikama Campus; 03/03/2016.
7.      Dr. Ebraimah Lowe, Head, Department of Political Science, University of The Gambia, Brikama Campus; 07/01/2016.
8.      Dr. Halifa Salla, Forooya Newspaper, The Gambia; 15/03/2016.
9.      Her Excellency, Mrs. Esther John Audu, The Former High commissioner of Nigeria in The Gambia.....Private Residence at Cape Point, Bakau; 06/04/2014.
10.     Musa Mustapha, Chief Editor, Voice Newspaper, The Gambia; 06/01/2016.